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Sister Nations in Distress – “Frændþjóðir í neyð”, April 1940: 
 
And from the fire and destruction by the shells, and the oppression of the dominators, 
shall our sister nations rise, free and sovereign. And it will be their own inner 
civilization, which will carry them forward to that fortune. And it is the sympathy 
and help of the free peoples all over the world – direct and indirect – which gives 
them the strength and endurance to await that hour, unbroken, undefeated.(a) 
Hallgrímur Jónasson. “Frændþjóðir í neyð”. Alþýðublaðið. 24.04.1940, p. 3. 
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Foreword 
 
The contemporaries in 1939-1940 are not the only ones guilty of finding the incredible black-
and-white tales of heroes and villains during the Soviet Invasion of Finland fascinating. I for 
one have harboured such a fascination for a long time. My professional interest for the conflict 
in Finland began in the spring of 2012, during my undergraduate studies at the University of 
Iceland. In my BA thesis there, I laid the groundwork for this study, with an overview look into 
the Icelandic reactions to the invasion and an archival research into the Icelandic Finland Relief 
as well as portraying the four Icelandic volunteers who went to Finland.  
What struck me then was the apparent heat of the Winter War discourse in the Icelandic press 
and I imagined that the anger and the judgements which characterised both the non-communist 
and the communist press regarding that particular subject must be a manifest of something in 
Icelandic society. Reading through the newspapers discussions around April 9, 1940, when the 
Germans invaded Denmark and Norway, I was, again, struck by the apparent ‘ease’ observable 
in the initial news stories. Thus, this study began with a hypothesis in mind. I set out to see if 
the heated reactions to the invasion of Finland in Iceland were based on anti-communism and 
Russophobia rather than sympathy and brotherhood with Finland. Over the course of this work, 
I came to change the focus of the research, although this basic observation; the difference of 
the two cases – the fervour of the Finnish case and the ease of the Norwegian case, has remained 
in the back of my head. 
I want to give my thanks to Rakel, both for her support reading through this paper and for 
taking care of our two young children for the last few hectic days before the paper was finished.   
 
 
Trondheim 
May 2015 
Andri Jónsson  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The Icelanders observed the horrors of the Second World War isolated by the Atlantic Ocean 
and shielded by Allied military protection. The war years, nevertheless, became one of the most 
formative and consequential period in the modern history of Iceland. After years of depression, 
poverty and labour unrest, the Icelanders had become a wealthy and constitutionally 
independent nation by the end of the war; and an important ally of the Western Powers for 
decades to come. Such goes the typical narrative of the history of the Second World War in 
Iceland. This study takes place during the short period after the war began and before the 
country was drawn into it. That period was the unusually cold winter of 1939-1940 and the 
following spring, also known as the Phoney War period, when the young and defenceless 
Icelandic microstate held on to lingering hopes of remaining neutral. 
The Phoney War period, from September 1939 until May 1940, was a time of great 
uncertainty for the neutral nations of Europe. People could only guess how long the world war 
would last, where it would be fought, by whom and who would come out on top. Some people 
envisioned a quick Allied victory over Germany and others feared that the unholy alliance of 
Hitler and Stalin, forged in the autumn of 1939, would have the consequences of bringing 
Europe under the two dictators. Much to their discontent, the neutral Nordic Countries were 
swiftly drawn into to the centre of the belligerents' focus. By the end of the Phoney War period, 
all of the Nordic Countries, except Sweden, had been invaded by each of the three belligerent 
great powers: First, Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union; then Denmark and Norway by 
Nazi-Germany and finally Iceland by Great Britain. 
1.1 Subject and Problem 
This goal of this research is to give a glimpse of Icelandic society during this last winter of the 
interwar era by delving into the Icelandic press and its reactions to the invasions listed above. 
The Soviet Invasion of Finland in November 1939 and the subsequent Winter War, which lasted 
until March 1940, caused loud reactions in Iceland. The Icelandic mass-media and the political 
elite displayed almost unanimous expression of sympathy with the Finnish nation and 
disapproval with the Soviet Union. The reactions to the Invasion of Denmark and Norway in 
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the following month were also of a sympathetic nature but even though these nations shared 
more cultural identities with the Icelanders (and a monarch, as did the Danes) the reactions here 
appear from a first glance less heated.  
The research’s aim is to describe, analyse and compare the Icelandic reactions to the German 
and Soviet invasions in Scandinavia. I have chosen to limit the research as much as possible to 
the cases of Finland and Norway only. There are primarily two reasons for this choice: First, 
due to the constitutional relationship of Denmark and Iceland, the occupation of Denmark had 
constitutional and domestic political consequences in Iceland, which cannot be addressed 
specifically in this study. Second, the invasions of Norway and Finland triggered battles that 
went on for an extended period of time. This offers plenty of source material from the 
contemporary press to work with and provides a suitable platform for comparison. However, 
because the initial invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940 is in many ways the same historical 
subject as the invasion of Norway – and because the contemporaries in the sources often discuss 
the two cases simultaneously, the case of Denmark will be included as long as it coincides with 
the Norwegian case.  
I would suggest there are three ways to define domestic reactions to foreign events. First, 
these are the official reactions and non-reactions; acts, views and opinions of a government. 
Second, the views and opinions expressed by the political and cultural elite in the mass-media, 
political press or other publications, and third; the collective views, actions and opinions of the 
wider public, i.e. the public opinion. The reactions and non-reactions of the Icelandic 
government before and during the world war are already a well-covered theme and it is 
problematic to make convincing conclusions about public opinion without sufficient statistical 
data on mass involvement such as, for example, public opinion polls. Therefore, I intend to 
limit the research to the examination of the second point; the opinions depicted in the printed 
press – i.e. the mainstream non-communist press. For the sake of limitation, and because the 
Icelandic communists’ opinions cannot be said to represent a mainstream opinion at that 
particular time, their opinions are not included here as a main study matter.  
By examining the Icelandic press from that period, I seek to shed light on the mentality of 
the Icelandic political elite on the eve of the greatest turning point in Icelandic history and reveal 
world-views and self-perceptions. Since the focus is on the opinions, I will not be dealing with 
general news content but with opinion pieces authored by Icelandic commentators. The aim 
here is to determine what idea the they had about the conflicts and their belligerents, how they 
felt about them and why; with an emphasis on sympathies, apologies and criticism. 
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For that purpose, I have formulated three overarching research questions with a number of 
sub-questions, which will be addressed in this study: 
1. How did the Icelandic press react to the invasions in Scandinavia and what were the 
newspaper discussions thereof about? The first question is a descriptive one where I seek to 
shed a light on the overall content of the newspaper discussions. What did the Icelandic 
commentators feel was most important about the foreign events? What kind of atmosphere does 
one experience when reading through the content? This will also be viewed in chronological 
terms: Did the discussion change over time? Are there examples of a shift in opinions? 
2. What was similar and dissimilar in the discussions on the two foreign events and how 
did the various party-press newspapers approach the two events similarly or dissimilarly? 
This second question is comparative. I will compare the two cases up against each other and 
state the apparent differences in the writings of each newspaper. The main question here, 
however, is on the evident difference between the two cases which was mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter: Did the invasion of Finland trigger more anger and shock in the 
Icelandic press than the Invasion of Norway? If so, why? 
3. What ideas, world-views and opinions are apparent in the newspaper discussions on 
the two events and what does this tell us about the Icelanders themselves? Here, I will delve 
into the discourse and extract from it views and opinions. I will focus on the portrayals of the 
conflicts' belligerents with an emphasis on negative or positive presentation. How are the four 
actors of the two cases, Finland, Norway/Denmark, Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union 
portrayed in the Icelandic press?1 The goal here, of course, is not to learn about these parties 
but to draw up an image of the Icelandic commentators’ construction of the external world and 
their associations with them. To that end, I will focus on apparent us and them-polarities. How 
is association between the speaker and the subjects observable in the texts? 
1.2 Methodology  
Although I do not intend to place this study into a complete theoretical framework, I will borrow 
certain theoretical concepts from the field of discursive and linguistic studies. These concepts 
are discourse and discoursive themes, the latter of which will be defined in the next sub-chapter. 
The concepts are most often associated with the methodology of discourse analysis; which has 
been defined as a “detailed exploration of political, personal, media or academic” texts 
                                                 
1 There are more actors in the Battle of Norway than only Norwegians and Germans. For the sake of limitation 
though, I will focus primarily on the aggressor and the victim. 
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“designed to reveal how knowledges are organized, carried and reproduced”.2 This research 
shares the basic idea of discourse theory, although it is not considered a discourse analysis 
because of the large pool of source material it deals with. This approach carries with it an 
embodiment of social constructionism; the understanding that our way of writing and speaking, 
as well as acting and being, is a social practice, shaped by – and shaping – social structures, 
situations and institutions.3 Scholars within discursive studies have also seen the discourse in 
light of ideas about the relations between power, knowledge and language. Michel Foucault is 
perhaps the best known thinker to this regard. His understanding of the discourse is that social 
institutions of power decide what is allowed to express at each given time and that the discourse, 
which is a necessary tool for the execution of power, dictates what people perceive as the truth.4 
The understanding of the discourse employed in this paper, is by the definition of it being “a 
set of thoughts, a pattern or a context in which to interpret the world”.5(a) The discourse is treated 
as a manifest of social power and a reflection of society, and therefore I feel comfortable 
drawing conclusions on the mentality of the Icelandic elite by examining its discourse. 
Furthermore, this is a qualitative research. When remarks in my sources are determined, for 
example, as anti-communist or pro-Allied remarks; such a judgement is solely built upon the 
interpretation of the analyst. The same goes for the quantitative survey of editorials presented 
in Chapter V; all quantitative data from the newspapers is selected, categorised and presented 
according to my interpretation.  
1.2.1 Method and Operation 
For the operation of this research, I use a three-step method which consists of (1) a systematic 
data collection, (2) data processing and (3) analysis. A historical time frame was determined 
from November 30, 1939 until June 10, 1940. 6 This frame of roughly six months covers the 
entire period of the Winter War and the Battle of Norway including the interim period in 
between and is divided into the four following sub-periods, henceforth called research periods: 
 
                                                 
2  John Muncie. “Discourse Analysis”. The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods. Ed.: Victor Jupp. 
Thousand Oaks, 2006, pp. 75-77, p. 75. 
3 Yoosun Park. “Historical Discourse Analysis”. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Ed.: 
Lisa M. Given. Thousand Oaks, 2008, pp. 394-396; Yngve Benestad Hågvar. Å forstå avisa. Innføring I praktisk 
presseanalyse. Bergen, 2007, p. 18; N. Fairclough and R. Wodak. “Critical Discourse Analysis”. Discourse as 
Social Interaction. Ed.: T.A. van Dijk. London, 1997, pp. 258-284, p. 258. 
4 Michel Foucault. “Two Lectures”. Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and other writings 1972-1977. Ed.: 
Colin Gordon. New York, 1980, pp. 78-108, p. 93. 
5 Hågvar. 2007, pp. 20. 
6 In effect, the end date will be June 11 due to time lag. 
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First research period: November 30, 1939 – March 14, 1940: The Winter War. 
Second research period: March 15 – April 9, 1940: The interim period between the 
conclusion of the Winter War and the German invasion of Denmark and Norway. 
Third research period: April 10 – May 10, 1940: The Battle of Norway until the British 
Occupation of Iceland and the German Invasion of France. 
Fourth research period: May 11, 1940 – June 11, 1940: The Battle of Norway until its 
conclusion, while Iceland was occupied by the British. 
The reason for this division is not only it is appropriate for the purpose of processing the sources 
but also because at the beginning of this research I anticipated that there would be some sort of 
a shift between the third and fourth periods due to the change in status of Iceland vis-à-vis the 
belligerents of the world war.  
The first step of my method was to collect primary sources from the given time frame. 
Opinion pieces were collected from certain newspapers, whose titles will be discussed in 
Chapter 1.3.1. An opinion piece is any writing in the press intentionally expressing opinion; 
typically an editorial article, submitted article or a column. A total of roughly 300 individual 
articles were collected and entered into a source registry. The source registry is a database with 
a sorting system, designed to make large amounts of opinion pieces both easily accessible and 
thematically categorised. The articles were assigned with content tags such as, for example, 
“anti-communist remarks”; “pro-German remarks”; “sympathy with Norway”, etc., followed 
by a title, date and comments. This is essential in order to give the long time period a detailed 
description and to keep track of the hundreds of articles that were collected. 
The second step is the processing of the data from the source registry. The main goal of this 
study is the extraction of ideas, portrayals and opinions from the discourse. Therefore, I would 
suggest that a thematic presentation of the newspaper content is best suited to shed light on the 
research questions instead of, for example, a chronological narrative or a presentation by 
newspaper titles. This choice of presentation also reflects my approach towards the study matter; 
in order to draw attention to the ideas and opinions, I choose to bring the newspapers themselves 
into the background. To the same effect, I also choose to leave out individuals as much as 
possible from both description and analysis, even though some of the commentators writing in 
the Icelandic press at the time are known locally and even historical figures. I want the discourse 
to speak for itself.  
To that end, I have borrowed the concept of discursive themes, as presented by Ingólfur 
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Ásgeir Jóhannesson in his six-step model for conducting historical discourse analysis 7 
Jóhannesson describes discursive themes as such: 
Words and ideas, behaviour and practices are observed and identified as themes in the discourse, 
that is, discursive themes […]. The discursive themes create patterns in the discourse, patterns that 
are shaped and reshaped in the social and political atmosphere of the past and the present. These 
patterns are historical and political legitimating principles that constitute the available means for 
the participants for what is appropriate or safe to say at certain moments or in certain places […].8 
In other words; discursive themes are an observable pattern in the discourse which makes up its 
main content – its plot, so to speak. In line with the Foucaultian theory of power relations, the 
discursive themes are determined by rules and social codes of what society has allowed to be 
said and written. Jóhannesson calls these social codes legitimising principles, and I shall stick 
with that terminology. 
The third and final step is the analysis and comparison of the findings with the help of 
secondary literature. This is first and foremost threefold: (1) I compare the findings with one 
another (2) I discuss the findings in context, both international and domestic context as well as 
in historical context and (3) I seek Icelandic self-perceptions through apparent associations.  
Placing the texts in context is one of the basic principles of discourse analysis. One definition 
of discourse is namely, text in context, and analysts have come up with contextual concepts to 
understand this, such as the cultural context and the situational context.9 Locating a press article 
in its cultural context reveals the historical situation of the newspaper itself and is thus reflective 
of the press’ standing in the respective society; its readership, representation, prestige etc. The 
situational context reveals the specific news article or opinion piece in relation to others and is 
relevant for the comparative analysis of this study. So is the cultural context of my sources no 
less important to understand the views and opinions of the newspapers. Therefore, I make room 
for a historical overview of Iceland, Norway and Finland during the winter of 1939-1940 as 
well as of the Icelandic newspapers’ standing in society; the respective political parties they 
represented and their overall stance towards the world war. 
Even though the Icelanders did not participate in the conflicts, they inevitably placed 
themselves somewhere vis-à-vis the belligerents. Analysis of the Icelandic press’ self-
                                                 
7 Ingólfur Ásgeir Jóhannesson. “The Politics of Historical Discourse Analysis: a Qualitative Research Method?” 
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education. 31:2 (2010), pp. 251-264. See also: Ingólfur Ásgeir 
Jóhannesson. “Leitað að mótsögnum - um verklag við orðræðugreiningu“. Fötlun. Hugmyndir og aðferðir á nýju 
fræðasviði. Ed.: Rannveig Traustadóttir. Reykjavík, 2006, pp. 178-194. 
8 Jóhannesson, I. 2010, p. 252. 
9 Hågvar, 2007, 18 and 30-31. 
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perception and identity building through portrayal of the other can be traced by locating 
metaphors of us and them polarities. Stuart Hall has pointed out how us and them polarities are 
reflective of the identity of the speaker. To illustrate this, Hall takes examples from the 
perspective of various fields, such as the following example from the field of linguistics:  
We know what black means […] not because there is some essence of ‘blackness’ but because we 
can contrast it with its opposite – white.10 
The relations between actors as portrayed by the media, can reveal ideologies and views within 
the society portraying them. Tatjana Felberg maintains that asking the question “who does what 
to whom in the world we construct” is unavoidable in order to illuminate this.11 Taking sides 
with or against foreign belligerents is one of the most obvious signs of one’s own ideology or 
identity and therefore, I focus on the press’ construction of a villain, a hero and a victim in the 
discourse. These are portrayals carrying negative or positive moral presumptions which give 
way to sympathy and antipathy in the minds of the contemporaries. 
1.2.2 Disposition 
This paper is structured into four main chapters on a model of (1) setting and background, (2) 
study matter 1, (3) study matter 2, and (4) evaluation and analysis of (2) and (3). 
Chapter II provides the important historical setting in which this study takes place. An 
account is given of the Nordic Countries’ involvement in the Second World War along with all 
relevant background information about Iceland in the 1930s with emphasis on the political 
landscape and the government’s relations with the great powers. Finally, the newspaper 
reactions are placed in context with an overview on Icelandic popular and political reactions to 
the invasions in Scandinavia. 
Chapters III and IV house the empirical contents of this study. The findings from the source 
material are placed here and thematically presented as noted before. Chapter III deals with the 
Invasion of Finland and Chapter IV with the Invasion of Norway. I have noticed that the nature 
of the Battle of Norway discourse allows for a successful presentation using a different method 
than the thematic one. However, I decided to keep both chapters strictly identical in structure. 
That is because a parallel internal structure both provides excellent possibilities for comparison 
                                                 
10 Stuart Hall. “The Spectacle of the Other”. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
Ed.: Stuart Hall, London, 1997, pp. 223-290, p. 234. 
11 Tatjana Felberg. Brothers in arms? Discourse analysis of Serbian and Montenegrin identities and relations as 
constructed in Politika and Pobjeda front page articles during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. 
Doctoral Thesis at the University of Oslo. 2008, p. 45-46. 
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and offers a better possibility for conclusions to be made based on generalisations and 
summaries from both cases. This is precisely what Chapter V, the analytical part of this study, 
consists of. The findings from Chapters III and IV are summarised, compared and discussed.  
1.3 Sources 
1.3.1 Introduction to the Primary Sources 
The Icelandic printed press is the sole type of empirical evidence on which this research is based. 
Accessibility to these primary sources is outstanding. The newspaper titles in question, along 
with hundreds of other publications from the 19th and 20th centuries, have been digitalised by 
the National and University Library of Iceland and are accessible to anyone in a searchable 
digital database on the web.12 
During most of the 20th century, the daily printed press in Iceland was closely intertwined 
with a political system dominated by four permanent political parties.13 The political system 
was developed during the 1910s and 1920s, and by the 1930s, three class-political parties – four 
including the Communist Party, had consolidated and climaxed their influence in society. A 
fully grown political press system had been developed in which each party was represented by 
a newspaper which generally served its party’s political interests. Some papers were directly 
owned and run by the parties while others were independent but openly affiliated to a political 
party or ideology.14  
I have chosen four newspapers in Reykjavík as the main source material of this study. These 
papers make up a complete list of the daily newspapers at the time and sum up the complete 
flora of the party-press, with the exception of the communist press. These publications are:  
1. Alþýðublaðið (‘The People’s Paper’); a socialist newspaper and the party organ of the 
social-democratic Labour Party. The paper was founded by the party in 1919 and was 
one of the country's leading newspapers during the former half of the 20th century. In 
1940, Alþýðublaðið was generally published every day but Sunday with an issue of four 
                                                 
12 Timarit.is. Landsbókasafn Íslands – Háskólabókasafn. www.timarit.is. 
13 The four main parties were: The Labour Party (i. Alþððuflokkurinn) the Progressive Party (i. 
Framsóknarflokkurinn) –the Independence Party (i. Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) – and the Socialist Unity Party – The 
Socialist Party (i. Sameiningarflokkur alþððu – Sósíalistaflokkurinn). The last one did not become one of the 
four mainstream parties until after the Second World War. The political parties will be presented in more detail 
in Chapter II. 
14 Guðjón Friðrikson. “Tímabil flokksfjölmiðla – ris og hnig”. Íslenska söguþingið 28.-31. maí 1997.Ráðstefnurit 
I. Reykjavík. 1998, pp. 305-316, pp. 307-309; Helgi Skúli Kjartansson. Ísland á 20. öld. Reykjavík, 2002, pp. 
161-162. The following description of the Icelandic newspapers is based on these.  
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pages. 
2. Morgunblaðið (‘The Morning Paper’); an independent but market-liberal and 
conservative daily newspaper. Established in 1913, the paper was originally party-
politically neutral, but from the 1930s on it was decisively placed as the party organ of 
the Independence Party. The paper was the largest printed media of the time; generally 
eight pages in length and came out every day but Monday. 
3. Tíminn (’The Time’); a centrist newspaper and the party organ of the liberal-agrarian 
Progressive Party.15 The paper was established as a weekly newspaper by the party and 
the co-operative movement in 1917 and was indented for readers in the country as well 
as townspeople in Reykjavík. For that reason, it was not a daily newspaper. During the 
late 1930s, Tíminn came out every second day but Sunday, at the length of four pages. 
4. Vísir; a conservative daily newspaper. Established in 1910 as the first daily newspaper 
in Iceland, Vísir was, like Morgunblaðið, originally neutral in party-politics but gradually 
became affiliated with the Independence Party political standpoint. During the 1940s, 
the paper competed with Alþýðublaðið for the status of being the second most distributed 
newspaper in Reykjavík, publishing an issue of four pages every day but Sunday. 
These four papers consist of what I call the non-communist press. They were also political 
proponents and organs of the Icelandic government during this study’s time frame and are in 
that context sometimes referred to as the government press. To the same effect, Vísir and 
Morgunblaðið are often collectively termed the right-wing press or the centre-right press with 
Tíminn included, and Alþýðublaðið is on occasions referred to as the social-democratic press. 
Although the communist press is not accounted for as a main source material, it is appropriate 
to introduce it as well due to its significance for this study: 
5. Þjóðviljinn (“The Nation’s Will”); a communist daily newspaper, and the party organ of 
the far-left Socialist Unity Party. The party's predecessor; the Communist Party of 
Iceland, established a weekly party organ in 1930, which from 1936 was published as 
the four-page Þjóðviljinn, every day but Monday. 
1.3.2 The Source Value of the Icelandic Press 
The press has been used as historical source since the 19th century and from the 1970s, we have 
                                                 
15 Although Jónas Jónsson, the leader of the Progressive Party, wrote many editorial articles in Tíminn during this 
study‘s time frame, he never really was the paper‘s editor. He served as chairman of the editorial board (i. 
formaður blaðstjórnar) but is nevertheless referred to as editor or co-editor in this study. 
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witnessed an extensive use of it within the fields of everyday social history, the new cultural 
history and not least, local history. 16  For its detailed coverage of day-to-day society, the 
newspaper is a window into the past, almost like a still image of a daily setting which rarely 
can be found in the archives. But just like historical photographs, the source value of the press 
must be assessed and source criticism practised. 
The newspaper is a typical textbook example of a source that can both be a secondary and a 
primary source at the same time. Contemporary events and activities, people and places within 
the social, political, cultural and international arena are reported in the news reports of the day. 
One must beware when using the press for historical information and bear in mind the golden 
rule of source criticism; who wrote it, for whom and why? This is especially true when dealing 
with the political press, as this research does. For the second part, the press can also be used for 
the analysis of the society in which it was produced. The paper can reflect society either through 
its own news reports or commentaries, as well as the submitted material from readers and active 
players in contemporary society. By answering the questions who, for whom and why, the 
historian can see the reflection of society in the press. 
Even though the newspapers listed before are typical for their time and a symbol of the four-
party system which characterised the 20th century in Icelandic politics, we must ask, whose 
opinions do they represent?17 Can they be considered representative of the general public? 
Helgi Skúli Kjartanson maintains that even though the larger papers tried to reach out to a wider 
public, most supporters of each party generally read only their party's paper. The papers were 
in fact “the party [itself] dressed in paper” and were considered by readers as “the voice of the 
party”.18(b) Everything from news to advertisements was either conformed by party policies or 
at least did not go against them. In turn, those who did not affiliate with any of the four political 
parties could not find a place to promote their political opinions in the nation's largest papers.19 
Thorstein Strømsøe, who has studied the opinions and discussions on the Winter War in Norway, 
points out that thanks to the authority enjoyed by a political party, the party press is generally 
                                                 
16 Hallvard Tjelmeland. “Aviser som historisk kjelde”. Pressehistoriske skrifter 3:1, 2004, pp. 114-130, p. 115. 
17 Friðriksson maintains that there never was a large enough market in Iceland for so many daily newspapers, and 
that the party press system was kept going by subsidies from the political parties and from the state (1998, p. 
311). Only the bourgeois papers were privately run and the other papers were usually burdensome to their party's 
finances, especially the socialist press which could hardly compete with the others for advertisers (Kjartansson. 
2002, p. 162). Only Morgunblaðið is still to this day published by its original name; Vísir joined with another 
newspaper in the 1980s and the class-party organs, Alþýðublaðið, Tíminn and Þjóðviljinn, all became extinct in 
the 1990s.  
18 Kjartansson. 2002, p. 162.  
19 ibid; Friðriksson. 1998, p. 309-311. 
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more opinion-shaping than other media.20 The very purpose of a political press is to shape 
opinions and the Icelandic parties had indeed much authority. It should also be added that 
newspapers, especially the mainstream press, seldom expresses official opinions that collide 
head-on with the public opinion. Papers must publish what their readers want to read in order 
not to lose subscribers and I would suggest this applies particularly when dealing with 
sentimental issues regarding foreign events. 
Yet, despite the party-press' authority, its opinion-shaping effects do have limits. Despite 
their dominant position, the three large non-communist parties in Iceland represented altogether 
roughly 60-75% of the electorate during the 1930s and besides that, elections cannot count as 
public opinion polls on every single policy – let alone opinions on foreign events.21 These 
considerations aside, Strømsøe argues that even though the press undoubtedly reaches parts of 
the population, the opinion-shaping effects are also affected by pre-determined and personal 
ideas, experiences, preferences and worries of individual members of the public. The public 
opinion is therefore neither monolithic nor is it easily shaped. Age, sex, social class and 
education are examples of variables that form individual opinions before the press does.22 I 
agree with this, and think it should be safe to conclude that the four Icelandic newspapers in 
question can offer a rough image of the Icelandic public opinion, although what they really 
represent is the opinions of the Icelandic political elite and that is how it will be treated in this 
study. 
1.4 Secondary Literature and Historiography 
This study is a first and foremost the subject of three fields: The history of Iceland during the 
Second World War, Icelandic press history and the history of Icelandic political culture. 
Additionally, this study touches upon the history of the Icelandic far-left movement, which, 
because of its controversial nature, shall be mentioned here in this historiographical overview. 
To my knowledge, there has not been published other specific studies on Icelandic press 
opinions regarding the conflicts of the Second World War. 
1.4.1 The History of Iceland in the Second World War 
The history of the Second World War in Iceland has only received a moderate amount of 
                                                 
20 Thorstein Strømsøe. Solidaritet eller nøytralitet? Norsk Finlands-politikk og opinionen under Vinterkrigen 
1939-1940. Volume 22 in series: Skriftserie fra Historisk institutt. Trondheim, 1997, pp. 318-319. 
21 Election results from Kjartansson. 2002, pp. 536-537. 
22 Strømsøe. 1997, pp. 306 and 319. 
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scholarly attention. Given the war's importance in modern Icelandic history, this lack of interest 
seems surprising. Unlike most other European countries, Icelandic war history has not become 
the field of historical debates and revisions. According to Guðmundur Hálfdanarson the 
“apparent disinterest” relates from a combination of factors. Apart from the obvious lack of 
specialists due to the limited size of the nation and its pool of historians, Iceland was from early 
on in the war decisively placed in the Allied camp, making debates on war guilt and Nazi 
collaboration non-existent in the history writing. Second, the war and its important domestic 
consequences for the nation's political and economic future, does not fit into the grand narrative 
of the traditional nationalist historiography, Hálfdanarson maintains, according to which the 
prosperous post-war society could only have been established through other, more idyllic, 
means than the economic and political aid of the Western great powers.23  
Interestingly, the traditional nationalist historiography Hálfdanarson is referring to, 
developed during the Icelandic ‘Struggle for Independence’ and has been the subject of huge 
revisions in the last decades of the 20th century. However, this revisionism has not affected the 
historiography of the Second World War. 24  History writing on Icelandic foreign affairs, 
including the war years, is a relatively young field, arriving at the scene within the history 
profession in the 1970s.25 It is therefore perhaps safe to assume that this state of affairs is subject 
to change in the coming decades. 
Most historical works on the Second World War appearing from the 1980s on have focused 
on the Allied occupation, relations between the people, the government and the occupation 
forces and/or operational history on, above and around the island. Relations between Icelandic 
women and Allied soldiers (generally termed 'The Situation' (i. Ástandið)) has also received a 
fair amount of attention in the literature. 26 
As mentioned before, the small pool of Icelandic historians does not provide for great many 
specialists in each field. Professor Þór Whitehead has unquestionably dominated the field of 
                                                 
23 Guðmundur Hálfdanarson. “'The Beloved War'. The Second World War and the Icelandic National Narrative”. 
Nordic Narratives of the Second World War. National Historiographies Revisited. Eds.: Henrik Steinus, et al. 
Lund, 2011, pp. 79-100, pp. 79 and 80. 
24 ibid. p. 97. 
25 Valur Ingimundarson. “Saga utanríkismála á 20. öld”. Saga. 38:1 (2000), pp. 207-227, pp. 207. 
26 See for example: Tómas Þór Tómasson. Heimssstyrjaldarárin á Íslandi 1939-1945. Volume I and II. Reykjavík, 
1983 and 1984; Magnús Þór Hafsteinsson. Dauðinn í Dumbshafi. Íshafsskipalestirnar frá Hvalfirði og 
sjóhernaður í Norður-Íshafi 1940-1943 and Návígi á Norðurslóðum. Íshafsskipalestirnar og ófriðurinn, 1942-
1945. Reykjavík, 2011 and 2012. On 'The Situation', see for example: Herdís Helgadóttir. Úr fjötrum. Íslenskar 
konur og erlendur her. Reykjavík, 2001; Bára Baldursdóttir. “'Þær myndu fegnar skipta um þjóðerni' 
Ríkisafskipti af samböndum unglingsstúlkna og setuliðsmanna”. Kvennaslóðir. Rit til heiðurs Sigríði Th. 
Erlendsdóttur sagnfræðingi.. Eds.: Anna Agnarsdóttir et al. Reykjavík, 2001. 
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Icelandic Second World War studies for the last three decades. His book series, labelled Ísland 
í síðari heimsstyrjöld (e. “Iceland in the Second World War”), was launched in 1980 and is a 
cornerstone work in the field. Currently at the fourth volume, the series deal mainly with the 
relations between the Icelandic government and the great powers before the war, and the great 
powers' interests in the island's strategic location.27 Whitehead's works are based on detailed 
research into Icelandic, German, British and American archives, which has earned him 
reverence among other historians and his style of writing is popular with the public consumer.28 
However, in light of Whitehead's historiographical approach, the apparent consensus by the 
academic community and the public on his analysis is interesting and quite unique. His 
dismissal of theories and strive for public accessibility describes Whitehead's intention to make 
the sources speak their language and write from it a history which, to quote one of his book 
reviews; “carries his opinions and delivers them”. Thus, he allows as himself “to judge people 
and subjects”.29(c) In the introduction to the first volume of his series, Whitehead declares this 
historiographical approach as such: 
I am not one of those historians who believe that they can stand above their own time and opinions, 
and deal with their subject from some undefined 'neutral' point of view. I adhere to certain principles, 
which it would be dishonest for me to hide. My goal is not to be 'neutral', but to search for a truth 
and explain it.30(d) 
This statement might sound frightful when put up against Whitehead's unconcealed pro-
Independence Party and pro-American political standpoint. 31 Indeed, Whitehead’s sympathy 
with the Icelandic National Government of 1939-1942, his anti-fascist and pro-Allied approach 
is noticeable throughout his narrative. Yet his dismissal of neutrality has not really been a source 
of serious criticism in the case of his war history. His use of sources has been generally accepted 
and praised and his overall analysis and presentation of the “truth” has been received mostly 
uncontested. 32  Again, this shows better than anything else how unbelievably consent the 
                                                 
27 The four volumes published in 1980-1999; “A War Approaching”, “War Beyond the Coast”, “Between Hope 
and Fear” and “The British Arrive”, cover the period from the late 1930s until the summer of 1940. Whitehead 
has also published a book dealing specifically with German pre-war interests in Iceland; “Himmler's Icelandic 
Adventure”. (Þór Whitehead. Ófriður í aðsigi. Reykjavík, 1980, Stríð fyrir ströndum. Reykjavík, 1985, Milli 
vonar og ótta. Reykjavík, 1995, Íslandsævintýri Himmlers, 2.ed. Reykjavík, 1998 and Bretarnir koma. 
Reykjavík, 1999). 
28 Hálfdanarson. 2011, ppp. 86-87. See also: Ingimundarson. 2000, pp. 210-211; Stefán F. Hjartarson. “[Review:] 
Þór Whitehead. Milli vonar og ótta. Ísland í síðari heimsstyrjöld”. Saga. 34:1 (1996), p. 329-332; Helgi Skúli 
Kjartansson. “[Review:] Stórvirki í sögurannsókn”, Helgarpósturinn, December 19. 1980, p. 17. 
29 Hjartarson. 1996, p. 330.  
30 Whitehead. 1980, p. 8.  
31 Hálfdanarson. 2011, p. 87. 
32 ibid; Hjartarson. 1996, p. 330. 
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Icelandic academic and cultural community seems to be about the established historiography 
of that particular period in Icelandic history. If anything, critics of Whitehead’s world war series 
have pointed out opinionated writings on the communists during the war.33 
Whitehead covers the Icelandic government's attitudes towards the great powers in great 
depth and his use of the Icelandic political press is also detailed and widespread. Whitehead’s 
comprehensive construction of the winter of 1939-1940, especially in the second volume, Milli 
vonar og ótta (1995), is a valuable secondary literature for my study. I do for the most part not 
see my research and my conclusions in contradiction to Whitehead’s analysis, although my 
perspective and focus is different from his. 
1.4.2 The History of the Icelandic Far-left 
Even though Whitehead‘s writings on the Second World War have gone mostly unchallenged, 
his version of the history of the Icelandic communist movement has been the subject of serious 
criticism and has become a centrepiece in a recent historical debate. With the opening of 
Russian archives in the early 1990s, much research has been done on the topic of Icelandic 
communist and socialist relations with the Soviet Union which has spawned what has been 
called the most controversial topic of modern Icelandic history.34 The debate mostly deals with 
two questions: Weather or not the communists were violent and dangerous quislings and on 
what terms their relationship was with the Soviet authorities. 
Jón Ólafsson has determined that historians and scholars generally adhere to two opposing 
theories within these studies; the so-called “obedience theory” (i. hlýðnikenningin); maintaining 
that communist actions and opinions were directed from Moscow, and the “self-control theory” 
(i. sjálfstjórnarkenningin); claiming they sought advice and example from Moscow but were 
not controlled from abroad.35 No one denies that the Communist Party of Iceland and its 
successor; the Socialist Unity Party, kept close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
The scale and importance of these relations, however, are debatable. Ólafsson’s categorisation 
is reasonable, although historians of the latter category are harder to spot and define. The vast 
majority of scholars opposing the “obedience theory” agree to the client-patron relationship 
between Icelandic communists and Moscow but reject the obedience school’s emphasis on the 
                                                 
33 Hjartarson. 1996, p. 331; Kjartansson, 1980, p. 17. 
34 Skafti Ingimarsson. “Saga sigurvegaranna. Kommúnistahreyfingin á Íslandi og söguskoðun kalda stríðsins”. 4. 
íslenska söguþingið 7-10 júní 2012. Ráðstefnurit. Reykjavík, 2013, pp. 295-307, p. 295. 
35 Jón Ólafsson. “Komintern gegn klofningi. Viðbrögð Alþjóðasambands kommúnista við stofnun 
Sósíalistaflokksins”, Saga. 45:1 (2007), pp. 93-111, p. 94. 
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communists' violent and dangerous nature. 36  Whitehead's books have, among others been 
categorised into the obedience-category; one of which; “Soviet-Iceland...” (2010), is referred 
to in this study. 37  These writers have criticised those who oppose them, Jón Ólafsson in 
particular, for belittling the communists' humbleness to the Soviet leadership and even to 
commit academic dishonesty to reach such conclusions.38 Ólafsson, on the other hand, deems 
Whithead's theories in his recent work “Soviet-Iceland” as “non-academic” and makes an 
argument claiming that Whitehead’s sources are misinterpreted in order to reach prepared and 
politically opinionated conclusions.39 
What is interesting about this historiography is that many writers committing to the 
“obedience theory” are deserted communists themselves or scholars who are publicly known 
for their rightist political standpoint. In a similar manner, adherents of the self-control theory 
were often old communists writing their memoirs.40 This point goes to show the political nature 
of the historiography of the communist movement; a historiographical tradition which Skafti 
Ingimarsson has called “Cold War historiography”.41 He calls for a new historiographical 
approach towards this history; one that is not coloured by the black-and-white mentality of the 
Cold War and one that does not focus so heavily on the relations with Moscow.42 Ragnheiður 
Kristjánsdóttir has also highlighted this point, whose work “New People...” (2008) has blown 
a fresh breeze into these studies by drawing attention to the nationalistic character of the 
Icelandic communist and socialist movement.43 
                                                 
36 See for example: Ingimarsson. 2013; Skafti Ingimarsson. “Fimmta herdeildin. Hugleiðingar um Sovét-Ísland, 
óskalandið”. Saga. 49:2 (2011), pp. 152-195; Jón Ólafsson. “Landráðakenning Þórs Whitehead. Nokkrar 
athugasemdir við ritið Sovét-Ísland óskalandið”. Bifröst Journal of Social Science 5-6 (2011-2012), pp. 47-72; 
Guðni Th. Jóhannesson. “Samhengi”. Seminar address at the Historians' Association of Iceland and the 
Reykjavik Academy, Nov. 23, 2011, labelled “Icelandic Left-Wing Radicalism: Idealistic Struggle or 
Treachery?” Retrieved: 21.11.2013 from: www.gudnith.is > Greinar og Erindi > Kalda stríðið > Samhengi 
(2011): http://gudnith.is/efni/samhengi_2011. 
37 Þór Whitehead. Sovét-Ísland, óskalandið. Aðdragandi byltingar sem aldrei varð, 1921-1946. Reykjavík, 2010. 
See also: Þór Whitehead. Kommúnistahreyfingin á Íslandi 1921-1934. Volume. 5 in series: Sagnfræðirannsóknir, 
Studia Historica. Reykjavík, 1979; Arnór Hannibalsson. Moskvulínan. Kommúnistaflokkur Íslands og 
Komintern. Halldór Laxness og Sovétríkin. Reykjavík, 1999; Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson. Íslenskir 
kommúnistar 1918-1998. Reykjavík, 2011. 
38 See for example: Whithead. 2010, p. 152 (footnote); Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarson. “Furðulegar árásir á Þór 
Whitehead”. Pressan. 2011. Retrieved 21.11.2013 from: www.pressan.is > Pressupennar > Hannes Hólmsteinn 
Gissurarson: http://www.pressan.is/pressupennar/Lesa_Hannes/furdulegar-arasir-a-thor-whitehead. 
39 Ólafsson. 2011-2012, pp. 50-51. 
40 Ólafsson. 2007, p. 95. On veteran communists leaders maintaining the “self-control theory”, see for example: 
Einar Olgeirsson. Ísland í skugga heimsvaldastefnunnar and Kraftaverk einnar kynslóðar. Prepared by Jón 
Guðnason. Reykjavík, 1980 and 1983; Brynjólfur Bjarnason. Brynjólfur Bjarnason, pólitísk ævisaga. Viðtöl 
Einars Ólafssonar ásamt inngangi. Reykjavík, 1989. 
41 Ingimarsson. 2012, pp. 295-296. 
42 ibid. pp. 305-307. 
43 Ragnheiður Kristjánsdóttir. Nýtt Fólk. Þjóðerni og íslensk verkalýðsstjórnmál 1901-1944. Reykjavík. 2008; 
Ragnheiður Kristjánsdóttir. “Má biðja um annað sjónarhorn?” Seminar address at the Historians' Association of 
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It is important for the reader to understand the state of affairs in the historiography of this 
topic as he or she reads through this work. Although I do not consider this research a direct 
contribution to the debate, communism and anti-communism is a central theme throughout the 
Icelandic newspaper discourse of the Winter War and the Battle of Norway. The anti-communist 
contemporaries’ claim that they serve foreign interests and pose a danger to the Icelandic state 
is widespread. In the following chapter, we will cover the history of the Icelandic far-left 
movement during the winter of 1939-1940, in addition to other historical settings relating to the 
empirical study of the Icelandic press reactions to the German and Soviet invasions in 
Scandinavia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Iceland and the Reykjavik Academy, Nov. 23, 2011, labelled “Icelandic Left-Wing Radicalism: Idealistic 
Struggle or Treachery?” Retrieved: 21.11.2013 from www.sagnfraedingafelag.net > Hádegisfyrirlestrar > 
Hlaðvarp: Vinstri róttækni > Link to audio file: http://vefir.mh.is/kaj/Vinstri.mp3. 
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Chapter II 
Finland, Norway and Iceland 
1939-1940 
 
Scandinavia’s involvement in the Second World War was – as Richard Overy puts it: “the 
product of geopolitical chance”, more than anything else. 1  Situated between the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Soviet Union, the flanks of Scandinavia was of strategic 
significance for them all. In the east, the southern coast of Finland loomed over the Baltic 
entrance into Russia and the Finnish-Soviet borders in Karelia lay only 40 km from the second 
city of the Soviet Union; Leningrad. In the west, Norway was situated in a way that in the event 
of war, both Britain and Germany would consider stationing navies there in order to strike at 
each other in the North Sea or the Baltic Sea. In addition, Norwegian waters served as an 
important life-line for the German industry since Swedish iron, indispensable to the Germans 
in wartime, was shipped from the Norwegian port of Narvik to Germany when the Gulf of 
Bothnia was frozen.2 
Having signed a joint deceleration of neutrality in 1938, the Nordic countries went great 
lengths to stay out of the war. They all had solid democratic traditions and parliamentary 
institutions which, unlike in most other European minor states, had survived the economic 
depression of the 1930s. Extreme political movements, like fascism and communism, were 
marginal in all of the Nordic countries. Norway enjoyed political association with Great Britain 
and the democratic West, whose traditions were in a sharp contrast to German political thought. 
Political relations between Norway and Germany increasingly deteriorated after the rise of 
national socialism in Germany and the country became the target of heavy criticism by the 
influential liberal and socialist movements in Norway.3 Although the Norwegian government 
                                                 
1 Richard Overy. “Scandinavia in the Second World War”. Hitler's Scandinavian Legacy. The Consequences of the 
German Invasion for the Scandinavian Countries, Then and Now. Eds.: John Gilmour and Jill Stephenson. 
London, 2013, pp. 13-37, p. 15. 
2 Tom Kristiansen. “Closing a Long Chapter: German-Norwegian Relations 1939-45. Norway and the Third 
Reich”. Hitler's Scandinavian Legacy. The Consequences of the German Invasion for the Scandinavian 
Countries, Then and Now. Eds.: John Gilmour and Jill Stephenson. London, 2013, pp. 73-99, p. 77; Olav Riste. 
“War Comes to Norway”. Norway in the Second World War. 5th edition. Ed. Olav Riste. [Oslo], 1996, pp. 9-55, 
pp. 29-31. 
3 Kristiansen. 2013, pp. 73, 77 and 81-83. 
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held firmly on to the politics of neutrality after the outbreak of war in September 1939, it was 
apparent that if it was forced to take sides, it would consider siding with the British in the 
conflict rather than the Germans. In either case, the Norwegian neutrality strategy counted on 
the Royal Navy as a safeguard in the unlikely event of a German invasion. It was, in fact, the 
Soviet Union - not Nazi-Germany, which was regarded the biggest threat to Norwegian security 
during the winter of 1939-1940.4 
If the Norwegians feared the Soviet Union they must not have envied the position of their 
other eastern neighbours; the Finns. Finland was among the Russian imperial lands that 
departed the empire after the Great War and Revolution of 1917. The Republic of Finland was 
established with a great white terror after the White Guards, aided by Imperial Germany, were 
victorious over communists in the Finnish Civil War. In light of these experiences, Finnish 
interwar society was characterised by anti-communism, Russophobia and Germanophilia, 
although the Finns gradually abandoned martial radicalism and expansionism and oriented 
towards Scandinavian and Western European culture and thought.5 Yet, sharing a border with 
the Soviet Union kept Finland, as Oula Silvennoinen put it: “an eastern European country with 
eastern European problems” in the geopolitical sense.6 Relations with the giant in the east were 
characterised by fear and mutual mistrust throughout the interwar period and therefore, Finnish 
foreign policy sought international cooperation focused on Soviet containment.7 This policy did 
not bear fruit and in November 1939, the Scandinavian theatre of the Second World War opened 
with a realisation of the Finns’ worst fear: A Soviet invasion of an isolated Finland. 
2.1 The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939-1940 
Having failed to reach an agreement about border adjustments at the Fenno-Soviet borders, the 
Soviet Air Force launched an air strike on Helsinki in the morning hours of November 30, 
concurring with a land invasion of 450.000 heavily equipped soldiers. The Finnish Army had a 
defensive force of 250.000 men at its disposal, with little air and armour support.8 Thus began 
the Winter War that lasted until March 14, 1940. The undeclared war on the neutral minor state 
                                                 
4 ibid. pp. 87-89; Ola Svein Stugu. Velstandslandet. Norsk historie etter 1905. Oslo, 2012, p. 113. 
5 Henrik Meinander. “Finland and the Great Powers in World War II. Ideologies, Geopolitics, Diplomacy”. Finland 
in World War II. History, Memory, Interpretations. Eds.: Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki. Leiden, 2012, pp. 
93-139, pp. 51-56; Oula Silvennoinen. “Janus of the North? Finland 1940-44. Finland's Road into Alliance with 
Hitler”. Hitler's Scandinavian Legacy. The Consequences of the German Invasion for the Scandinavian Countries, 
Then and Now. Eds.: John Gilmour and Jill Stephenson. London, 2013, pp. 129-144, pp. 130. 
6 Silvennoinen. 2013, p. 133. 
7 ibid. p. 134. 
8 Meinander. 2012, p. 59. 
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by the Russian great power caused heated reactions across the globe, for it was perceived by 
many in the West as an act of unmasked aggression. Ousted by the international community, 
the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations and the United States declared a 
“moral embargo” against it.9 How did this come to be? 
2.1.1 Motivation and Aims 
Stalin’s motivation for attacking Finland, and the question whether or not the Winter War could 
have been avoided, has been asked ever since its outbreak. Carl Van Dyke stated in 1997 that 
the invasion of Finland remained “a significant lacuna in Soviet history”, even after the opening 
of Russian archives.10 No documents have been found that prove that Stalin aimed at annexing 
Finland. 11  However, there are implications supporting the argument, most obviously the 
apparent fate of the Baltic States in 1940 after having agreed to treaties and terms similar to 
those offered to Finland before the invasion.The Baltic States gradually lost their sovereignty 
and eventually became soviet republics of the USSR. Furthermore, the creation and purpose of 
the Finnish puppet government in the Soviet-occupied Finnish border town of Terijoki, headed 
by the exiled Finnish communist and a client of Stalin, Otto Wille Kuusinen, points to the same 
direction. 
 Stalin maintained the Terijoki government was the legitimate government of Finland, 
refusing to negotiate with the actual government in Helsinki until his hand was forced in March 
1940.12 The original purpose of the Terijoki government was thus intended to be, as Kimmo 
Rentola put it; “a government-in-waiting”.13 Additionally, some recent Winter War literature 
assumes that in the grand scheme of things, Stalin aimed in 1939 for a restoration of the Russian 
imperial borders of 1914.14 Others claim the Soviet leadership preferred an autonomous but 
cooperative neighbour and that the goal to politically subjugate Finland through the means of 
the Terijoki government was an opportunistic goal set as a consequence of – not a prerequisite 
for – the breakout of war.15 
                                                 
9 H. Shukman. “Introduction”. Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. In series: Cass Series on the Soviet 
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However, most scholars are in agreement that the prime motivation for the invasion, and the 
most urgent one, was the preservation of Soviet national security in the wake of the Second 
World War.16 After the rise of Hitler in Germany, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Moscow based 
its interwar diplomacy on the ideological assumption that Nazi-Germany was the most likely 
of the capitalist states to stage an invasion in an inevitable second world war. Soviet military 
planners were convinced that such an attack was most probable through Poland, the Baltic 
States and Finland. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s focused on preventing German 
influence in the Baltic region.17 Having failed to isolate Germany through the means of treaties 
and collective security in cooperation with the Western Allies due to mutual mistrust, Stalin 
concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Hitler in August 1939, stunning the world 
communist movement and German sympathisers alike.18 Unlike the Western Allies, Hitler was 
willing to give him a free hand in the Baltic region. Isolated and under heavy pressure from the 
Soviets, the Baltic States agreed to said treaties of mutual assistance in the autumn, giving the 
Soviet Union military access and political influence.  
Similar negotiations with Finland, however, did not yield any results. Finnish-Soviet 
negotiations went on from 1938 until the final days before the outbreak of war and they failed 
because of mutual misconceptions and mistrust. Moscow insisted that Finland was bound to 
succumb, willingly or forcibly, to Nazi-Germany in the event of a German-Soviet war. Moscow 
offered protection and cooperation and suggested seemingly generous territorial concessions in 
Russian Eastern Karelia in exchange for a slight adjustment of the Soviet-Finnish borders on 
the Karelian Isthmus and limited military access. The Finnish authorities, however, saw the 
Soviet Union as a much bigger threat than Germany and firmly rejected all such proposals. 
They believed that Soviet threats of military actions were empty and that military access would 
only lead to a gradual Soviet takeover. Likewise, fully aware of Finnish-German contacts, Stalin 
did not trust the Finnish guarantees of neutrality. He based his decision to invade the country 
on the ideologically charged misconception that Finnish society was deeply divided by class 
conflict and thus unwilling and unable to withstand an invasion.19 
2.1.2 The Campaign 
Stalin was struck with a far different reality in December 1939. The main thrust of the Soviet 
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attack was directed at the tight Karelian Isthmus, where it was projected to break through to 
Helsinki in two weeks and occupy Finland in a month.20 This was where the Finns concentrated 
their defence with land fortifications, most prominent of which was the so-called Mannerheim 
Line. In Eastern and Northern Finland, the Finns primarily deployed small parties of ski troops, 
which engaged in small-scale guerrilla tactics. The Soviet advance north of Lake Ladoga and 
at the Mannerheim Line was halted already in the first weeks of fighting, where the Red Army 
suffered heavy casualties despite the numerical advantage. The Soviets also struggled in Eastern 
and Northern Finland, where whole divisions were encircled by small parties of Finnish mobile 
troops at isolated roads leading into the woodlands.21 
The Finns enjoyed the advantage of an unusually cold winter, for which they were well 
equipped, and the ability to exploit the difficult terrain. Contrary to Soviet pre-war 
considerations, Finland’s cohesion and fighting spirit was high – and it was decisively raised 
by the successful defensive operations at the front. Equally important for determining the initial 
poor performance of the Soviets was the circumstantial and general state of the Red Army. From 
the top levels, weakened by the Great Purges in the preceding years, down to platoon 
commanders and regular soldiers, the Red Army was deficient in all fields.22 The troops were 
poorly prepared for winter warfare and the upper levels of the army suffered from poor planning 
and confusion. 
Despite all this, logic dictated that the greatly outnumbered Finns were unable to win the 
Winter War in the long term. The Finnish strategy was therefore to hold out long enough until 
foreign powers would come to their aid or help negotiate for peace.23 The Finns enjoyed great 
sympathy in the West. A number of countries sent economic and humanitarian aid to Finland as 
well as volunteers, although only the 8.000 strong Swedish volunteer corps arrived in time to 
see combat.24 The Western Allies developed interest for a military intervention early in the 
Winter War, as a moral justification for a strike against Germany. Public opinion in both Britain 
and France opted for aiding Finland and the French government was very keen on diverting the 
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world war from its borders. Even though the British leadership was uncertain and divided about 
the subject, it was eventually decided to carry out the ostensible moral intervention in Finland 
to stop the flow of Swedish iron to Nazi-Germany.25 Allied operational plans involving landings 
in Norway, occupation of the Swedish iron mines and an expedition to Finland were developed 
and approved in February 1940. The intervention was never realised because of a firm 
opposition by the Norwegians and the Swedes who would not risk provoking a preventive or 
retaliatory attack from Germany.26 
Reorganisation of the Red Army leadership and increased superiority in numbers and 
armaments changed the situation at the front from February on. The Mannerheim Line was 
finally broken by the Soviet troops who reached the city of Vyborg in early March. The Finnish 
army was exhausted, its resources depleted and the prospects of a Franco-British intervention 
was dwindling. However, the existence of the intervention plan put pressure on Stalin, who 
eventually decided not to occupy Finland and rather to negotiate peace in mid-March 1940.27 
The Finns were forced to agree to peace terms similar to – but more disadvantageous, than the 
Soviet demands put forward in the pre-war negotiations. The Red Army and the Soviet Union, 
however, had suffered a huge blow of prestige and the effects of the invasion of Finland had 
spilled over to Allied-German conflict. 
2.2 The German Invasion of Norway 1940 
“Norwegian history is international history”, wrote Magne Skodvin in the preface to his book 
on Norway in the Second World War.28(a) Whereas the Winter War was a conflict between the 
Finns and the Russians, the Norwegian Campaign was a multinational battle and, hence the 
name, one of the campaigns of the Second World War. Unlike the British and French, the 
Germans were silent during the Winter War in obligation to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. 
However, the Soviet advance into Finland and the knowledge of Allied plans involving 
occupation of parts of Scandinavia caused alarm in Berlin as much as it did in Oslo and 
Stockholm.29 The Nordic countries’ fears of a pre-emptive attack by Germany were, in fact, not 
far off reality. Roughly a month after the Winter War’s conclusion, Hitler launched Operation 
Weserübung – a massive combined operation with the aim of conquering Denmark and Norway 
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in a risky, but decisive blow. 
2.2.1 Motivation and Aims 
Because of its successful operation, and due to the fact that Germany became the grand loser 
of the Second World War, the Invasion of Norway is a less speculative theme in historiography 
than the Invasion of Finland. Surely, nazification and/or subjugation of Norway existed in 
Hitler’s vision of a future ‘New Order’ in Europe, as much as the world revolution did in Stalin’s. 
However, this was not the primary motivation nor the immediate goal for the German attack on 
April 9, 1940.30 In his planning for Weserübung, Hitler aimed for a peaceful occupation where, 
in an ideal scenario, the political administration of Denmark and Norway was not taken over 
by the Germans. This was successful in the case of Denmark.31 
Hitler did not have any actual plans for conquering Norway before December 1939.32 His 
focus was on defeating France in a head-on assault on the continent. However, as the offensive 
was repeatedly postponed during the Winter War months in 1939-1940, his attention gradually 
turned to the north. It was of utmost importance to the Germans that the status quo in Norway 
and Sweden was preserved and the Nordic Countries remained neutral. British control of 
Norway would indeed have had severe consequences for the Germans, not only the loss of 
indispensable Swedish iron ore, but it would also mean British access to the Baltic Sea – an 
area where Berlin and the heartland of Germany lay poorly defended.33 Additionally, a German 
controlled Norway was perceived an excellent position for the German armed forces to stage a 
counter-blockade and siege of Great Britain.  
During the Winter War, Norwegian territorial waters became an international arena for 
determining whether or not Britain could enforce its blockade of Germany by keeping German 
vessels out of international waters. If the Norwegians were able to hinder German and British 
breach of neutrality in their territorial waters, they could escape the situation of being squeezed 
between the warring powers. 34  Nevertheless, tensions over Norwegian neutrality raised 
constantly and reached a climax in February 1940, during and after the so-called Altmark 
incident. Altmark was a German Navy auxiliary ship, carrying 299 British sailors as prisoners, 
en route to Germany through Norwegian waters on February 16 when the British destroyer 
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Cossack, following a short skirmish, captured it. The incident was a blatant breach of 
Norwegian neutrality and prompted an urgent realisation in Berlin, and indeed in Oslo, that the 
Norwegians were unable to patrol their neutral waters. Furthermore, the incident confirmed to 
Hitler that Norwegian authorities would not resist British landings, and urged him to carry out 
an invasion.35 Following the end of the Winter War in March 1940, the Western Allies cancelled 
the invasion plan for Scandinavia, relieving the prepared forces to the Western Front while the 
Germans sped up their preparation for an invasion of Norway. Freed from the risk of a conflict 
with the Soviet Union, the British leadership proceeded in early April with a ‘minor plan’ 
against the Norwegian iron route; the deployment of mines in Norwegian waters, backed by a 
military expedition to counter possible German retaliation.36 The British were too late, however, 
and by surprise, the ‘minor plan’ was made redundant on April 9 by the German attack. 
German propaganda, thus, claimed the motivation behind the invasion of Norway was purely 
pre-emptive; a first strike in a race with Great Britain. This explanation lived on in 
historiography for decades.37 However, modern studies maintain that since the Norwegian 
government and people were pro-British and anti-German, no Allied landings would have taken 
place without the government’s consent or without an evidence that a German attack was 
imminent. Furthermore, such a landing would only be limited to strategic locations. Recent 
historiography also claims that even if an Allied landing had taken place without Norwegian 
and Swedish approval, the Scandinavians would not have put up a real fight. The German 
invasion on the other hand, was fully prepared to use force if needed be and was carefully 
planned as a complete occupation of the whole country.38 It is thus widely viewed as – not a 
pre-emptive action, but, to use Olav Riste’s words: A “plain aggressive exercise in power 
politics”.39 
2.2.2 The Campaign 
German troops disembarked their ships at various locations on the Norwegian coast from Oslo 
to Narvik on April 9, 1940. Although the invasion hit the Norwegians mentally and physically 
unprepared, the king and the government refused to cooperate in a peaceful occupation. Instead, 
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they offered resistance and waited for Allied assistance, which was promised to them 
immediately once the invasion was launched. While the king fled the German onslaught, a 
German sympathiser, Vidkun Quisling, aimed to collaborate with the Germans and staged a 
self-initiated coup in Oslo. Quisling was a major in the Norwegian army and a former 
Norwegian minister of defence who founded the fascist-inspired, far-right political party 
Nasjonal Samling in 1933. The party enjoyed microscopic support from the Norwegian 
population and received little interest from the Germans until he was granted an audience with 
Hitler in December 1939, during which he shall have agitated for an invasion of Norway. Soon 
after his coup, the Germans dismissed Quisling’s government for it seemed to have a negative 
effect on their effort in Norway.40  
Allied forces landed in Norway less than a week after Weserübung commenced, aiming to 
reinforce the Norwegian defence in central Norway and march on southwards. The Germans, 
however, enjoying the benefit of air superiority, drove out the inexperienced Allied expedition 
and managed to gain control over most of Southern Norway by late April, leaving the exhausted 
Norwegians to a determined struggle in isolated pockets. At the month’s end, Norwegian and 
Allied forces evacuated from the whole of Southern Norway. German air superiority did not 
reach Northern Norway where the defenders held a more favourable position. The Norwegian 
army in the north was fully mobilised and went on the offensive along with British and French 
troops against German-held Narvik. On May 10, 1940, however, Hitler finally ordered the long-
awaited invasion of France, which naturally directed British and French priorities towards the 
Western Front. The British decided to evacuate Norway in early June and the Norwegian king 
and the government, who had resettled in Tromsø, followed suit and left for Britain, from where 
they would continue the war in exile. On June 10, all remaining Norwegian forces capitulated 
to the Germans and the country remained occupied until 1945. 
2.3 The Icelandic Political Environment in 1939 
2.3.1 The National Government 
The Kingdom of Iceland was established with the Act of Union with Denmark in 1918. This 
meant that Iceland and Denmark were separate sovereign constitutional monarchies in a 
personal union, although the Danish government was obliged to handle Icelandic matters of 
defence and foreign affairs. Fairly modernised by 1940, and with a population of c. 120.000 
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inhabitants, Iceland was by majority an urban society with a significant rural population.41  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the interwar era had developed a class-political 
system where virtually all power was consolidated amongst three mainstream political parties: 
The Independence Party (i.Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn), the Progressive Party (i. 
Framsóknarflokkurinn) and the Labour Party (i. Alþýðuflokkurinn). Despite the economic 
hardships of the 1930s and an omnipresent nationalist culture, the Icelanders shared the Nordic 
model of rooted parliamentarianism and solid democratic institutions. Political extremism the 
likes of which was popular in Central and Eastern Europe was scarce in Iceland. The ideological 
aspects of National Socialism enjoyed some appeal among middle-class anti-communists and 
nationalists in the 1930s. A political party was formed in 1934 by radical young men of the 
conservative right; the Nationalist Party (i. flokkur þjóðernissinna), which gradually faded out 
from 1938 on. By 1939, it was “well and securely dead” and the number of vocal members of 
the national socialist movement had declined into a few dozen at most.42 German-friendly 
elements in Iceland at that time thus consisted mostly of “respected citizens” on the right-wing, 
whose home was in the mainstream Independence Party.43  
By far the largest party in the Althing, the Icelandic parliament, was the right-wing 
Independence Party, formed by a merger in 1929. Represented by Vísir and Morgunblaðið in 
the press, this party of employers and entrepreneurs contained a mixture of liberal and 
conservative bourgeois elements. The party also aspired to establish itself in resistance of the 
horizontal class division of politics, which delivered it support from the “average nationalistic 
and even ‘non-political’” voter in addition to the upper classes.44 The Independence Party thus 
enjoyed the wide support of 41-48% of the electorate during the 1930s.45  
The Progressive Party, owner of Tíminn, was an agrarian-liberal party formed in 1917, 
largely representing the interests of the prominent rural society. An additional source of 
influence was the party’s connections with the cooperative movement, which was a growing 
rural organisation and soon-to-be trading empire. Due to flaws in the electoral system, the 
Progressive Party was usually overrepresented in the parliament and very powerful and 
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influential. During the 1930s, the party received between 22 and 36 per cent of the votes.46  
The Labour Party, represented in the press by Alþýðublaðið, was a social democratic party 
formed in 1916, which enjoyed strong ties with the social-democratic sister parties in 
Scandinavia. The party functioned as the political arm of the Icelandic Confederation of Labour 
(i. Alþýðusamband Íslands), i.e. the organised labour movement. With this link, the party 
enjoyed significant influence among the working classes, although its grip on the labour 
movement was constantly challenged from both the left and the right. The Labour Party had the 
support of 16-22% of the voting population in the decade before the Second World War.47 
The three mainstream parties took turns occupying government cabinets in various coalitions 
throughout the 1930s, usually lead by the Progressive Party. Despite their differences, they 
generally shared a common animosity towards the Icelandic communists, whose ideology was 
considered alien and dangerous.48 In the spring of 1939, a Progressive-Labour government was 
joined by the Independence Party to form a three-party coalition for the first time. This was a 
measure to cope better with the economic hardships, the endangering international situation and 
the rise of communist influence.49 The coalition was termed the ‘National Government’ (i. 
Þjóðstjórnin); a name that emphasised its focus on national unity, but simultaneously alienated 
the three Socialist Party MPs remaining in opposition. The first priority of the National 
Government was to maintain Icelandic neutrality in the war and try to keep continued trade 
with both Germany and Britain. Trade with Germany was seen as equally important to British 
trade because increased trade with Germany in the late 1930s had softened the economic effects 
of the loss of Spanish fish export markets following the Spanish Civil War.50 
2.3.2 The Socialist Party  
It was mentioned before that far-right extremism was scarce in Iceland before the war. The 
radical left, however, had a relatively strong support among the Icelandic working classes. 
Although usually dominated by the Labour Party, the labour movement was greatly influenced 
by the communists who enjoyed relatively more influence in the labour movement than their 
sister parties did in the other Nordic Countries.51 Formed in 1930, the Communist Party of 
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Iceland was a revolutionary vanguard party, which operated in cooperation with the Communist 
International.52 In 1938, the party merged with a splinter group from the Labour Party to form 
the People’s Unity Party – The Socialist Party (i. Sameiningarflokkur Alþýðu – 
Sósíalistaflokkurinn). It has been described as becoming a “radical mass movement” with the 
merger and was by definition a democratic socialist party and a non-member of the Comintern.53 
The far-left gained increasing support during the 1930s, gaining from 3 to 9 per cent of the 
electoral votes. This was the largest share of parliamentary votes received by any pro-Soviet 
far-left party in Scandinavia.54  
With the Socialist Party leadership consisting predominantly of communists after the merger 
in 1938, it was unmistakeably aligned with Moscow in these years. The leadership was in 
contact with the Soviets and in the party’s official manifest, the leadership ensured that the 
revolutionary way preserved as an option for a final push to power.55 Some scholars maintain 
that even though it was a mass movement, the Socialist Party of the 1940s was still bent on 
stealing power in Iceland with or without the aid of the Soviet Union.56 
2.4 Iceland during the Phoney War 
Even though the creation of the National Government in the spring of 1939 may have had 
something to do with rising communist influence, it was primarily an attempt to steer the 
country securely through the windy waters of depression and the upcoming Second World War. 
Upon gaining sovereignty in the Act of Union Treaty with Denmark in 1918, Iceland declared 
“perpetual neutrality” (i. ævarandi hlutleysi). This was part of the Icelanders’ nationalist ideal 
for living free and autonomous on their island.57 With war approaching, the declaration was 
stressed along with the Nordic Countries in Stockholm in 1938, and again after the outbreak of 
war a year later. In effect, these Icelandic neutrality declarations were nothing more than empty 
statements. The declaration of 1918 had no legal authority, unlike the perpetual neutrality of 
Switzerland for example, which was a legally binding contract.58 Furthermore, unlike the other 
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Nordic Countries, Icelandic neutrality would not be enforced since there existed no army to 
defend it. After the outbreak of war in September 1939, the National Government went great 
lengths to maintain the neutrality policy, for example by taking equal measures when German 
and British sea- and airmen found themselves stranded on the island. Additionally, the 
government tried to talk itself past the British blockade in order to continue trading with 
Germany.59 
Despite all this talk of neutrality, the position of Iceland at the outbreak of war was in ways 
similar to that of Norway discussed before. According to Whitehead, the Icelandic government 
favoured the Western Allies above the Germans and it based its neutrality policy on the believe 
that Iceland was – and had been since the Napoleonic Wars – established within the British 
sphere of influence and already protected, without a garrison, by the Royal Navy roaming the 
North Atlantic. 60  Despite Icelandic protests, trade with Germany was ceased already by 
November 1939, and in January 1940, secret Icelandic-British trade negotiations had secured 
Icelandic exports to Britain.61 Icelandic officials even recognised that the British were “fighting 
for law and order in Europe and for the rights of minor nations, including the Icelanders, to live 
in peace” and the authorities made arrangements after the Invasion of Denmark and Norway so 
that aid could be called in from Britain if the Germans attempted landings in Iceland.62 All this, 
of course, was top secret. On the outside, Iceland was supposed to look completely neutral – 
and there were few voices in government circles who wanted to change that.  
2.4.1 The Non-communist Press and the World War 
When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, the political organs of the National 
Government addressed their readers in a rather paternalistic manner, preparing the public for a 
long period of sacrifice, isolation and shortages of imported goods. There was a universal 
understanding in the papers that the outbreak of war was a terrible and unwelcome tragedy and 
that the official neutrality policy of the country should be maintained at all cost.63 The complete 
non-communist press was undoubtedly more aligned with the Western Allies than Nazi-
Germany in terms of politics. Additionally, Whitehead points out that the British enjoyed the 
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upper hand in a “propaganda war” which took place in in all Icelandic media. This fact 
apparently outraged the German consul in Iceland who complained about an unequal 
representation of Germany in the Icelandic newspapers.64 
Even though the social-democratic Alþýðublaðið was advocate of the official Icelandic 
neutrality, it was the only paper to take an explicit anti-German and pro-Allied stance when 
referring to outside the war itself. In early September 1939, the paper was in no doubt as to who 
was to blame for the great conflict. The Second World war was considered an “unscrupulous” 
and deliberate, cold-blooded war of “German Nazism”, as declared by the editor on September 
5, who underlined that the Western powers had only gone to war to put an end to German 
“aggression” and “violence”.65 Such explicitly pro-Allied remarks were seldom released in the 
centre-right press before April-May 1940, although Tíminn occasionally gave the impression 
during the Phoney War that its commentators disliked German actions in direct relation to the 
German-British conflict.66 Otherwise, the right-wing press was careful to maintain the utmost 
neutrality towards the Germans in its writings, at least before the British Occupation of Iceland. 
After the occupation and the escalation of the world war in Europe in May and June 1940, there 
is a marked increase in pro-Allied remarks appearing in all of the centre-right papers.67  
The Soviet Union was fiercely castigated in the non-communist press across titles, and 
especially in relation to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Alþýðublaðið went by far the furthest in 
interpreting the pact as an alliance of cooperation. Quite a few opinion pieces published in the 
Labour Party organ during the winter of 1939-1940 onwards depicted the world war in that 
period as a jointly devised conspiracy by the two dictators in Germany and Russia.68 
Pro-German remarks are rare and almost non-existent. The very few opinion pieces carrying 
pro-German sentiments are mostly articles from German sources published in Vísir and 
Morgunblaðið in January and February 1940, promoting the German point of view regarding 
the heated situation of the Nordic Countries.69 Comparing Hitler and Stalin in February 1940, 
                                                 
64 Whitehead. 1995, p. 192-194. See for example: “Breska þingið á ófriðartímum”. Morgunblaðið. 07.02.1940, p. 
5. 
65 “Hinir seku”. Alþýðublaðið. 05.09.1939, p. 3. 
66 See for example: “Yfir landamærin”. Tíminn. 23.03.1940, p. 132; “Áróður kommúnista”. Tíminn. 25.01.1940, 
p. 39. 
67  See for example: “Sóknin mikla”. Vísir. 11.05.1940, p. 2; Jónas Jónsson. “Hið breytta viðhorf”. Tíminn. 
16.05.1940, p. 206. 
68 See for example: “Varnarstríð(!)” Alþýðublaðið. 15.12.1940, p. 3; Sigurður Einarsson. “Þreifað til meðalkaflans”. 
Alþýðublaðið. 09.02.1940, p. 2; “Örlagastund Norðurlanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 09.03.1940, p. 3; “Uppgjöf Finna”. 
Alþýðublaðið. 14.03.1940, p. 3; “Auðvaldsstyrjöld?”. Alþýðublaðið. 22.05.1940, p. 3. 
69 “Hótanir Þðzkalands í garð Norðurlanda”. Vísir. 08.01.1940, p. 2; “Hættan, sem Norður-Evrópu stafar úr Austri”. 
Morgunblaðið. 23.01.1940, p. 5; ““Altmark”-atvikið”. Morgunblaðið. 20.02.1940, p. 4. 
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Morgunblaðið's columnist presented Hitler and the Nazi state in an unusually positive light.70 
This article is probably the only explicitly pro-German opinion piece written by an Icelandic 
journalist during the Phoney War period.71 
2.4.2 Political and Popular Reactions to the Invasions of Scandinavia 
Sovereignty Day, December 1, was the 
national holiday of the Kingdom of Iceland. It 
was the day Iceland became a sovereign state 
in 1918, the same year an array of other minor 
nations became independent, including 
Finland. Sovereignty Day in 1939, however, 
the first day of the Winter War, was not 
engulfed in celebrations of freedom, but 
sympathy and grief. With the Icelandic and 
Finnish national flags flying at the front, the 
traditional Sovereignty Day student parade in 
Reykjavík was transformed into a “walk of solidarity”. A crowd, claimed by the papers to be 
the largest gathering in Reykjavík since 1918, assembled outside the Finnish consulate where 
the “condolences of students and the Icelandic nation” were ceremonially delivered to the 
consul, followed by Reykjavík City Band’s performance of the Icelandic and Finnish national 
anthems.72 Sovereignty Day celebrations and gatherings were also cancelled elsewhere, or had 
their agendas changed as to include the payment of respect to the Finns.73  
Although the Icelandic government did not issue any official statements about the Soviet 
invasion of Finland in November 1939, its members expressed their pro-Finnish and anti-Soviet 
standpoint decisively both in words and actions. Virtually every prominent member of the 
government, along with members of the intelligentsia and government agencies, signed an 
address of sympathy and good wishes to the Finns, issued by the Nordic Association in Iceland 
on December 1.74 The address was broadcast over state radio and published in all the major 
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Image 1: The gathering outside the Finnish consulate in 
Reykjavík on December 1, 1939. The Icelandic and 
Finnish national flags can be seen in the foreground. 
Morgunblaðið claimed the crowd numbered 8.000-
10.000 people. Source: Morgunblaðið. 02.12.1939. 
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newspapers in Reykjavík before it was sent to the government in Finland.75 Three days later, 
the parliament took a more formal and decisive stance with the Finnish cause at a parliament 
session. Having resigned from the idea to ban the Socialist Party, whose communist leadership 
refused to condemn the invasion, the Speaker of the parliament read out a declaration, signed 
by all MPs except the Socialists and three absent members:  
In light of the position that the communist party, which operates here under the name Socialist Unity 
Party – the Socialist Party –, its MPs and party organs, have established towards the freedom, rights 
and democracy of the minor nations in the last weeks, and especially regarding the case of Finland, 
the undersigned MPs declare that they consider the dignity of the Althing outraged by the presence 
of representatives of such a party in the parliament.76(b)  
A few weeks later, all non-Socialist members of the parliament also demonstrated their support 
of Finland by collectively donating one week of their pay to the Icelandic Finland Relief 
program.77 
The Finland Relief (i. Finnlandssöfnunin) was launched on December 10, 1939; the so-
called “Finland Day” in Reykjavík. The Icelandic Red Cross and the Nordic Association in 
Iceland organised the event which included entertainment and public speeches in order to raise 
money for Finns in need. The success of the day lead to a nation-wide fund-raising which lasted 
throughout the Winter War and beyond. Markedly, the Finland Relief became the largest and 
most far-reaching fund-raising ever held in Iceland at the time. The Red Cross received money 
donations from firms and individuals; apparently from all walks of life, as well as gifts of 
knitted clothing and other wares. The Red Cross packed and sent supplies to Finland in the form 
of clothing and cheques of money.78 In addition, the Icelandic Red Cross was in contact with 
the sister association in Finland and other actors during the Winter War, offering to mediate 
evacuated Finnish children to care in Icelandic families. According to Tíminn, at least 40 
families volunteered to the undertaking but the Finnish Red Cross declined the offer in January 
1940 due to the distance and risky transport.79  
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The storms of the concluded Winter War had just begun to settle on April 9, 1940, when the 
news of the German Invasion of Norway and union-member Denmark reached Iceland. A 
historic moment presented itself with Denmark occupied and the king of Iceland imprisoned in 
his palace. During an extraordinary parliament session in the evening of April 9, MPs agreed to 
a parliament resolution which released the king’s constitutional duties over to the Icelandic 
government and with a stroke of pen, the 700 year reign of foreign kings was, “for the time 
being”, put to an end.80 The government and non-Socialist MPs also made the decision that day 
not to plead for British military protection in light of the events in Denmark, but to remain 
neutral. Protection had already been offered by the British in December 1939 and January 1940 
and the future British prime minister Winston Churchill publicly declared after Operation 
Weserübung that he would not allow for a German occupation of Iceland.81 
There was no walk of solidarity through the streets of Reykjavík on April 9, 1940, nor a 
public conveyance of condolences at the consulates. Instead, a crowd of people gathered in 
town until past darkness, monitoring the latest news updates from Scandinavia. News leaflets 
were spread out and homemade news panels were flung from the windows of Morgunblaðið’s 
headquarters, which were lit up with spotlights in the evening. Alþýðublaðið followed suit and 
exhibited the latest news written on boards in the windows of the paper’s offices. The events in 
Denmark had brought the war closer to the Icelanders; they even woke up the day after the 
invasion to false news reports that Germany was at war with them.82 
In May, however, the Norwegians fighting for their homeland did receive a resemblance of 
the mass-gatherings previously undertaken for the support of Finland. The Labour Party and 
the Confederation of Labour decided to dedicate their Labour Day celebrations this year to the 
“brethren-nations in the Nordic countries”, as a token of support for the international social 
democratic movement and the international struggle against fascism. The workers’ holiday thus 
became, as Alþýðublaðið claimed: “a mighty declaration of sympathy”, especially for 
Norway.83 (c ) The parade marched through town with the Nordic national flags at the front, 
making stops for Reykjavík City Band to play the national anthems of Denmark and Norway at 
their respective consulates. Meanwhile, pins were sold in the streets with the label of the day; 
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the Nordic flags on a shield with a red ribbon.84 The number of people gathered on this day is 
uncertain, although, it is safe to assume that the Labour Party’s agenda was the most widely 
attended that day. The right-wing paper Vísir stated in protest that people had not joined 
Labour’s parade out of sympathy for the party, but for “other kind of sympathy” - that towards 
the neighbours at war.85 
Even though the Labour Party may have played on people’s sympathies to attract them to 
their celebrations on May 1, it were generally members and associates of the party who 
organised and/or appeared in the events demonstrating sympathy and brotherhood with Norway 
and Finland. During the Winter War, there are reported two such meetings being held with 
arrangements for cultural enlightenment and entertainment whilst raising money for the Finland 
Relief. The Reykjavík Labour Party Society (i. Alþýðuflokksfélag Reykjavíkur) included such 
an arrangement at one of its political meetings in December 1939 and shortly after the invasion 
of Norway, the association held the only reported educational meeting dedicated to Norway and 
Denmark with reference to the invasion.86  
The Nordic Association in Iceland, whose president was the Labour minister and party leader 
Stefán Jóh. Stefánsson, was the standard-bearer of sympathy with Norway and Finland.87 
Having co-organised the successful Finland Relief, the Nordic Association proceeded with a 
new fund-raising along with the Norwegian Society in Iceland (n. Nordmannslaget) on the 
Norwegian Constitution Day, May 17, 1940. This was intended for a handful of Norwegian 
refugees who fled the German onslaught on fishing boats. According to news reports, the first 
boat arrived in Seyðisfjörður from Molde on May 7, carrying ten fishermen followed by a 
second fishing boat in Akureyri a week later, carrying 16 people from Ålesund.88 May 17 was 
far different from the “Finland Day” spectacle in December which triggered the Finland Relief. 
Followed by a Norwegian service in Reykjavík Cathedral, members of the Nordic Association 
sold pins in the streets of Reykjavík, Akureyri and Hafnarfjörður while the state radio broadcast 
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a message followed by a performance of Norwegian music. Compared to the profits of the 
“Finland Day” which produced c. 11.000 ISK on the first day, the fund-raising on May 17 
collected slightly over 6.000 ISK.89 No further fund-raising was conducted for the Norwegians 
in this period.90 
2.4.3 The Socialist Party and the Invasions in Scandinavia 
Despite its relative strength, the Socialist Party experienced a historical low-point already one 
year after its formation in 1938. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet Invasion of 
Eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939 tested the Icelandic communists’ loyalty to Stalin. The 
party leadership confusingly tried to explain and apologise the controversial foreign policy of 
the Soviet Union, even though the party was no longer an official part of the Comintern and its 
newspaper officially claimed a neutral standpoint in these affairs.91  
The Socialist Party was hard hit by the Soviet invasion of Finland and its isolation reached 
new heights. The communists themselves coined the term Finnagaldur (‘Finnish-trick’), which 
has stuck in historiography, describing the wave of internal and external disfavour with the 
Socialist Party during that year. Many members left the party, including the non-Soviet-aligned 
arm of the leadership, which had joined the communists in the merger one year earlier. Among 
them was the party boss himself, Héðinn Valdimarsson who ended his political carrier there and 
then.92 Þjóðviljinn entered financial disarray, not only due to the lack of advertisement revenue 
but also because the paper lost nearly half of its subscribers.93 Additionally, party members were 
denied from renting rooms and locales for their meetings and arrangements and Socialist MPs 
were largely ignored in the parliament throughout the rest of the year. The situation even 
reached such heights that it came to physical clashes between the Socialist party leader and the 
prime minister in March 1940.94  
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The Icelandic Finnagaldur had its parallels in other democracies during the winter of 1939-
1940. A similar advertisement boycott was employed against the communist newspapers in 
Norway and Denmark while some of the Swedish communist press was the subject of terrorism 
and government confiscations.95 In France, communists were ousted or arrested throughout the 
country and in March-April 1940, French communist MPs were tried and sentenced for 
treason.96 Around that same time, in late March and early April, a parliament resolution was 
suggested at the Icelandic parliament, presented by three government MPs. Inspired by the 
Winter War discourse, it was directed against those persons who aspired to “overturn the 
societal order with violence and deliver Iceland under a foreign state”97 In its original form, the 
resolution would have restricted these persons from holding offices for the Icelandic state, but 
it’s final and passed version was merely an indecisive confirmation of the government parties’ 
fears and suspicion towards communists and other political extremists.98 
As for opinions and portrayals of the foreign events, the communist press echoed the 
Socialist Party leadership’s claim that the Soviet Union was not at war with “the Finnish nation” 
- only with the Finnish government, which Þjóðviljinn tirelessly criticised for being an 
imperialist and oppressive regime of reaction during the winter of 1939-1940. Personified in 
the former leader of the White Guard in the Finnish Civil War, Carl Emil Mannerheim, who 
now was the chief of the Finnish defence during the Winter War, the supposedly illegitimate 
and militaristic ‘Mannerheim-government’ was presented by the paper as an enemy of the 
people.99 Thus, Þjóðviljinn celebrated the prospects of a communist liberation of the Finnish 
people, just as it had celebrated the sovietization of Eastern Poland and the Baltic states.100 In 
addition, the communist press maintained the Soviet argumentations of a pre-emptive strike. 
The Finnish government is said to have conspired with both Nazi-Germany and the Western 
Allies against the Soviet Union and engaged in an excessive military build-up.101 In light of this 
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believe, the communist press claimed that the war was purely a “defensive war” with the 
benefits of a socialist liberation as a positive side-effect.102 
Þjóðviljinn presented an interpretation of the Second World War according to the latest line 
from Moscow. The effect of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the activities of the communist 
parties in Europe was that criticism relating to the war was directed from an anti-fascist 
standpoint into a general anti-imperialist standpoint. Germany was now considered no worse 
an imperialist power than the Western Allies. 103  This line is reflected in the writings of 
Þjóðviljinn during the Phoney War period, whose OP writers softened their view of Nazi-
Germany and bashed relentlessly on the British. 104  Þjóðviljinn’s opinion on the German 
Invasion of Norway and Denmark was in line with this anti-imperialist perspective. The paper 
declared its sincere condolences with the Norwegian and Danish peoples for being dragged into 
the imperialist war.105 
Þjóðviljinn opposed the Allied intervention in the Norwegian Campaign as well.106 The 
paper criticised the Allies heavily for mine laying in Norwegian waters, even claiming that the 
Germans were “lured” into performing the invasion by the British. Even though the paper 
maintained that the Allies were illegitimately fighting the war on Norwegian ground, it still 
accused them of “betrayal” when the British evacuated Norway in early May 1940, for giving 
the Norwegians false hopes that they cared for them.107 The communist press’ hostile attitude 
towards the British continued into the British Occupation of Iceland, against which Þjóðviljinn 
fought fiercely in its writings, eventually earning the hostility of the occupation authorities who 
banned the paper in April 1941 and moved its editors as prisoners to Britain.108  
2.5 Epilogue 
Such was the mind set of those in Icelandic government circles when they decided to decline 
British offers of protection after the invasion of Denmark and Norway, that they regarded such 
offers “double-edged” and a threat to the nation’s independence, even though most of them 
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considered a German occupation “the worst curse that could be brought over the country”.109(d) 
Norway and Iceland thus shared the common attribute of being politically aligned with the 
Allies and preferring an indirect protection by the Royal Navy as a means of staying on the 
“right side”, to quote Norwegian foreign minister Halvdan Koht’s words, while officially 
preserving neutrality.110 
The Icelandic political and popular reactions to the invasions of Norway and Finland 
resemble the winter of 1939-1940 as a period of uncertainty. The battle between communism, 
fascism and democracy was in its starting phase without a winner emergent. They display a 
decisive feeling of solidarity, although its form of expression seems to have been dictated by 
proximity and urgency – the Finnish case receiving more symbolic reactions and the 
Norwegian-Danish case generating more serious reactions of real danger. In the next chapter, 
we will see how the Icelandic press reacted to the Invasion of Finland. 
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Chapter III  
The Soviet Invasion of Finland 
in the Icelandic Non-Communist Press 
 
All four newspapers this research is based on, decisively and openly took sides with Finland 
and against the Soviet Union during the Winter War. Vísir, Morgunblaðið, Tíminn and 
Alþýðublaðið maintained the widely-held opinion that the Soviet invasion was an act of 
illegitimate violence. In this chapter, the discursive themes that were identified in the Icelandic 
Winter War discourse will be presented, along with quotes and references to the Icelandic 
newspapers. We shall reveal if, and how, the discourse evolved over time and eventual 
dissimilarities between newspaper titles. Six discursive themes were identified in the source 
material, and are categorised into three groups, appearing here in order of significance:  
1. Domestic Anti-Communism: Themes about the expression of anti-communism 
relating to the Winter War. 
2. Portrayals of the Winter War Belligerents: Themes about the portrayals of the Finns 
and the Soviets in relation to the day-to-day conflict on the battlefield. 
3. The Frontier-Metaphors: Themes about the wider significance of the Winter War in 
Europe. 
3.1 Domestic Anti-Communism 
Domestic anti-communism during the Winter War is the most obvious characteristic of the 
whole Winter War discourse. Winter War anti-communism appears principally as a reaction to 
the writings of communist press; Þjóðviljinn, and the opinions of Socialist Party leaders. These 
actors are accused of failing to denounce the invasion of Finland, celebrating the Soviet attack, 
rejoicing over Finnish calamities and legitimising Soviet violence by disguising it as a 
liberation.1 The discourse is largely uniform and is usually structured in a way as if the four 
papers repeat one after another, in diverse forms, the following five points: (1) It is unbelievable 
that there are people in this country who apologise an act such as the Invasion of Finland. (2) 
Such people have willingly resigned from this society and their allegiance lies abroad. (3) This 
                                                 
1 See for example: “Fullveldisdagurinn í ár”. Alþýðublaðið. 01.12.1939. p. 3; “Fyrirlitnir menn”. Vísir. 02.12.1939, 
p. 2. 
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is something we, the anti-communist elements, already knew, but is now exposed to the whole 
nation. (4) They would form a puppet-government here too, if the Red Army came to Iceland 
and (5) it is therefore important to exclude them from society. Let us now review the anti-
communist discursive themes deriving from this train of thought: 
1. “The Kuusinens” and the Drop of the Mask: The idea that the Soviet Invasion of 
Finland had dispelled a myth about the Soviet Union and communists being peaceful 
and non-aggressive. Functioning as fifth column for an aggressive power, domestic 
communist are proved treacherous. 
2. Call for Excommunication: The idea that Icelandic communists must be politically 
excluded from society because of their standpoint towards the Invasion of Finland 
and the argumentation for their danger described above. 
3.1.1 “The Kuusinens” and the Drop of the Mask 
““The Protector of the Minor Nations” fully reveals itself”, declared Tíminn's front page 
headline on December 1, 1939, the day after the Soviet Invasion of Finland began.2(a) This exact 
term; “protector of the minor nations” (i. verndari smáþjóðanna), usually within quotation 
marks, appears frequently in the non-communist press to denote and mock the Soviet Union, 
whose leaders had posed as the defenders of the minor nations against Nazi-Germany.3 The 
Invasion of Finland illustrated to these papers that the Soviet Union was an enemy of the minor 
nations, not their defender. Many opinion pieces, especially during the Winter War's opening 
weeks, thus describe the invasion as a drop of the mask (i. grímufall). The term was used to 
metaphorically to describe an exposure of a concealed real intent of the Soviet Union and of 
the Icelandic communists.4 The social-democratic Alþýðublaðið wrote on December 6, quite 
alarmingly, as if to wake up those among its working class readership who perhaps still 
harboured warm feelings towards the Soviet Union, that “what people had previously believed 
in” was now betrayed.5(b) The invasion dispelled “once and for all” the illusion that Russia was 
a “worker's and peasant’s state.”6(c) 
To the hardened anti-communist commentators who were no amateurs in the debate with 
                                                 
2 ““Verndari smáþjóðanna” afhjúpar sig til fullnustu”. Tíminn. 01.12.1939, p. 553. 
3 See for example: “Fyrirlitnir menn”. Vísir. 02.12.1939, p. 2; “;Landráðaskrif kommúnista”. Vísir. 27.01.1940, p. 
4; “'Verndari smáþjóðanna að verki' [image]”. Tíminn. 30.12.1939, p. 597. 
4 See for example: “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 31.12.1939, p. 5; “Hvað verður um kommúnistana?”. Vísir. 
07.12.1939, p. 2; Jónas Guðmundsson. “Kommúnistar heima og erlendis.” Alþýðublaðið. 10.02.1940, p. 3; Sr. 
Brynjólfur Magnússon. “Friðarríkið í austri og Finnlandsstyrjöldin”. Tíminn. 09.03.1940, p. 110. 
5 “Verið á verði”. Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 2. 
6 “Rússneskir verkamenn og bændur”. Alþýðublaðið. 21.12.1939, p. 3. 
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communists, the drop of the mask was no surprise. The discourse is, on the other hand, directed 
at the greater public, made to illustrate to previous non-believers or believers of the opposite 
cause that those pointing the finger had been right all along. In late January 1940, an author of 
a Vísir article pointed out that the latest international events were the variable which made 
Winter War anti-communism different from classic anti-communism: 
Each and every true Icelander despises the activities, the mentality and the mental wretchedness of 
these men [the communists]. Most people has viewed them as lacking a fatherland, but harmless 
upstarts. But the eyes of the nation are now opening to that they can be very harmful in these 
ongoing dangerous times.7(d) 
Morgunblaðið boasted over the fact that now that the Invasion of Finland had “opened the eyes 
of the nation”, the Independence Party could proudly remind that it had always fought valiantly 
against communism in years past and its proponents had foreseen something like this coming.8 
To the same effect, it was also commonplace for OP writers to list highlights from the history 
of the Icelandic Communist Party - often with quotes from their leaders or publications, leading 
up to the autumn of 1939 and the invasion of Finland proving the point that anti-communists 
had been right all along.9 As much as the invasion appalled and displeased these writers, the 
suggested final exposure of the communists must therefore have been a positive side effect for 
the non-communist press.  
The Soviet Invasion of Finland was supposed to have proven the real nature of Icelandic 
communists regarding three points: First, their violent and aggressive nature; that they could 
and would use violence to advance to power. “[He] who defends the murderers cause”, wrote 
Vísir's editor, poetically describing Icelandic communists, has the “victim's blood on his guilty 
hands”.10(e) Second, the communists are accused of being hypocritical in their stance towards 
national freedom and the rights of minor nations and third, the dropped mask represents the 
communists' own patriotic and democratic rhetoric which the non-communist press claimed 
was now proven as being lies and disguise. Of course, this was no new anti-communist 
propaganda. What caused alarm for the authorities and established anti-communists at that 
particular time was the perceived aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the example set by 
Finnish communist Otto Ville Kuusinen and his puppet government set up in Soviet occupied 
                                                 
7 “Hvað á að gera við föðurlandssvikaranna?” Vísir. 29.01.1940, p. 2. 
8 “Níðingsverkið”. Morgunblaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 5. 
9 See for example: “Föðurlandssvikarar”. Morgunblaðið. 03.12.1939, p. 5; Jónas Jónsson. “Gríman fellur af 
kommúnistum”, Tíminn. 05.12.1939, p. 562; Jakob Ó. Pétursson. “Kommúnisminn”. Vísir, 10.02.1940, p. 2. 
10 “Burt með kommúnistana”. Vísir. 17.12.1939, p. 2. 
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Finland.  
Alþýðublaðið stated in early December that there was one thing “even more disgusting” than 
the Red Army invading Finland and that was the “demeanour of the Finnish traitors”. 
Furthermore, their conduct was seen as having exposed how “completely unscrupulous” 
communists around the globe, including the Icelandic counterparts, in fact were.11 Based on 
this argument, Icelandic communists are deemed treacherous on the grounds of their Finnish 
counterparts' judgements. 
[The Icelandic communists] declare their contempt for the people who express their sympathies 
with those who want to own their homeland for themselves. They send their regards to other people; 
the bullies, who have betrayed their homeland and joined the enemies, the Finnish traitors, who 
shout with a crazed zeal: Finland for Russians!12(f) 
Here, a Vísir editorial titled “Iceland for Russians” displays a separation of us and them based 
on direct support for each side in the conflict. Icelandic communists are alienated on the grounds 
of sympathy with the Finnish “traitors” and “bullies”. Afterwards, he goes on to show that this 
is what the Icelandic counterparts are capable of and eventually they will cry out “Iceland for 
Russians!”13 
There was not much talk about Kuusinen himself and the Terijoki-government in the 
Icelandic press after the opening days of the Winter War in December 1939. The topic 
disappeared quickly from Soviet news reports after a few days when it became apparent that 
the war would prolong. However, Kuusinen's name came to represent the stereotype of the arch-
traitor and this stereotype was repeatedly attached to the Icelandic communists throughout the 
Winter War. Even after the war's conclusion in March 1940, Tíminn's editor pointed out to its 
readers that Kuusinen's name must not be forgotten, but live on “as some sort of a reminder to 
the nation, whose errands [the communists] serve”.14 (g ) The most obvious example of this 
metaphor is the made-up noun “kuusinen”, or “the kuusinens” (i. Kuusinarnir), used when 
referring to Icelandic communists. This mock-term was used in the non-communist press and 
                                                 
11 “Verið á verði”. Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 2. 
12 “Ísland fyrir Rússa!”. Vísir. 06.12.1939, p. 2. 
13 ibid. 
14 Þórarinn Þórarinnsson. “Eftirmæli um jarlsdóm Kuusinens og “alþððustjórnina í Terejoki”” Tíminn. 16.03.1940, 
p. 122. This article is equally important for it being the only OP in the non-communist press that exploits the 
fact that Otto Ville Kuusinen had been known among Icelandic communists before the Winter War made him a 
household name. During the 1930s, when Kuusinen was secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
and overseer of the Nordic communist parties, the Communist Party of Iceland had occasionally had its cases 
sent to him for consultation (Whitehead. 1995, p. 195). 
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is also recorded to have appeared within the halls of the parliament.15 Morgunblaðið coined the 
term in an editorial in January 1940 titled “The Icelandic Kuusinens”: 
These men are the communists, or the Kuusinens, which is now their rightful name because they 
are waiting for the opportunity to betray their country and nation, just like Kuusinen, the Finnish 
communist […]. How long must we tolerate the Kuusinens' activities in our society? Must we wait 
for them to plea to the dictator in Moscow for a similar “protection” as Kuusinen did? Must we wait 
until the Red Army arrives here, summoned by the traitors? 16(h) 
The latter questions posed by the author brings us to the next point: The anti-communist 
discourse during the Winter War months up until the German Invasion of Denmark and Norway 
is characterised not only by mockery and hostility but also of what appears an expression of 
danger and alarm. There is a clear link in the anti-communist discourse between the drop-of-
the-mask metaphor and an increased threat of a communist coup. These writers made it very 
clear to their readers that the Icelandic communists were considered likely to follow Kuusinen's 
footsteps if the Red Army were suddenly to arrive in the port of Reykjavík.17  
A Morgunblaðið columnist wrote after the outbreak of war in Finland that Icelandic 
communists had begun “whispering” that “the long-awaited hour [was] approaching, when the 
Red Army comes and “liberates” the Icelandic people”.18 (i ) Vísir's editor declared that “the 
events of the last few days” had convinced him that the communists would “sell out their people 
without hesitation” if Stalin was out to “conquer” it.19(j) In that case, Tíminn suggested they 
would “celebrate the Russians with a torch parade” and establish a Soviet puppet regime.20(k) 
The distance between Iceland and Russia and the historical trajectory of the Second World War 
might make these ideas seem irrational from today's perspective. However, as we shall see in 
Chapter 3.3, the fear of the Russians and the Soviet Union appears very real in the winter of 
1939-1940.  
                                                 
15At the time of the Winter War’s conclusion, rumours reached Iceland with the newspapers that Kuusinen had 
been shot on the orders of Stalin. According to Tíminn, Prime Minister Hermann Jónasson is said to have 
mockingly suggested to some MPs off-session on March 14, 1940, that Socialist Party MPs should be referred 
with “-Kuusinen” attached behind their names, such as “Brynjólfur Bjarnason Kuusinen”. The prime minister 
made the remarks having pointed out that death was a suitable fate for traitors. Socialist Party leader Brynjólfur 
Bjarnason overheard the conversation, confronted the prime minister and “groped” him, resulting in the prime 
minister striking Bjarnasson with a flat palm (“Brynjólfur Bjarnason fékk kinnhest...“ Tíminn. 16.03.1940, p. 
121). 
16  “Kuusinarnir íslensku”. Morgunblaðið. 17.01.1940, p. 5. See also: “Kuusinarnir tala um Quislinga!”. 
Alþýðublaðið. 11.05.1940, p. 3. 
17 See for example: “Ísland fyrir Rússa!” Vísir. 06.12.1939, p. 2; Jakob O. Pétursson. “Kommúnisminn”. Vísir. 
10.02.1940, p. 2; “Fullveldisdagurinn í ár”. Alþýðublaðið. 01.12.1939, p. 3. 
18“Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 03.12.1939, p. 5. 
19 ““Það hendir okkur aldrei””. Vísir. 04.12.1939, p. 2. 
20 “Þeir, sem vijla gefa Grímsey”. Tíminn. 18.01.1940, p. 27. 
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3.1.2 Call for Excommunication 
In a direct continuation of these accusations, the anti-communist Winter War discourse typically 
includes remarks suggesting social exclusion of Icelandic communists. This discursive theme 
is threefold: First, it evolves around passive social ostracism usually engulfed in highly 
nationalistic language and second, it contains instances where writers try to plant anti-
communism in society by actively encouraging social exclusion among the public. 
This rhetoric typically begins with a general referral to the alleged disdain harboured by the 
population of Iceland towards the communists because of the Winter War. They are ostracised 
in the discourse for being anti-national, pro-foreign and potential traitors to the motherland. The 
communists' repeated violent and anti-national conduct that is said to have culminated in their 
support for the Invasion of Finland has made them cease being Icelanders – in a nationalist-
romantic vision of what it means to bear that title. These writers are aware that the communists 
may not necessarily have broken any laws yet, but imply that certain social codes have been 
broken for which they must be excommunicated. A Vísir editorial titled “Despised Men” 
claimed that this widespread exclusion from “the company of those who know patriotism and 
love for the motherland” was a “punishment” for their conduct.21(l) A similar standpoint could 
be read in Tíminn immediately after the invasion: “The [Icelandic] nation will deliver to those 
who [...] plan for her the same fate as the Finns, the payment they deserve”, suggesting social 
excommunication based on a transgression.22(m) 
Some OPs take a step a bit further by directly promoting and encouraging social exclusion 
of communists to their readers. In January 1940, a Tíminn columnist proudly reported an 
example of the effects of Finnagaldur out in society where a Socialist gathering in town was 
ignored and bypassed by people. “Such disrespect should be shown to the communists 
everywhere”, declared the columnist, “and they should be made feel lonely and deserted” as 
long as they undemocratically oppose the “freedom of the minor nations” (i.e. Finland). The 
example for such an exclusion was set quite early on in the Winter War, on December 4, 1939, 
by the Icelandic parliament (see Chapter II). Tíminn's news coverage of the parliament 
declaration that triggered the Althing's circumvention of Socialist MPs was concluded with an 
applause and an agitation for the effort to be extended to society: 
 
                                                 
21 “Fyrirlitnir menn”. Vísir. 02.12.1939, p. 2. 
22 “Starfshættir kommúnista”. Tíminn. 02.12.1939, p. 558. 
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[The parliament having set the example], it is now the responsibility of the general public to act on 
this policy and show communists in all places the animosity and contempt that their activities 
deserve. […] They should sense that […] they have forfeit their right to affect Icelandic matters. 
With such a joint effort by the public, a perfect lack of communist influence will be secured.23(n) 
The thought that the parliament had set a course, or “policy”, suggesting social exclusion of a 
certain group of citizens, on which the common people was encouraged to act, is interesting 
since the non-communist press was effectively equivalent to official government press. 24 Even 
though the parliament eventually refrained from restricting access to important positions based 
on political convictions in April 1940 (see Chapter II), the discussion on whether or not such 
restrictions should be enforced, socially or politically, did take place in the Icelandic press 
following the Invasion of Finland. In the quote above, Jónas Jónsson, the leader of the 
Progressive Party and co-editor of the prime minister’s party organ was calling for a social 
enforcement of such restrictions. 
In a submitted Vísir article titled “What to do with the Traitors?” in January 1940, the author 
claimed that now, two months into the Winter War, it was about time the communists realised 
that the widespread antipathy displayed against them on all fronts was no longer sufficient for 
the Icelandic people. “If the state won’t do what's needed the nation will have to do it by herself”, 
the author threatened; the people “will now see to it that they [the communists] cease posing a 
threat to her independence and culture”.25(o) Another article in the same paper rejoiced over the 
anti-communist wave in society but urged it must rise “higher and higher” until “public opinion 
has expelled them [communists] from the legislature, from town councils, from local 
governments” and elementary institutions across the country.26 
Undoubtedly, many loyal members of the Socialist Party were employed in posts such as 
these. However, it was in the labour movement and among the working class where the party 
enjoyed the most influence. “This has to change”, declared Vísir's editor in December 1939, 
worrying about the high amounts of money laying in the hands of communist union bosses, 
before making a plea to “each individual who is loyal to his nation” to follow the Althing's 
example and eliminate communist influences in the labour movement.27 This argumentation 
was fiercely employed during the campaign leading up to the January 1940 board elections in 
                                                 
23 “Þingseta kommúnista...”. Tíminn. 05.12.1939, p. 561. 
24 See also similar suggestions in: “Burt með kommúnistana”. Vísir. 17.12.1939, p. 2. 
25 “Hvað á að gera við föðurlandssvikaranna?” Vísir. 29.01.1940, p. 2. 
26 Jakob O. Pétursson. “Kommúnisminn”. Vísir. 10.02.1940, p. 2-3, p. 3. 
27 “Burt með kommúnistana”. Vísir. 17.12.1939, p. 2. 
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Dagsbrún; the largest labour union in Iceland, in which the communists lost the vote. 
Morgunblaðið declared on the eve of the election that it was the first step in the operation of 
“excommunicating the mercenaries from Moscow from all positions of responsibility in this 
society”.28 (p ) Suggestions such as these go hand in hand with the commonplace argument 
mentioned above, that the communists had not broken any law with their opinions regarding 
the Invasion of Finland and could not be punished by the state, but they could – and should, be 
punished by social ostracism. Likewise, if state-sponsored political persecutions were 
unconstitutional, the ‘Icelandic people’ would have to remove communists from places of 
influence. 
3.2 Portrayals of Winter War Belligerents 
Moving on to the discussion in the Icelandic press about the Invasion of Finland itself, the next 
two discursive themes we shall be dealing with are portrayals of the belligerents, focusing on 
their armies and the construction of the Winter War through the use of stereotypes. The heat of 
the Winter War and its sharp contrasts, its narratives of good and evil, deeds and misdeeds make 
the conflict appear fantastical and remind the reader of classical tales like David and Goliath 
and the Persian Wars. These discursive themes are: 
3. The Red Army: Forces of Violence: Portrayals of the Red Army as incompetent, 
replaceable and at the same time, a frightening and cruel force. 
4. Finland: The “Hero-Nation”: Portrayals of the Finnish soldier as heroic, 
individualistic and backed by a united nation but destined for defeat. 
3.2.1 The Red Army: Forces of Violence: 
“Violence” (i. ofbeldi) is a prevalent word and a central theme in the Winter War discourse. The 
usage of the word as a means to denote the Invasion of Finland carries with it a sense of moral 
judgement aside from political considerations. The non-communist press failed to see any 
motive behind Stalin's decision to attack Finland but blatant aggression, expansionism and 
imperialism29 Morgunblaðið began its first front page coverage of the war by referring to this 
unconcealed hostility and pointing out the absurd size ratio of the belligerents: 
Yesterday morning, the Russians, a nation of 180 million people, attacked the 4 million strong Finns 
[...]. Almost the entire educated world believes that never before has such a totally unreasonable 
                                                 
28 “Úrslitastundin”. Morgunblaðið. 19.01.1940, p. 5. 
29 See for example: “Fyrirlitnir menn”. Vísir. 02.12.1939, p. 2; Alþýðublaðið. “Varnarstríð (!)” 15.12.1939, p. 3. 
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attack been launched, with so little effort to camouflage it.30(q) 
The violent nature of the invasion was thus seen both in a lack of casus belli and in its bully-
like outlook due to disproportional size ratios. Vísir metaphorically compared the invasion to a 
grown person's “mutilation” of a child and Tíminn called it “the most disgraceful action in the 
history of the world”.31(r)  
A third aspect of this rhetoric can be seen in the construction of the Soviet armed forces as 
the forces of violence. “The Red Army is spreading fire and death across the country”, was 
stated in a submitted article in Alþýðublaðið, while “cities are burned and defenceless villages 
are razed”. 32(s) There were repeated rumours that Soviet pilots chased civilians on the ground 
and shot them down with machine guns.33 Soviet-dominated air combat was especially linked 
to this image of terror in Finland, and this includes the bombing of cities and alleged atrocities 
performed from the air against civilians. Newspaper headlines repeatedly announce terror 
bombings and air attacks on civilian targets that re-appear in the OPs discussions of the violent 
nature of the attack and attacker. Morgunblaðið’s columnist asserted that “air raids, 
bombardments, incendiary bombs [and] Russian pilots chasing women and children with 
machine gun fire”, were among the “daily” ordeals imposed by the Soviet Air Force against the 
civilians in Finland.34(t) 
Despite the portrayed ferocity and cruelty of the Soviet Air Force, the common Soviet soldier 
is not presented as a terrifying figure at all. On the contrary, he is portrayed as both incompetent 
and expendable. Day after day, newspaper headlines reported Finnish land victories in which 
tens of thousands of Soviets soldiers were taken prisoners. Typical photographs of Soviet 
soldiers appearing in the papers are those of Soviet prisoners, often with captions describing 
how well they were being treated in Finnish captivity as opposed to the maltreatment of their 
own officers.35 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 “Finska stjórnin segir af sjer...” Morgunblaðið. 01.12.1939, p. 2. 
31  “Fyrirlitnir menn”. Vísir. 02.12.1939, p. 2; ““Verndari smáþjóðanna” afhjúpar sig til fullnustu”. Tíminn. 
01.12.1939, p. 553. 
32 “Verið á verði”. Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 2. 
33 ibid. 
34 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 04.02.1940, p. 5. See also: “Yfir Landamærin”. Tíminn. 23.03.1940, p. 132. 
35 See for example: “Stríðsmenn Stalins [image]”. Morgunblaðið. 17.01.1940, p. 5; “Rússneskir fangar í finnsku 
baði [image]”. Morgunblaðið. 23.02.1940, p. 4. 
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Despite the incompetence of Red Army soldiers, their expandability makes the Finnish Army 
fated for defeat in almost every commentary published in the non-communist press. This 
argumentation is often followed by an acknowledgement by the Icelandic commentators that if 
the Finns are to stand a chance of winning they must receive more aid from the Western Allies.36 
Alþýðublaðið stated in an editorial that no matter how bravely the Finns fought, Stalin could 
always renew the “myriad of the Red Army” by “sending in new […] thousands of slaves to 
their deaths”. 37 ( u ) Not only does this language contain a bitter acceptance of the Soviet 
advantage and the eventual victory, but also pity with the common Soviet soldier who often 
appears in the non-communist press as unwilling victim of a tyrant regime. Soviet soldiers are 
pitied for the poor conditions at the front and they are also victimised for being sent to an 
                                                 
36 See for example: “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 17.12.1939, p. 5; “Syrtir að”. Morgunblaðið. 18.02.1940, 
p. 5; “Risi á brauðfótum”. Alþýðublaðið. 27.12.1939, p. 3; “Eftir sex mánaða stríð”. Alþýðublaðið. 04.03.1940, 
p. 3;  
37 “Hver hefir Finnans metið móð?” Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 3. 
Image 2: Morgunblaðið's front page on December 22, 1939 demonstrates the appearance of 
successful Finnish forces versus incompetent and cruel invaders. Frame 1 depicts Soviet 
armoured vehicles under the caption: “Russian tanks sitting stuck in the snow”. The tanks 
represent the brute force of the Red Army and the caption portrays their unfitness. Frame 2 
shows the main news story of the day which bears the title: “Finnish counter-attack in 
North-Finland”, continuing to the sub-headline appearing beside a figure of a pointing 
hand, “but Stalin has bombs rain over hospitals”. In the centre, Frame 3 has a rather 
small news story, made look important by the location and size of its title, reading: “Hitler 
sends his regards to Stalin”. It tells of birthday regards but the headline obviously gives 
the impression of a Soviet-German alliance. Source: Morgunblaðið. 22. 12.1939, p. 2. 
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aggressive war on the grounds of propaganda and lies.38 
3.2.2 Finland: The “Hero-Nation”: 
“Today, the whole world observes the valiant Finnish defence with wonderment and 
admiration”, wrote the editor of Alþýðublaðið in early December 1939.39(v) The Icelandic press 
did not retract the fanfare displayed in the international press over the striking defensive abilities 
of the numerically inferior Finns. In his description of the Finnish war effort, Alþýðublaðið's 
editor used phrases such as “unbelievable endurance”, “altruistic and tenacious struggle” and 
“admirable” sacrifice by “valour and fortitude”.40 The Finnish soldiers’ heroism seems to have 
been understood as being a solid fact. Even the most sober news commentaries or the few non-
political opinion pieces take Finnish heroism for a fact. One such article in Alþýðublaðið calmly 
pointed out in January 1940 when describing the world conflict from the most neutral 
perspective, that “individual enthusiasm” of the Finns fighting “for the freedom of their 
fatherland”, weighted out the superior leadership and numbers of the Soviets.41 
[A news reporter in Finland] arrived at a barrack where a [Finnish] soldier was giving one of his 
comrades a haircut […] [Barbering] was obviously not his daily profession. The journalist thus 
asked what his main profession was. “I shoot Russians”, the Finn replied.42(w) 
This comic anecdote from Morgunblaðið illustrates the sharp contrast in the belligerents' 
appearance in the Icelandic press. As opposed to the “myriad of the Red Army”, the Finnish 
soldier is often portrayed as an individual, appearing mobile athletic, daring and cunning. 
Especially, the Finnish ski-troops provided stories of individual heroism which became a basis 
for the stereotypical Finnish soldier as an elite commando.43 A Morgunblaðið article said the 
Winter War was the kind of conflict in which the “achievement of the individuals” was the most 
crucial factor. The Finnish individuality was personified by the paper in a cool and confident 
athlete and ski-trooper, Pekka Niemi who stated in an interview: “[W]e are [not] in a race […] 
                                                 
38 See for example: Tor Gjesdal. “Einn dagur á vígstöðvunum á Kyrjálanesi”. Alþýðublaðið. 29.12.1939, p. 3; 
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39 “Hver hefir Finnans metið móð?” Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 3. 
40 ibid.  
41 “Fyrstu fjórir mánuðir stríðsins”. Alþýðublaðið. 06.01.1940, p. 4. 
42 “Úr daglega lífinu”. Morgunblaðið. 18.01.1940, p. 6. 
43  See for example: “Murmanskbrautin rofin…” Morgunblaðið. 05.01.1940, p. 2; “Með morgunkaffinu”. 
Morgunblaðið. 19.01.1940, p. 8; “Íþróttir eftir Vivax”. Morgunblaðið. 22.02.1940, p 4; “Molar”. Tíminn. 
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of minutes and seconds but for Finland's freedom”.44(x) These remarks are typical for the image 
of the Finnish exemplar soldier; courageous and cool, living a healthy lifestyle while defending 
his country.  
Image 3 proposes an example of the 
individualisation of the Finnish forces 
not through the stereotype of the elite 
troops described above. The depicted 
photograph and column are attached to a 
news story (not shown) covering the 
siege of Vyborg in March 1940. The text 
reports of massive Finnish casualties; a 
topic given special attention for its rarity, 
and is presented, along with the picture, 
in a way as to appear a tragedy. The 
Finnish soldier is individualised by 
giving him a face and a special 
commemoration for his and his 
comrades' tragic but supposedly noble 
deaths. 
Where did this “hero-nation” (i. hetjuþjóð) find the ability to pose the “most admirable 
defence in history” in the eyes of the press?45 Finland appears a very successful young republic 
in the non-communist press during the winter of 1939-1940.46 During the last 20 years, the 
Finns are said to have witnessed great cultural, industrial and financial progress as well as 
worldwide attention for achievements in arts and athletics. Morgunblaðið claimed that during 
these years the Finnish nation had also managed to rid itself of ethnic conflicts and even been 
“cured of the pest of communism”.47 Alþýðublaðið said Finland excelled others in culture, both 
“mental and physical” and Tíminn described the Finns having for twenty years built up a society 
                                                 
44 Tage Christiansen. “Skíðamenn í styrjöld”. Morgunblaðið. 17.02.1940, p. 5. 
45  “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 04.02.1940, p. 5; “Hin hetjulega sjálfstæðisvörn Finna…” Tíminn. 
14.03.1940, p.117. 
46 See for example: “Hver hefir Finnans metið móð?” Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 3; “Frelsi og sjálfstæði”. 
Tíminn. 20.02.1940, p. 78; “Örlög Finna”. Vísir. 14.03.1940, p. 2; Jón N. Jónsson. “Þjóðir og þjóðmenning”. 
Vísir. 29.03.1940, pp. 2-3, p.3; Christian Gierlöff. “Finnlandsbrjef: Frelsi og framfarir Finnlands í 20 ár.” 
Morgunblaðið. 02.12.1939, p. 5; Christian Gierloff. “Olympiuleikar í Helsingfors?” Morgunblaðið, 31.01.1940, 
p. 5. 
47 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 14.01.1940, p. 5.  
Image 3: A photograph and a column in Morgunblaðið on 
March 5, 1940. The caption reads: “This picture shows a young 
Finnish soldier. The look on his face is calm and stoical. This 
young Finn's image is symbolic for the 17 thousand Finns, who 
have lost their lives at the Mannerheim Line during the last few 
days defending their country against the invasion of the red 
communist-army."” Source: Morgunblaðið. 05.03.1940, p. 2. 
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of hard work, patriotism and honesty where young people were raised “in a Spartan manner”.48 
All of these references are examples of Icelandic observers explaining how the Finnish 
defenders could hold out for so long against the numerically superior Red Army. They all agreed 
that the success of the independent Finnish Republic described above had created an 
atmosphere of patriotism and an appreciation of freedom for which the whole nation united in 
protection and sacrificed their blood. The Finnish nation is described having merged into an 
“unbreakable unit”, where the soldiers, the leaders and the housewives, are all seen working 
together as a “single soul” towards a single goal.49 
3.3 The Frontier Metaphors  
The final group of Winter War discursive themes is the Frontier Metaphor, so-called because 
these indicate the idea that the Russo-Finnish borders make up sort of a frontier between us and 
them, and that Finland is an outpost – or an obstacle, in between. These ideas reflect the world-
view of the non-communist press from a cultural and political perspective and at the same time, 
the uncertainties of the Phoney War period. These discursive themes are: 
5. The Military Frontier: The idea that the Soviet Union was a primary aggressor in the 
ongoing world conflict and that the Invasion of Finland was one step towards a Soviet 
conquest of Scandinavia. 
6. The Civilisation Frontier: The idea that the Winter War was a confrontation of two 
distinct societies on the opposite ends of a developmental hierarchy, portraying 
Finland as “civilised” Europe and the Soviet Union as “uncivilised” Asia. 
While the anti-communist discourse dominated the first month of the Winter War, the Frontier 
idea becomes increasingly prominent as the war dragged on. 
3.3.1 The Military Frontier 
Most commentators of the Winter War in the Icelandic non-communist press shared the fear 
that Stalin did not intend to make his armies “halt at the Gulf of Bothnia”, or that he at least 
posed a significant threat to the lands west of that gulf.50 The defence of Finland was thus seen 
                                                 
48 “Ánægð þjóð og nægjusöm…” Alþýðublaðið. 07.12.1939, p. 3; Jónas Jónsson. “Maraþon í norðurátt”. Tíminn. 
16.03.1940, p. 122. 
49 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 04.02.1940, p. 5. See also: “Í Viborg þegar innrás Rússa hófst”. Vísir. 
04.01.1940, p. 2; “Úr daglega lífinu”. Morgunblaðið. 16.01.1940, p. 6; “Finnska konan fórnar sér fyrir ættland 
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2.  
50 “Þeir eru glaðir”. Morgunblaðið. 22.02.1940, p. 5 See also: Skúli Skúlason. “Norðurlönd í hættu”. Morgunblaðið. 
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by many as the defence of Scandinavia – hence the idea of Finland as a Scandinavian military 
frontier. There are two approaches to this train of thought: First, a pragmatic look from the 
perspective of the other Nordic Countries, namely Norway and Sweden, where some people 
and politicians felt the Winter War was a real threat due to the proximity of the conflict. This 
perspective in the Icelandic press might be partly influenced by the interventionist movement 
in Norway and Sweden which used the threat as an argument for intervention. There are 
examples where the Icelandic papers published articles, letters and addresses, presumably made 
as interventionist propaganda from Scandinavia and/or Finland.51 The second approach was 
based on a classic Russophobic distrust of the great power in the east.  
In February 1940, Alþýðublaðið published an article by the foremost commentator on the 
Winter War in Iceland who declared that Soviet “hostility” towards Norway and Sweden in 
relation to their material support for Finland was evidence for Soviet designs against these 
countries. This “looming danger”, the author explained, was the reason why certain Norwegian 
and Swedish politicians wanted a more active support for Finland.52 As the Soviet advance grew 
more steadfast in late February, some OP writers seem to foresee the end of Finland. Vísir's 
editor speculated over the consequences of an occupied Finland declaring that “no one knows 
where the Russian divisions stop when they have reached the borders of Sweden and 
Norway.”53(y) “Isn’t Sweden next in line and Norway thereafter?” asked Morgunblaðið's editor 
when Finland's defeat was evident, extending the thought by asking: “And wouldn’t it then be 
a short way over to us, Icelanders?”54(z) 
The idea that the Soviet Union had strategic interests in the Norwegian coast, particularly 
Narvik, and that these interests were linked with the Invasion of Finland, is frequent in the 
Winter War discourse.55 It is first mentioned in a Morgunblaðið front page news story on 
December 10, 1939, stating it was “feared, that sooner or later the […] ice-free ports of Northern 
Norway” would, along with Swedish iron, “tempt” the Soviets to carry on westwards.56(aa) Vísir 
even claimed as late as April 1940 that it was still “feared” that the “Russian bear” aimed 
                                                 
08.02.1940, p.5; “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 28.01.1940, p. 5; “Hvers vegna Svíum…” Vísir. 
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51 See for example: Ida Holmboe Mönsterhjelm. „Mæður Finnlands“. Vísir. 08.02.1940, p. 2-3; “Úr daglega lífinu”. 
Morgunblaðið. 17.01.1940, p. 6; “Verkalððsfélög Finnlands…” Alþýðublaðið. 19.01.1940, p. 2. 
52 Sigurður Einarsson. “Þreifað til meðalkaflans”. Alþýðublaðið. 09.02.1940, p. 2. 
53 “Ef Finnland bíður ósigur”. Vísir. 17.02.1940, p. 2. 
54 “Þeir eru glaðir”. Morgunblaðið. 22.02.1940, p. 5. 
55 See for example: “Kvaddir heim”. Vísir. 28.03.1940, p. 2; “Reykjavíkubrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 28.01.1940, p. 5; 
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56 “Átök í Svíþjóð”. Morgunblaðið. 10.12.1939, p.2. 
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towards the Atlantic.57 Although a common claim, the idea of Soviet Atlantic interests is rarely 
supported with arguments and usually appears as a recurrent rumour, often following phrases 
like “isn’t it said that...” or “it is feared that...” etc. Therefore, these claims reflect a more general 
fear of Russian expansionism and mistrust in the Soviet government, which represents the 
second approach to the Military Frontier idea. 
All of the non-communist press saw the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as an alliance and 
understood that Eastern Europe had been divided between Hitler and Stalin. Alþýðublaðið, the 
social-democratic paper that never concealed its opposition to Nazi-Germany saw Stalin and 
Hitler as brothers in crime with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Thus, 
Alþýðublaðið’s argumentation for Stalin’s war responsibility was his association with Nazi-
Germany – which was already considered the main villain of the war. Many OP writers on the 
right-wing, however, had independent reasons to fear Stalin and the Russians. Tíminn and the 
right-wing press usually left Germany out of the equation for the sake of neutrality and focused 
on Stalin’s aggressions and the danger posed by the Soviet Union without reference to the 
Germans; effectively sheltering Hitler from the burden of war responsibility for the time being. 
This view is sometimes expressed in a way that it carries a feeling of disappointment that 
Germany and the Western Powers are letting the Soviet Union run loose and pose a threat to 
Scandinavia. Some journalists in the right-wing press downplay the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
maintaining the interpretation that Stalin was getting out of Hitler's control and rightfully point 
out that Soviet domination of Scandinavia could not be in Germany's best interest. 
Morgunblaðið’s columnist evens seems to have given some hope that the Winter War would 
bring an end to Hitler’s strange pact with the Soviets and come to the defence of Finland.58 In 
January 1940, Morgunblaðið went as far as to publish an article from a German source from 
the time before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Under the subtitle “The Real Opinion of the 
Germans?” the article declared German support for a Nordic Alliance given the presentation of 
the Nordic Countries as Europe's northernmost bulwark against expanding Soviet barbarism.59  
In March 1940, Tíminn published an address delivered at one of the fund-raising 
arrangements for the Finland Relief held in January in which Soviet-Russian great power 
ambitions were described as such: 
They [the Russians] have sought for centuries to move their dominance westwards, preferably all 
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the way to the Atlantic. And now, they saw a particularly good opportunity present itself, as the 
Western nations, England and Germany, were engaged in a conflict and could not turn to an 
opposition against their plans. That is why the minor state Finland was attacked, which stands in 
the way toward the ocean.60(bb) 
The author makes the assumption that the Soviet Invasion of Finland was only a stepping stone 
towards a grander conquest of Scandinavia, Norway included. The view that the attack is being 
performed while the great powers are not watching isolates Stalin as the prime villain of the 
war. To a similar effect, Morgunblaðið's editor wrote in February that it terrified him knowing 
that the “world's most civilized nations”; Great Britain, France and Germany were “facilitating” 
the advance of “savage communism” in the Nordic Countries by fighting each other instead of 
helping the Finns.61(cc) 
3.3.2 The Civilisation Frontier  
This interesting antitheses put forward in the quote above, between “civilized” Britain, France 
and Germany and the “savage” Soviet-Russia, brings up the commonplace interpretation that 
the Russo-Finnish conflict was a battle between civilisation and savagery – between Europe 
and Asia. In January 1940, Morgunblaðið published a front-page article where the author 
expressed the following interpretation of the Soviet Union and the Winter War: 
Alone among the rulers of white people's countries, they [Soviet communists] have administered 
their country so poorly, that there has raged famine upon famine, killing millions upon millions of 
people. And they were no more fortunate when they began the attack against the free, courageous 
Finnish nation, who now carries the fight of civilisation against the Mongolian pest.62(dd) 
The effect of this language is not only a positive portrayal of the Finnish army as the force of 
“civilisation” but also an alienation of the Red Army by depicting it as non-European and 
pestilent. Referring to the Soviet “pest” as Mongolian, the author reminds the reader of the 
medieval Mongol Invasion of Europe, recognised in Western collective memory as violent, 
barbaric and uncivilized. Thus, the author draws up a symbolic metaphor for the idea of a 
European/Asian civilisation-frontier at the Russo-Finnish borders. This Eurocentric and racist 
language is not uncommon in the Winter War discourse, and the fact that the author of this 
article is none other than Professor Bjarni Benediktsson shows that it was not considered 
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marginal or inappropriate. A central figure in the Independence Party, Benediktsson would soon 
become one of the most prominent leaders of the country holding posts such as mayor of 
Reykjavík, cabinet minister and eventually prime minister.  
In fact, Morgunblaðið frequently referred to “The Asian Nation” and “The Asian Power” (i. 
Asíuveldið) when degrading the Soviet Union.63 The paper also referred to the Red Army as 
“the Asiatic pest” and determined the intention of Invasion of Finland as being “to force upon 
the Nordic Countries an Asiatic killer-regime” (i. asiatisk böðulstjórn).64 Although mostly 
confined to Morgunblaðið, such a language was also used in the other papers. An author of an 
article in Tíminn claimed the Russians were “still the oriental, half-civilized nomads”, they used 
to be and Alþýðublaðið referred to the Russian leadership in past and present as “half-Asiatic 
tyrants” and “uncultured Asiatic tyrants” (i. asiatiskir menningarsnauðir harðstjórar).65 
Simultaneously as the press portrayed the Russian invaders as Asiatic, it placed the Finnish 
defenders into a group of European and civilized, cultured or educated nations.66 Vísir stated 
that Finland had “taken its place among the most civilized nations” since gaining independence 
from Russia in 1918, and was now the easternmost outpost of Nordic culture.67 Similarly, 
Morgunblaðið published an article in which the Finns were termed “the guardians of 
civilisation's easternmost outpost”.68 (i. útverðir menningarinnar í austri) Such remarks express 
an understanding that the Russo-Finnish borders mark a significant civilisation frontier. When 
Morgunblaðið's columnist compared the two separate conflicts of the world war; the Allied-
German war and the Russo-Finnish war, he concluded that “neutrality of the mind” was required 
for the former, and not for the latter, because the Western Front was a battle “between [two] 
European nations”, both of whom have demonstrated companionship with Icelanders.69 Here, 
the author placed Iceland, Finland, the Western Allies and Nazi-Germany under the same 
“European” hat while illustrating the otherness of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet breakthrough 
of the Mannerheim Line began in February 1940, the paper placed Finland into the group of 
civilized and educated nations by delivering the responsibility of its survival to a European 
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collective, claiming it would be an “eternal stigma on every civilized nation in the world” if the 
Western intervention failed to save the Finns in the Winter War. Because then, the “valiant and 
decent” Finnish nation would be downtrodden by “tyranny and savagery“70(ee)  
Finally, building on the roots of Western/European civilisation and rhyming with the 
portrayal of the Russians as “Asiatic”, the non-communist press occasionally likened the Finns 
– “the Nordic Spartans”, to the ancient Greeks, either for their ‘Athenian’ level of civilisation 
or their ‘Spartan’ fighting spirit.71 In late February 1940, Alþýðublaðið published a translated 
article titled “Barbarians and Hellenes” in which the author referred to the Persian Wars to 
metaphorically describe the Winter War as a civilisation frontier between Europe and Asia. Re-
reading Herodotus' accounts, the author felt he saw a 2000 year old struggle between the 
“civilised Greek nation and the Asians” reappearing in a modern scenario: 
[Those who sacrifice themselves today (i.e. the Finns)] to prevent the Asians' savage empire of 
blood from spreading out over the civilised world, perform the same historical deed that once was 
performed in Thermopylae Pass.72(ff) 
3.4 Chronology and Newspaper Titles 
With all of the discursive themes taken together we can see that the discussion is principally 
concentrated on the alienation of the aggressor and of its supporters in Iceland. Domestic anti-
communism seems to have been the first reaction of non-communist journalists upon hearing 
the news from Finland. 73  Although the discussion on Icelandic communists is continuous 
throughout the three-month period, it is most concentrated in December 1939. It constitutes of 
two discursive themes and it has roughly an equal representation in all four non-communist 
newspapers, although Vísir and Tíminn seem to focus more on this aspect of the discourse than 
other themes. Even though sympathy with Finland is declared in all papers from the outbreak 
of war, there is an observable increase in pro-Finnish heroisation sentiments in January and 
February 1940 resulting from the unexpected Finnish defence apparent in late December and 
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in January. Whereas sympathy with Finland is universal among the non-communist press, 
heroisation of the Finns is by far the most obvious in Morgunblaðið.  
There are a total of three anti-Soviet discursive themes apparent in the Icelandic non-
communist press. The perception of the invasion in general as illegitimate violence, bullying 
and terror is apparent in all papers and appears consistently from December 1939 until March 
1940. The Frontier Metaphors, which contain traditional East-West polarity, are most heavily 
concentrated in Morgunblaðið, especially the Civilisation Frontier Metaphor which was mostly 
discussed in the late Winter War period; February and March. The Military Frontier Metaphor 
has more equal distribution among the papers and appears most often in February 1940 when 
the eventual defeat of Finland was apparent following the successful advance of the Red Army 
on the Karelian Isthmus. 
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Chapter IV 
The German Invasion of Norway 
in the Icelandic Non-Communist Press 
 
The Invasion and Battle of Norway prompted quite different reactions in the Icelandic 
newspapers than did the Invasion of Finland four months earlier. Morgunblaðið, the paper 
which had fronted the harsh vocal opposition to Stalin’s aggression and violence now soberly 
reviewed the events in Denmark and Norway with caution, maintaining the strictest “neutrality 
of the mind”. Alþýðublaðið and, to a less obvious decree, Tíminn, had a more definite standpoint 
in the conflict by decisively condemning the invasion with references to anti-fascism. Vísir 
fluctuated between the neutral and the anti-German approaches and like Tíminn, the paper 
concentrated on the domestic constitutional affairs which resulted from the invasion. In this 
chapter we shall sum up the ideas and portrayals presented in the discourse on the Invasion of 
Norway and clarify its chronological evolution. Six discursive themes were identified, which 
are categorised into three groups, appearing here in order of significance: 
1. Dangerous Times: Themes involving the fact that the German Invasion of Norway 
provided examples that threatened both the internal and external security of Iceland. 
2. Two Approaches towards Nazi-Germany: The two main approaches towards the 
portrayal of Germany in the role of the attacker. 
3. The Most Innocent Victims: The portrayal the Norwegians and the Danes during the 
Battle of Norway. 
4.1 Dangerous Times 
The invasion of Norway and Denmark was perceived by the Icelandic newspapers as the most 
important event in the World War so-far as Iceland was isolated from the rest of Scandinavia 
and the war was brought significantly closer. In addition, Vidkun Quisling’s treason in Norway 
provided a lesson which kept life in the ongoing discussion on state security and the anti-
communist witch-hunt which had reached a climax during the Winter War. These discursive 
themes are: 
1. Between Hope and Fear: The fact that the world war had been brought closer to 
Iceland and that Icelandic neutrality and security was in danger. 
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2. Quisling and the Treason: The idea that the downfall of Norway was largely a 
result of an internal betrayal, and that Icelandic authorities should be on the guard 
for traitors inside the country. 
4.1.1 Between Hope and Fear: 
“People are still waiting between hope and fear”, wrote an Alþýðublaðið columnist on April 12, 
1940 describing the intensive atmosphere in Reykjavík during the initial days of Operation 
Weserübung.1(a) Alþýðublaðið wondered whether or not the Germans could manage to conquer 
Norway and if perhaps this first clash between the Allies and the Germans would conclude the 
world war there and then. Tíminn’s initial response to the invasion was the expression of worries 
about trade and the economic isolation which followed the loss of contact with almost entire 
Scandinavia. 2  Most uncertainty, however, revolved around the question of security and 
neutrality. The cynical and hopeless attitude towards the great powers and their uneven 
relationship with the minor nations in wartime, which had developed in the Icelandic papers 
during the Winter War, intensified with these latest events.  
For the commentators in the Icelandic press, this was a terrifying example of the failure of 
the neutral cause. The Scandinavian declarations of neutrality and non-aggression pacts that 
were meant to protect the Nordic Countries from being dragged into the war had utterly failed. 
Most commentators expressed a mixture of surprise and disappointment with this fact. “[T]he 
most unbelievable [event] has happened”, stated Morgunblaðið’s editor surprised on April 10, 
ever so convinced that the “rights of the minor nations [no longer] exist”.3(b) He was acting 
under the impression that the Nordic Countries should have just slipped pass the world war 
when the Winter War took an end a half a month earlier. Alþýðublaðið explained that the shock 
of the invasion was so deeply felt by the Icelanders because they based their policy of neutrality 
on the same principles as the Nordic Countries: 
[T]hese events have had deep effects on the minds of people in this country. We Icelanders have, 
like many other minor nations, not believed that the minor nations’ neutrality would be severed and 
non-aggression pacts would be broken. But now we have to believe it, the events [in Denmark and 
Norway cannot be ignored.]4(c) 
The apparently frightful fact that the great powers did not respect neutrality declarations created 
                                                 
1 “Um daginn og veginn...”. Alþýðublaðið. 12.04.1940, p. 2. 
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3 “Ørlagastundin”.Morgunblaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 5. 
4 “Oft var þörf en nú er nauðsyn”. Alþýðublaðið. 15.04.1940, p.3. 
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much discussion during the weeks until Iceland itself was occupied. Vísir reacted quite 
dramatically to the events in this regard and declared that the Icelanders were “more touched 
by the current events” than ever before in the war: 
Now we see that the neighbour’s wall is burning. We know this means that our own house is in 
danger. [...] Even though we Icelanders are remote and distanced from the main routes, we should 
not forget that forest fires or brush fires do not follow any cairns. [...] It is therefore most important 
that we are prepared for everything.5(d) 
The sense of emergency expressed in the editor’s rhetoric even suggests that he was expecting 
the Germans to invade Iceland and impose a Nazi regime. “We shall expect the worst [and] 
hope for the best”, he wrote, “and even though it darkens for a while, we shall never lose the 
hope of a bright [and] peaceful future”.6(e) The day after the invasion, Vísir revisited the subject, 
claiming it would be “naive” to think an invasion of Iceland by either faction of the world war 
was avoidable and encouraged his readers to stand up in protest whenever such an invasion 
happened.7 
Tíminn was less dramatic in its analysis although it followed the others by declaring its – 
and the Icelandic people’s – discontent with the great powers’ “way of thinking”. Ignoring the 
minor nations’ “rights and existence”, the paper claimed, was undermining Icelandic plans for 
independence.8 On April 13, Tíminn’s front page columnist dismissed rumours that the Germans 
were on the way to occupy Iceland and rejected all talk that Great Britain – or even the United 
States and Canada, had begun operations aimed against Icelandic neutrality. The author issued 
a warning against all such “unconfirmed slander” and declared it was most important that 
everyone kept calm and stood together.9 
In numerous editorial articles, the four papers representing the government agreed that 
Iceland must retain its neutrality and repeatedly stressed the urgency to stand together and 
practice national cohesion.10 Alþýðublaðið and Morgunblaðið used the National Government – 
a symbol of cross-political cooperation during extraordinary times as an example, as well as the 
Finnish fighting spirit. In an editorial titled “A Single-Minded Nation”, Morgunblaðið sought 
                                                 
5 “Hvað skeður?” Vísir. 09.04.1940, p. 2. 
6 ibid. 
7 “Hlutleysi Íslands”. Vísir. 11.04.1940, p. 2. 
8 Þórarinn Þórarinsson. “Kuusinen og Quisling”. Tíminn. 16.04.1940, p. 166. 
9 “Á víðavangi”. Tíminn. 13.04.1940, p. 161. Alþýðublaðið also warned people not to spread unconfirmed rumours, 
claiming it could be damaging. (“Um daginn og veginn”. Alþýðublaðið. 18.04.1940, p. 2.) 
10 See for example: “Hlutleysi Íslands”. Vísir. 10.04.1940, p. 2; “Einhuga þjóð”. Morgunblaðið. 14.04.1940, p. 5; 
“Á víðavangi”. Tíminn. 13.04.1940, p. 164; “Oft var þörf en nú er nauðsyn”. Alþýðublaðið. 15.04.1940, p.3. 
CHAPTER IV 
62 
 
an ideal in the Norwegian parliament on the dramatic afternoon on April 9, when suddenly, 
“there existed no [political parties] anymore.” 11  It is perhaps for that reason that Vidkun 
Quisling – the man who replaced Kuusinen as the stereotypical arch-traitor, and the atmosphere 
of betrayal and treason bore such a heavy weight in the Icelandic discourse during the intensive 
month of April 1940. 
4.1.2 Quisling and the Treason 
Over the course of the Battle of Norway, some Icelandic commentators, most prominently in 
Tíminn and Alþýðublaðið, developed an understanding of the invasion and downfall of the 
Norwegian state as an unprecedented story of treason and betrayal from within. A Tíminn news 
source described the German capture of Oslo and other cities as “the single most magnificent 
wile and treachery” committed against any nation in documented history.12(f) Tíminn’s editor 
even called the Battle of Norway “an internal war”, brought upon the Norwegian people by “a 
few, sick extremists”.13(g) By late May, the betrayal of Norway had become some sort of a legend; 
a series of submitted articles in Alþýðublaðið conceptualised the use of a foreign fifth column 
as “Hitler’s New Weapon”: 
[…] [E]veryone can agree to that Hitler has not yet brought any new decisive [secret] weapons [to 
the table in this war.] [It] is also certain that he has, in the current conflict, used with better results 
than all his predecessors in the history of the world, a weapon which is as old as warfare itself, […]. 
This weapon is organised treason [sic] among the enemies”.14 (h) 
In other words, Norwegian plotters were perceived by some of the Icelandic press to have 
played an essential role in the success of the German invasion. In addition to the anti-communist 
hype in relation to Kuusinen, the pro-government press now stepped up the discussion on the 
necessity to look out for traitors at home. “The names Kuusinen and Quisling have been burned 
into our conscience”, declared Tíminn’s editor in this regard. Echoing the language of December 
1939, he asked if there weren’t people in this country who were “ready to follow the footsteps 
of Kuusinen and Quisling?”15(i) Alþýðublaðið’s columnist stressed the need to survey foreign 
sailors and reminded that “every nation has its Kuusinens and Quislings” who could be just as 
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dangerous as foreigners.16 Even after the British occupation of Iceland, Morgunblaðið said that 
it was important to remain “well on the guard in the future” and not “be so blind as to think 
there are no Kuusinens or Quislings here”.17(j) 
This discourse needs little introduction because we know it well 
from the Winter War. But who were the quislings and the kuusinens 
whom the ‘nation’ had to beware of? In some cases, generally in 
Morgunblaðið, the OP writers refrained from pointing fingers and 
spoke generally towards the potential traitors. In addition to 
kuusinens and quislings which had become commonplace terms for 
a traitor, they used terms such as “enemies of the democracy” and 
those who advocate the suppression of the minor nations.18 The 
editors of the government organs Tíminn and Morgunblaðið sent a 
message into society reminding the readers, as citizens, to keep 
their loyalty to the state and oppose anti-national sentiments.19 In 
an early May editorial, Morgunblaðið appealed to the national 
identity and conscience of the public and asked its readers to look 
within themselves and examine their own state of mind towards the 
establishment:  
Isn’t there someone amongst us who is ready to perform the same misdeed against the motherland 
that the traitors did in Finland, Denmark and Norway? The question is posed here, so that each 
individual can look at his own state of mind. Perhaps the events in the Nordic Countries could 
remind people of their duty to the motherland – their civil duties.20(k) 
Icelandic Nazis were virtually non-existent on the pages of the Icelandic newspapers during the 
winter of 1939-1940. After Quisling’s treason, however, they were occasionally mentioned in 
Tíminn and Alþýðublaðið in relation to national security, although these mentions are almost 
only made on general terms; such as during a listing of potentially dangerous groups, alongside 
communists and nameless figures. 
One commentator in Alþýðublaðið speculated if the disestablishment of the former farm-
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right Icelandic Nationalist Party (see Chapter II), which had been a small and “despised” group, 
had merely been a strategy and if its members weren’t waiting underground and plotting, as 
Quisling’s party had done.21 Tíminn’s columnist wrote in early May that careful attention should 
be kept on both Nazis and communists. He applauded the fact that the Nazis did not show 
themselves in the Labour Day parades like they usually did, but reminded that communists and 
Nazis still posed a threat to national security.22(l) Tíminn’s editor more cautiously mentioned that 
there were “various influential figures who have looked approvingly” towards Icelandic parties 
similar to that of Quisling’s, when suggesting Icelandic groups that could replay the events in 
Norway. 23 ( m ) Judging from the wording, the author may be referring to German-friendly 
members of the Independence Party rather than the few vocal Nazis, although its highly 
doubtful that the editor of the Progressive Party organ actually believed this to be of any threat. 
More aggressive were the paper’s references to the Icelandic communists in this connection.  
4.1.3 ‘Kuusinens’ and ‘Quislings’  
Tíminn’s co-editor and leader of the Progressive Party declared in late April that one of the 
lessons from the Norwegian tragedy was how correct and profound it had been when the 
Icelandic parliament, on December 4, 1939, initiated Finnagaldur in society by ignoring 
Socialist MPs at the Althing. He maintained the Finns had made such precautions against the 
internal communist threat in Finland and for this reason they managed to keep their head in 
Winter War. The Norwegians on the other hand failed to eliminate their internal threat, with the 
apparent result.24 At the end of the article, he suggested that more anti-communism in action 
was the key to avoid a replay of the Norwegian experience in Iceland. Again, the party leader 
agitated for the social exclusion of Icelandic communists, as he had done in December 1939:  
The Althing has marked a clear line in these matters. […] Patriotic people in this country can now 
follow the leadership of the Althing […] by actively isolating [from public trust] those Icelanders 
[…] who work towards the same goal as the unfortunate people who opened Norway to a foreign 
nation.25(n) 
Anti-communism in relation to the Winter War was still a hot topic in all titles of the non-
communist press when Quisling performed his treason. Even though Nazi-Germany was now 
                                                 
21 Jónas Guðmundsson. “Landráðin í Noregi”. Alþýðublaðið. 18.04.1940, p. 3. 
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the perpetrator, elements of the non-communist press still focused on the Icelandic communists 
as the main threat to the establishment. It was particularly Alþýðublaðið who used Quisling and 
the invasion of Norway as a platform from which to bash on their communist opponents. An 
Alþýðublaðið editorial in late April accused them of “direct service to German Nazism” by 
criticising the Western Powers instead of Germany in its writings on Operation Weserübung.26 
By May this understanding had reached new heights. A rather comprehensive smear campaign 
was conducted by the paper in the latter months of the Battle of Norway against the Icelandic 
communists based on an association Alþýðublaðið and its foreign sources constructed between 
Norwegian communists and the German invaders. 
On May 6, Alþýðublaðið published a BBC news story which claimed that the German 
authorities in Oslo had not outlawed the Norwegian communist newspaper Arbeideren when 
the city was occupied, as had been the case with other non-Nazi papers such as Aftenposten, 
Arbeiderbladet and Tidenes Tegn. The report also supposed that Norwegian communists had 
been given “a role” by the Germans; namely, the reorganisation of the Norwegian labour 
movement. In other words “to disintegrate it and bend it into obedience to the Nazi 
authorities”.27 The claims were later confirmed in an article by an American reporter in Norway 
titled “The Norwegian Communists in the Service of the Nazi-Army”, published in 
Alþýðublaðið in late May. Norwegian communists were seen as “humble servants” of the 
German invaders, working “under their protection”.28  
A number of opinion pieces in Alþýðublaðið followed up on this rumour and others 
presenting an image of European communists as Hitler’s number one fifth column abroad.29 
The paper’s editor maintained in late May that European communists had been working actively 
for “the defeat” of the Allies, Norway and all “who fight for freedom and democracy” against 
Germany and the Soviet Union. “They have bent their knees before Hitler”, he declared, “and 
become his quislings”.30 (o ) And just like Kuusinen’s attributes were seen in the Icelandic 
counterparts during the Winter War, so was idea that the “kuusinens” were indeed quislings, as 
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an author of a submitted article suggested in in late May:  
These men [the communists] are best suited to wield the only “new weapons” Hitler has so far put 
to the table in the ongoing conflict – organised treason. […] If someone thinks that the 
communists and Nazis here [are any different than elsewhere] he has the wrong idea of things. 
What these parties have done elsewhere, they will also do here […].31(p) 
On May 16, Alþýðublaðið’s editor claimed that Þjóðviljinn would not have protested a German 
invasion of Iceland, and would most probably had received the same “honour”, that Arbeideren 
had acquired in Norway for to its “official alliance with Quisling”32(q) Four days later, he went 
on calling Icelandic communists “the Quislings of Iceland” and even accused them of having 
wished that the Germans would occupy the country before the British, in which event they 
would, “like in Norway”, have eliminated their opponents “under the protection of a German 
authority”.33(r)  
Although mostly concentrated in Alþýðublaðið, the rumour of German-communist 
cooperation in Norway, and its use in anti-communist discourse, is also mentioned in two 
editorial articles in the right-wing press in early June 1940.34  
4.2 Two Approaches towards Nazi-Germany 
It is safe to suggest that there was a universal understanding among all of the Icelandic papers 
that the Norwegian Campaign was not an isolated conflict but merely a single battle of the 
world war between Germany and the Allies. Morgunblaðið and other journalists of the right-
wing press refused to pass judgements on the Invasion of Norway whereas others saw no 
difference between the invasion of Norway and that of Finland. These discursive themes are: 
3. The Neutral Approach: Portrayals of the Norwegian Campaign as a disaster for 
which neither belligerent party is held properly accounted. Focus on neutral 
analysis and pacifist opinions. 
4. The Anti-German Approach: Portrayals of the invasion of Norway as a violent 
and illegitimate act of aggression, for which Germany is solely responsible. 
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4.2.1 The Neutral Approach 
“Of course, no judgement will be passed here on the belligerents’ actions”, wrote 
Morgunblaðið’s editor in late April 1940: “History will judge the German Invasion of Norway 
and the occupation of Denmark”.35(s) Whereas the Winter War discourse is decisively focused 
on the villain, a significant part of the Icelandic discussion on the Battle of Norway is conducted 
in an absence of such a figure – or at least a very vague presence of one. The outlook is mostly 
concentrated in Morgunblaðið, whose number of opinion pieces on the Battle of Norway 
exceeds the other papers by far. Commentators of the neutral approach strove to minimise the 
responsibility of the attacker in their analysis of the Battle of Norway and presented an 
understanding that Norway was only a chosen battlefield of the great powers for a limited time. 
The paper interpreted the Phoney War period as a six month period of “search for battlefields”, 
which the great powers had finally found: The great powers “found Norway.”36(t) Reflecting this 
standpoint, Morgunblaðið’s editor described the invasion on the day after the events as such: 
[…] Denmark and Norway have become the scene of the bloody great power war. [Denmark] has 
been forced to submit herself to the command of one of the belligerent, who has placed an army in 
[the country] […] and from now on, Danish land will be used in the purpose of waging war, as long 
as the war lasts.37(u) 
Contrasting the paper’s reactions on the day after the invasion of Finland, and the reactions of 
other papers on that very day, the article is completely rid of accusations of illegal conquest or 
violence. The editor pointed out that the Nordic Countries would from now on be “the scene of 
the [world] war against their will” - a phrase which depersonalises the attacker and implies that 
its purposes were purely of a temporary military nature. Additionally, usage of the typical 
anonymous word “belligerent” gives the impression it was the world war, who invaded.38(v) 
Morgunblaðið’s editorial article on April 10 was also the only OP in the initial days of the 
invasion who pointed out in all fairness that the Germans said they had no intention of severing 
the independence of the Nordic Countries.39 Two weeks into the conflict, Germany saw that the 
Norwegians were not accepting German military protection and formally declared war upon 
Norway. Morgunblaðið’s columnist’s comment on this new situation on April 28 was simply 
                                                 
35 “Friður”. Morgunblaðið. 24.04.1940, 5. 
36 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 28.04.1940, p. 5. 
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that “dealings between nations take peculiar forms these days.”40(w) 
The neutral approach should not be mistaken for a pro-German apologism. Neutral analysis 
of the Norwegian Campaign was also equally neutral towards Allied actions. Typical articles 
and columns dealing with the battle are characterised by an objective digest of the latest 
operational proceedings in Norway, giving equal weight to both belligerent parties.41 However, 
even though the neutral approach lacks a defined villain, it is the nameless world war and the 
unnamed great powers in their struggle, which the neutral commentators seem fitting to 
denounce. In other words, these writer did not take sides with or against either Germany or the 
Allies, but with the neutral powers in Scandinavia. For example, on April 16, Morgunblaðið 
published a lengthy and detailed article by a Swedish politician about the Swedish iron 
production and trade with the Germans, who concluded that the importance of said trade was 
highly overrated by the Allies. Unfortunately for Sweden, the author distressingly pointed out, 
this “widespread misunderstanding” was quite threatening to the country’s neutrality.42 
The Altmark incident in February 1940 provides another example of this aspect although it 
was not devoted much space in the Icelandic papers overall. Morgunblaðið published one of 
the very few unmistakably pro-German and anti-Allied opinion pieces in the Icelandic non-
communist press on the subject of Altmark. It was an announcement from the German 
government heavily criticising British actions in neutral Norwegian waters and deeming them 
an inhumane “act of piracy”.43 The fact that Morgunblaðið was willing to publish such an 
announcement goes to show how far the paper was ready to go in order to stay neutral and fair 
towards both belligerents. In a commentary after the incident, Morgunblaðið’s columnist 
explained the crisis to his readers both from the perspective of the Germans and the British, but 
his conclusion was in line with Scandinavian protests: 
The great powers are not disputing what is right and wrong towards international rights here. 
Because in these […] times, the belligerents assume the right thing to do is what best complies with 
their interests. This is the [moral] which dictates the world today [and] which the powerless and 
weak minor nations are forced to accept.44(x) 
Similarity, Morgunblaðið described the British mine laying in neutral Norwegian waters 
preceding the invasion on April 9, 1940, rather critically of both belligerents. The British are 
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said to have “intervened terribly” over Norwegian authority and the Germans are accused of 
sinking neutral vessels. Typically, the author concluded that such a situation “demonstrates how 
small the right of minor nations” is, “when the great powers are at war”.45 Neither the British 
nor the Germans are defined as a villain. In fact, the danger and the gathering storm clouds are 
seen as coming from the world war itself, which is described as closing in on the Nordic 
countries like some sort of a natural disaster. When discussing the probabilities of an invasion 
of Iceland on the eve of the Operation Weserübung, Vísir compared the world war quite literally 
to a natural disaster: “We cannot manage” such an invasion “rather than an earthquake, sea ice 
or an eruption of Katla,” the editor wrote; world events “happen to us” and are “unmanageable, 
like the elements themselves.” 46  Such a description illustrates an immense inferiority and 
passivity apparently experienced by the Icelanders vis-à-vis the great powers of the Second 
World War – which again is reflected in the way neutral OP writers approached the Invasion of 
Norway. 
In late April 1940, Morgunblaðið cautiously took the first step away from the neutral 
approach towards a more critical standpoint that would be openly expressed under the British 
occupation. An editorial article promoting peace and neutrality cautiously criticised the 
Germans for the secret attack on Norway and for promoting false peace in the occupied 
country. 47  However, the author quickly turned away from Nazi-Germany specifically and 
towards a more general criticism of the world war and the great powers of Europe: 
The question that people will be considering […] is this [:] Is the attack on Norway, whatever it’s 
real causes [were] or from where they originated, the final fruit of the civil life of European nations? 
Are the methods which are in use [in Norway], characteristic for the new and upcoming times? Is 
this weapon-culture going to swarm the whole continent […]?48(y) 
Unfortunately for the minor nations, the editor went on, the answer is most probably yes, 
although the Icelanders will not adopt to these new times “gladly”. Morgunblaðið pointed out 
on April 17 how symbolic it was that wherever this ‘weapon-culture’ reached, there followed a 
blackout of cities. First Denmark, and now “the darkness of war” had reached the Faroe Islands, 
which were occupied by the British a few days earlier.49 “In our complete neutrality, we look 
at the cruel attacks of the belligerents”, the editor concluded, and are “convinced that whoever 
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shall win, can never build up a newer and better world for humanity” until the weapons have 
been laid down and the lights turned on.50(z) Such a pacifist and cynical opinion, critical of both 
parties as if they had both gone mad, is typical for the Icelandic neutral approach. 
4.2.2 The Anti-German Approach 
Tíminn had hitherto also been careful in its writings about Nazi-Germany during the Phoney 
War. On April 11, 1940, however, Tíminn’s columnist dismissed the neutral approach, claiming 
that such a way of thinking was an unnecessary servility to the Germans and that it was 
contradicting the neutral nations’ freedom of expression. “Neutrality [should] not restrain 
people’s opinions”, the columnist wrote; that’s why it was “perfectly in order to condemn the 
Russians’ attack on the Finns and […] in the same way, we are allowed to criticise the Germans 
for their conduct in Denmark”. However, the editor reminded, “it goes without saying, [that one 
should] use moderate language about foreign events.” 51 ( aa ) Alþýðublaðið chimed in about 
freedom of expression, claiming that fear of German threats was undermining “normal and 
righteous criticism” of the invasion of Norway as well as the people’s natural expression of 
sympathy with the ‘sister nations’.52  
However, Alþýðublaðið’s editor and other commentators in the paper did not spare the 
Germans with the “moderate language” suggested by Tíminn. The Germans and the Soviets 
received the same treatment when it came to rhetoric in Alþýðublaðið, where anger and blame 
was among the first reactions to Operation Weserübung. “A more unfair and more unprovoked 
attack has never been made” against any country but perhaps the one against Finland, the editor 
declared the day after the invasion. The illegitimacy and aggressiveness of the invasion of 
Finland was still in fresh memory and Alþýðublaðið’s editor pointed out the parallels: 
Just like Russia broke [its] non-aggression pact with Finland, so broke Germany its non-aggression 
pact with the small and completely defenceless Denmark. And to [make the two cases identical,] 
Germany has now also made an example out of Russia’s puppet government in Terijoki […] [by] 
establishing a German puppet government in Oslo. The tools are the same, although one calls itself 
communist and the other Nazi […].53(bb) 
Even though Alþýðublaðið’s commentators seem to have had quite an up-to-date understanding 
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53 “Eldraun Norðurlanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 3. See also: Jónas Guðmundsson. “Landráðin í Noregi”. 
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of the Norwegian Campaign as a scenario in the struggle between Germany and the Allies, the 
idea that two attacks on Finland and Norway were derived from the same source; the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, and were thus intertwined with each other. 54 Just like the move against Poland, 
the Baltics and Finland, the editor maintained in an article bashing Icelandic communists for 
hypocrisy regarding their coverage of the events, the invasion of Norway was a direct result of 
the “alliance between Nazism and Moscow-communism”.55  
Running parallel to the Winter War discourse, commentators of the anti-German approach 
criticised the Invasion of Norway with references to violence and illegitimacy, as well as 
oppressiveness of the subsequent occupation. Alþýðublaðið claimed in late April that the Danes 
were unjustifiably forced “under the oppression of a Nazi tyranny for an unspecified time” and 
that the Norwegians sacrificed their lives on a daily basis defending their “country and freedom 
from a similar attempt of oppression.”56(cc) Wielding a typical nationalistic rhetoric on April 16, 
Tíminn interpreted the “cruel and unprovoked attacks” in a similar way: 
The Icelandic people generally wishes that the sister nations, who have undergone the unrestrained 
violence, will as soon as possible be able to cut themselves loose from the shackles of oppression 
and make it back among the ranks of free and sovereign nations.57(dd) 
An additional feature of the Invasion of Norway noted by the anti-German commentators which 
had not characterised the Winter War discourse was the apparent insidiousness of the attack. 
Comparing the two attacks on Scandinavia three weeks into the conflict, Tíminn deemed the 
Invasion of Norway “even more reprehensible” than the Invasion of Finland because the Finns 
had at least received two months of negotiations and managed to mobilise their army, whereas 
the Norwegians received no warning beforehand. 58  Similarly, submitted articles in 
Alþýðublaðið expressed both shock and disdain with the back-stabbing and deal-breaking 
behaviour of the Germans, sneaking an army into the Denmark and Norway in the cover of 
darkness to take the innocent neutrals by surprise. One author said the attack was “so insidiously 
prepared” and made with such an immeasurable “contempt for rights [and] for given promises” 
that people observing were left without words.59(ee) The operation is said to have been devised 
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for a long time “in one of the most insidious and dishonourable way imaginable.”60(ff) Even 
Morgunblaðið delivered a carefully worded criticism of the brutal and secretive way in which 
Norway was subjugated by Germany.61  
4.2.3 In to the Allied Camp 
What about the actions of the Allies in and around Norway during the spring of 1940? By 
condemning the Germans’ behaviour in Norway, were the anti-German papers simultaneously 
applauding or apologising the British? In fact, Allied involvement in the Norwegian Campaign 
seems not to have been the subject of any particular opinion beyond declared neutrality in the 
Icelandic non-communist press. The fact that the Norwegian campaign was first and foremost 
a scenario in the world war and that the Norwegians willingly became a member of the Western 
military alliance immediately after the attack seems to have been taken for granted in a way 
that it was neither criticised nor applauded specifically.  
German propaganda perpetually suggested the Invasion of Norway was an answer to British 
breach of Norwegian neutrality. Alþýðublaðið did not excuse British mine laying in Norwegian 
Waters but it did, however, make an explicit statement in an editorial article immediately after 
the invasion by dismissing the German casus belli: 
It is useless for Germany to go ahead and excuse this shameful attack with Britain’s mine laying off 
the Western Coast of Norway, even though that was definitely a breach of neutrality. […] And isn’t 
it clear to everyone that Germany’s attack has been prepared long before Britain had the mines laid 
[…] and [the invasion] had even begun before that time […]?62(gg) 
Up against this relatively little breach by the British, Alþýðublaðið counted a number of 
incidents where the Germans had breached the neutrality of both Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
before the invasion, emphasising that their hostile behaviour leading up to the operation was 
overwhelming.63 
Approaching the fourth period of this study’s time frame by early May, 1940, one can 
observe a shift in the opinions of Morgunblaðið, Vísir and Tíminn in the direction of a more 
solid pro-Allied sentiments. On May 4, the Morgunblaðið’s editor reflected over news of the 
                                                 
60 Jónas Guðmundsson. “Landráðin í Noregi”. Alþýðublaðið. 18.04.1940, p. 3. 
61 “Friður”. Morgunblaðið. 24.04.1940, p. 5. 
62 “Eldraun Norðurlanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 3. 
63  “Eldraun Norðurlanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 3. See also: Guðlaugur Rósinkranz. “Árásin á 
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Allied withdrawal from Norway, acknowledging his commiseration with the Norwegian 
people’s “unhappiness” relating from it. Simultaneously, the paper’s columnist stated that the 
foreseeable surrender of the Norwegian Army “set people silent”.64 Six days later, the paper 
viewed the act as having triggered “disappointment in neutral countries across the entire world” 
– now echoing the anti-German view which had been presented by Alþýðublaðið the day 
before.65 Given the fact that Morgunblaðið certainly considered Iceland belonging to this group 
of nations, the author was surely giving the impression that his countrymen were among the 
disappointed neutrals. The statement makes Britain appear the protector of the neutral minor 
nations; a title which the Soviet Union was mockingly said to have claimed before the Invasion 
of Finland. 
All four pro-government papers reacted to the British Occupation of Iceland on May 10, 
1940 with protest but politely promoting cooperation with the British.66 As the Icelandic press 
felt more comfortable displaying pro-Allied sentiments, Tíminn’s anti-German language had, 
by the end of the month, sharpened from the beginnings of April: “[O]ne minor nation after the 
other”, stated Tíminn’s columnist on May 21 – the very same who urged his readers on April 11 
to “use moderate language” about foreign events – is “deprived of its independence, its human 
rights and freedom by [Stalin’s] new friend, Hitler.”67(hh) Already on the day after the British 
Invasion of Iceland, the editor of Morgunblaðið revealed his preference to the Allied occupation 
over the German one experienced by the ‘sister nations’: 
It must […] be admitted that an occupation by the hand of a friendly nation of honour [the British] 
[…] should not be much of a worrying matter compared to the fate of many other minor nations 
[…][such as] the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, not to forget our most friendly sister nations 
[Denmark and Norway].68(ii) 
This view became quite common in the centre-right press during this study’s fourth period. 69 
In early June, 1940, Morgunblaðið declared that of the three Nordic minor nations who were 
occupied against their wishes; Iceland, Denmark and Norway, the situation was worse in 
Scandinavia under the Germans. Vísir chimed in on the discussion two days later, adding that 
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even though the Icelanders had been the subject of “diminished freedom”, this was nothing 
compared to the brutal dictatorship that had been established in Norway.70 Tíminn concluded in 
this direction too, no matter “how repulsive to the [Icelandic] nation” the paper considered the 
British occupation to be.71(jj)  
At the end of the day, the Icelandic press always saw the ‘sister nations’ as victims of the 
war and this outlook prevailed even though the Icelanders themselves had also been occupied 
against their will. Late in May, Morgunblaðið urged that total official neutrality was still the 
cornerstone of Icelandic policy and independence aspirations. Despite that, the paper now 
acknowledged people’s rights to have “opinions on the methods of the belligerent nations” and 
reminded that people “can” and indeed, “must”, carry deep sadness in their hearts over “our 
sister nations’ fates”.72(kk)  
4.3 The Most Innocent Victims 
The Icelandic press had great respect for the Nordic nations and undoubtedly counted them 
among their closest friends in the international arena. The portrayal of these nations in the 
discourse of the Battle of Norway is twofold: First, there was a widespread expression of 
sympathy and condolences with them in the form of victimisation – be it victims of Nazi 
oppression or the victims of circumstance. Second, there was a fair amount of glorification of 
Nordic society which was now under attack by totalitarianism and imperialist war. The 
discursive theme is: 
5. The Most Innocent Victims: Expressions of condolences and commiseration with the 
Nordic nations for being the victims of a terrible tragedy and simultaneously 
glorification of their fallen neutral, civilized and/or socialist society. 
4.3.1 Victimisation 
The Nordics in general – Denmark, Norway and sometimes Finland in particular, were 
perceived by the Icelandic press during the Battle of Norway as some sort of champions – and 
martyrs even, of neutrality and peace. During the Winter War and the events leading up to 
Operation Weserübung, the papers had maintained the understanding that the Norwegian and 
Swedish governments made great sacrifices to stay out of the world war by denying the Allies 
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military access – and thus abandoning the Finnish cause in the Winter War.73 Still, despite “their 
sincere peaceful intent” and “both material and mental” sacrifices to the neutral cause, Denmark 
and Norway were invaded.74(ll) The Icelandic papers thus presented an understanding that the 
Nordic Countries were among the most innocent victims of the war one could find. 
All of the five newspapers in Reykjavík, Þjóðviljinn included, devoted space in their first-
reaction editorials after April 9, 1940 to deliver their condolences to the Norwegian and Danish 
nations. Sympathies with the ‘sister nations’ was not concealed by the neutral approach towards 
Germany. In fact, these same authors who refrained from criticising Germany saw the Nordics 
as victims of a terrible tragedy. Morgunblaðið reminded on April 12 that even though the 
“declared everlasting neutrality” of the Icelanders must be kept at “every footstep” and during 
“every activity”, they cannot ignore that fact that “our sympathy with the ‘sister nations’ […] 
is sincere and everlasting”. 75 ( mm ) Vísir, referring to the ongoing Icelandic Struggle for 
Independence, declared that “the Icelanders have more sympathy with the Danish nation” than 
ever before and had there been “any vestiges of old animosities” these had surely disappeared 
the moment the “act of violence” was committed.76(nn) 
The fact that that there seemed less hype in Icelandic society during April 1940 than it did 
in December 1939 when Finland was attacked was noticed by the contemporaries themselves. 
A reader of Alþýðublaðið wrote to a columnist questioning that people were out dancing and 
drinking “even though two other neighbouring states have received similar fate as Finland.”77 
Þjóðviljinn was quick to point out that less anger with the German invasion proved the 
communists’ argumentation that the “Finland exacerbations” last winter had merely been a form 
                                                 
73 The view that Norway and Sweden had unjustifiably abandoned Finland and effectively forced the Finns to 
accept humiliating peace terms after the Winter War was widespread among interventionists and Finland Aid 
activists in Scandinavia. “Finlands säk var ikke vår”; “The Finnish cause was not ours”, stated the headline of 
the Swedish Volunteer Corps' publication on the day of the ceasefire in Finland. (Göran Andolf. Svenska 
frivilligkåren. Part of series: Svenska frivilliga i Finland 1939-1944, Stockholm, 1989, p. 146). Tíminn seems 
to have been the only Icelandic paper to admit to this opinion. The paper's sub-headline on March 14, 1940 
attributed full responsibility of the Finns' forced “surrender” to the Nordic Countries' refusal of military access. 
(“Hin hetjulega sjálfstæðisvörn Finna...”. Tíminn. 14.03.1940, p. 117). The paper accused the Norwegian and 
Swedish governments of indirectly aiding the Soviets and criticised them for selling Finland out in a selfish 
pursuit of their own security. (Þórarinn Þórarinnsson “Styrjöldin í Finnlandi og “norræn samvinna””. Tíminn. 
05.03.1940; pp. 101; “Hlutleysi Noregs”. Tíminn. 20.02.1940, p. 77). Alþýðublaðið and Morgunblaðið, on the 
other hand, did not share this opinion and defended the Norwegian and Swedish governments' decision with 
understanding, although they agreed that a sacrifice had been made. (See. for example: Guðlaugur Rósinkranz: 
“Afstaða Norðrulanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 29.02.1940, p. 3; “Hvað vill Tíminn...” Alþýðublaðið. 09.03.1940, p. 2; 
“Uppgjöf Finna”. Alþýðublaðið. 14.03.1940, p. 3; “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 17.03.1940, p. 5; 
“Reykjavíkurbrjef”. 31.03.1940, p. 5. ). 
74 “Eldraun Norðurlanda”. Alþýðublaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 3. 
75 “Með stillingu”. Morgunblaðið. 12.04.1940, p. 5.  
76 “Helgasta skyldan.” Vísir. 16.04.1940, p. 2. 
77 “Um daginn og veginn...”. Alþýðublaðið. 09.05.1940, p. 4. 
CHAPTER IV 
76 
 
of international and domestic persecutions against communists.78 These remarks became the 
subject of discussions in which the non-communist press was eager to declare that the 
Icelanders inhibited no less sympathy towards the ‘sister nations’ in Norway and Denmark than 
they did towards the Finns. On April 15, Vísir dismissed all such talk in an editorial article titled 
“The Sympathy of the Icelanders”: 
These speculations are both ignorant and dishonourable. […] We are talking about the nations with 
whom we have experienced [good things and bad] throughout the ages. The bonds of friendship 
and culture will never be severed by our initiative.79(oo) 
Tíminn suggested that less expression of sympathy with the Danes than with the Finns was 
partly the result of the neutral approach towards Nazi-Germany and partly because of the 
surprise and rapidness of Operation Weserübung. 80  Employing a nationalist rhetoric, 
Morgunblaðið explained the observable “ease” among the Icelandic people as some sort of a 
reaction to imminent danger; a national attribute which was normally conducted by Icelandic 
seamen who lived all their lives at “the limits of life and death”.81 Such kind of “ease” and even 
more, the editor suggested, was required if and when the day came that Iceland was attacked. 
The ease at which people observed the tragic events abroad was explained as a more sincere 
form of expression of sympathy and condolences, than anger and accusations. To exclaim the 
amount of fellow feeling shown in Iceland, an Alþýðublaðið article even listed quotes to all the 
non-communist newspapers who declared sympathy with Norway and Denmark. The author 
then explained the apparent difference from the Soviet attack on Finland from the standpoint of 
anxiety and emergency: 
The attack on Finland was the first [attack] on the Nordic Countries. Now, the dangerous events 
have moved closer to us, the danger is more impending for ourselves – and everything happens so 
unexpectedly. The most terrible news often silences people, they lack words to describe the 
pain.82(pp) 
The reactions to the events in Norway and Denmark are dramatically described here as reactions 
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to a tragic death of a loved one. Another commentator in the paper wrote to a similar effect that 
people became “stupor” and “sad” upon learning the news from Scandinavia: “It is perhaps this 
silence, this heaviness [and] silent coolness”, he went on, which best describes the “empathy 
with the brother-nations”.83 These views underline the fact that the victimised portrayal of the 
Nordic Countries in the Icelandic press after Operation Weserübung was the result of sombre 
sympathy of commiseration and sorrow. 
4.3.2 Glorification 
The apparently tragic attack on the Nordic countries also prompted some commentators in the 
Icelandic press to react with a glorification of Nordic society and a construction of the Nordic 
Countries as exemplar and some sort of champions of the neutral/pacifist or social-democratic 
cause. The outlook is most prominent in the anti-German Alþýðublaðið but is also observable 
in other papers. On April 18, 1940, Vísir published a short article loaded with Nordic extolment 
and pacifism. The peculiar article depicts the world war as a battle between life and death; not 
between the democratic Allies and the fascist Axis powers, but of peaceful and educated minor 
nations such as the Nordics against the great powers’ destructive “anti-life policy” (i. helstefna). 
The author maintained the Nordic nations were the “vanguard of humanity” (i. fylkingarbrjóst 
mannkynsins), at par with great minor nations like the Greeks and the Jews in terms of 
contributions to human civilization. 84 
Morgunblaðið praised the Nordic Countries for being the vanguard of a “healthy and true” 
democracy and Alþýðublaðið described Denmark and Norway somewhat similarly to the young 
and successful Finnish Republic during the Winter War; an exemplar society of peace, progress 
and social democracy.85 An Alþýðublaðið article in late April stated that the Nordic nations had 
used their energies, funds and intellect on “mental and material” activities which had placed 
them “among the most civilized nations in the world”.86 Vísir listed the names Norwegians who 
had contributed to world culture: Björnson, Ibsen, Nansen, Amundsen, Grieg, “just to name a 
few”, and pointed out that wherever the Norwegians and their great merchant fleet went, a 
“refreshing gust of diligence and manhood” followed.87(qq) To the same effect, Tíminn and Vísir 
described the Danes as a “peaceful and non-interfering” minor nation which had built “the most 
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civilized society” through “labour, diligence and attentiveness”. The fruit of said innocent 
labour, Vísir declared, was suddenly cast “before the feet of an attacker-nation”, giving the 
impression of a martyrdom.88(rr) 
As Image 5 suggests, Alþýðublaðið urged 
the workers of Reykjavík to turn the Labour 
Day celebrations on May 1, 1940 into a 
demonstration of “sympathy and respect” in 
honour of the Danes and Norwegians. The 
paper added that Nordic society was 
perceived leading upholding the ideals of “the 
labour movement, socialism and 
internationalism”, thus, praising the Nordics 
on the international day of labour was seen as 
only logical. In addition, Alþýðublaðið’s 
editor pointed out, these countries were no 
longer able to celebrate Labour Day at home 
because of the occupation. The Norwegians 
were at that very moment fighting a real war, 
he continued, “for the ideals to which the first 
of May is dedicated”.89  
Such portrayal of martyrdom was also 
apparent in some opinion pieces on the 
Norwegian Constitution Day on May 17, 
1940, as seen here from Alþýðublaðið: 
And with a growing sense of democracy, the Norwegians have […] enjoyed peace with every nation 
and internal freedom for more than 125 years […] and have become what they are today: The freest, 
the most enterprising and the most civilized nation in the world.90(ss) 
And for 125 years, the Norwegians have celebrated said freedom on May 17, the author goes 
on, until now, as the “bloody oppressors” prohibit them to play their national anthem and raise 
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Image 5: Alþýðublaðið's front page was devoted to the 
Nordic Countries on Labour Day, May 1, 1940. The 
headline in frame 1 reads: “Show the brother-nations in 
the Nordic Countries our sympathy and respect today.” 
Frame 2 and 3 depict photographs of the prime ministers 
of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden and the four leaders 
of the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish labour 
movements. Source: Alþýðublaðið. 01.05.1940, p.1. 
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their flag all the way from Oslo to Trondheim.91 Both Alþýðublaðið and Vísir presented in their 
May 17 editorials an appraisal of the Norwegian people, like the Finns, as a nation for which 
freedom was a national virtue. Vísir’s article was mostly rid of criticism of the Germans, but 
focused on an appraisal of the Norwegian people and its free spirit.92 Furthermore, there are 
even occasional remarks to be found in Icelandic OPs of a heroisation of the Norwegian army 
during the Battle of Norway. Although uncommon, such a view did further fuel the idea of the 
Norwegians as a nation devoted to her national freedom – like the Finns.93 
4.4 Chronology and Newspaper Titles 
The heterogeneous discourse of the Invasion of Norway and Denmark and its subsequent 
campaign in the Icelandic non-communist press is foremost characterised by anxiety and 
distress. Furthermore, the discourse reflects the highest foreign policy values of the National 
Government; neutrality, independence and friendly relations with the non-communist great 
powers. The two approaches towards Germany give an interesting picture of the mind set of 
those writing for Morgunblaðið and Alþýðublaðið respectively. One approach is careful and, it 
seems, responsible during times of utmost alert, while the other is more reckless but stands for 
its ideals and beliefs – solid anti-fascism and association with the Nordic Countries in the case 
of Alþýðublaðið, and Icelandic nationalism in the case of Tíminn.  
The Battle of Norway can be divided into two periods: The third and fourth research periods 
of this study’s time frame; from April 9, 1940 to May 10, and from May 10 until the surrender 
of Norway on June 10. The newspaper discourse is overall heavily concentrated in the third 
period before other more important domestic and international events overshadowed the Battle 
of Norway. Sympathy with the Norwegians and Danes is evenly distributed among newspaper 
titles although glorification of the Nordics is most apparent in Alþýðublaðið.  
Discussions on internal and external national security also appeared consistently in all four 
non-communist papers in April although Alþýðublaðið and Tíminn are the only papers where 
Quisling’s betrayal constitutes as a discursive theme. As anticipated, there is a clear shift in the 
Battle of Norway discourse after May 10, 1940, be it for the effects of the British occupation, 
or the German assault into France and the Benelux Countries – or both. Morgunblaðið 
observably moves away from the strict neutrality policy towards Germany and Alþýðublaðið’s 
                                                 
91 ibid. 
92 “17. maí”. Vísir. 17.05.1940, p. 2. 
93  See for example: Jónas Jónsson. “Frjáls þjóð í frjálsu landi”. Tíminn. 30.04.1940, p. 186; “Noregur”. 
Morgunblaðið. 11.06.1940, p. 5. 
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discourse becomes increasingly focused on anti-communism. Interestingly, this second wave 
of anti-communism is briefly mentioned in two opinion pieces in Morgunblaðið and Vísir, but 
is otherwise a sole preoccupation of the social-democratic press. 
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Chapter V 
Comparison and Discussion 
 
Having laid out the discursive themes of both the Winter War and the Battle of Norway, we 
shall now delve deeper into the two cases, compare them and try to shed light on our research 
questions. I will address the two domestic themes that were extracted from both cases and 
revolve around neutrality and anti-communism. Then, the press’ portrayals of the aggressors 
and the defenders of the two invasions will be compared. Furthermore, the ideas and world 
views reflected by these portrayals will be presented and discussed.  
5.1 Direct Comparison 
In order to address the situational context of the compared cases, all editorial articles published 
in the Icelandic press over the durations of the two conflicts were registered and categorised by 
topics, providing data for a quantitative survey.1 Table 1 (see Appendix 1) lists a collection of 
the most common editorial topics in the Winter War period from December 1, 1939, until March 
14, 1940. Among the top five topics on the list, the Winter War appears to be as much discussed 
as the typical day-to-day topics like labour issues, the state budget and parliament activities. As 
the table illustrates, Winter War-related editorials are twofold: First, there are articles portraying 
opinion about the Winter War in general: Its belligerents, legitimacy, course etc. Second, there 
are articles made up of an anti-communist discourse aimed primarily at the Icelandic 
communists, as a direct response to the events in Finland.2 Table 1 shows that domestic anti-
communism relating to the Winter War is more frequent than discussion on the Winter War 
itself and taken together, we can see that the conflict was by far the most discussed topic of the 
period.  
Table 2 (see Appendix 1) reveals that the Battle of Norway is also the most commonly 
appearing topic overall during the period from April 9, 1940 until June 11, 1940. However, 
                                                 
1 Editorials, also known as leading articles or leaders, are easily measurable and relevant, not only because of their 
prominence being a newspaper's leading and official opinion piece, but also because an editorial article was 
included, with very few exceptions, in every published issue of the newspapers in question. Note, however, that 
such a categorisation can only give a rough overview of the most discussed topics during the time period in 
question because some editorials deal with multiple themes. This survey also counts editorials in Þjóðviljinn, 
thus grasping all of the party press and all daily newspapers in Reykjavík. 
2 Responses to Winter War anti-communism in Þjóðviljinn's editorials are also accounted for in the tables. 
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whereas the Winter War was largely an isolated conflict between two single parties, only 
touching upon the – nevertheless important, domestic issue of anti-communism, the Battle of 
Norway is intertwined with other huge topics associated with Operation Weserübung. These 
connected topics include the Occupation of Denmark and the subsequent dissolution of the 
personal union between Iceland and Denmark, the loss of markets and communication with 
Scandinavia and the overall course of the war between Germany and the Allies In addition, 
articles labelled as “The Battle of Norway” sometimes also contain discussions about some of 
these other topics. This fact undermines the significance of our topic being on the top of the list, 
as opposed to the Winter War topic which thrones a list of non-related domestic issues, but 
nevertheless shows that it was part of a larger issue with much greater significance than the 
Winter War or any other topics. 
 This last point illustrates the most obvious difference between the two cases which is the 
uniformity of the Winter War discourse, and the diversity of the Battle of Norway discourse. 
Table 3 lists all the discursive themes that were presented in the two previous. The Winter War 
discussion largely takes on only three clearly defined forms: Anti-communism, anti-Soviet 
remarks and sympathy with Finland. The four non-communist and pro-government newspapers 
employed similar vocabulary and there is a general consensus among them on the anti-Soviet 
and pro-Finnish opinions which they all claim is representing the ‘whole nation’. 
THE WINTER WAR THE BATTLE OF NORWAY 
1. The Drop of the Mask (anti-communism) 1. Between Hope and Fear (threat) 
2. Call for Excommunication (anti-communism) 2. Quisling and the Treason (threat/anti-communism) 
3. Forces of Violence (anti-Soviet remarks) 3. The Neutral Approach (neutrality towards Germany) 
4. The “Hero-Nation” (sympathy with the Finns) 4. The Anti-Fascist Approach (anti-German remarks) 
5. The Military Frontier (anti-Soviet remarks) 5. The Most Innocent Victims (sympathy with Nor/Den) 
6. The Civilization Frontier (anti-Soviet remarks/sympathy with the Finns) 
Table 3: A complete list of the discursive themes presented in Chapter III and IV. 
The discussion during the Norwegian Campaign is more diverse and disordered. Apart from the 
issues of national security and sympathy with the Nordic nations, lines are more unclear and 
discursive themes less conveniently spotted. It is obvious that the OP writers themselves saw 
the Invasion of Norway and Denmark as a more complicated matter than the Winter War. 
 The seriousness of the situation is apparent in all discursive themes. It is apparent from our 
findings in Chapter IV that the newspaper discussion during the Battle of Norway was 
characterised by fear and insecurity. In opposition to this serious discourse, the monolithic 
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Winter War discourse is on the other hand undoubtedly associated with anger and judgements. 
Decisively focused on the villain of the conflict, the Winter War discussion is aggressive and 
accusing towards the Soviet Union and Icelandic communists. While certain OP writers clearly 
made a villain out of the aggressor during the Battle of Norway, it is safe to suggest that the 
latter discourse is overall much less aggressive in terms of language and accusations.  
What do the two cases have in common? A common theme throughout the discussions on 
both conflicts, is the Icelandic papers’ sympathy with the Finns and the Norwegians/Danes as 
victims of war and aggression. Furthermore, great power suspicion and a denunciation of 
violence is a universal theme, as well as domestic anti-communism. 
 The 11 discursive themes that were identified in Chapter III and IV can be sorted into two 
main categories: (1) Domestic issues, dealing with Icelandic parties and the Icelandic situation 
as a direct result of the foreign events and (2) foreign issues, dealing with opinionated portrayals 
of the belligerents in the foreign events. We shall now discuss these factors, beginning with the 
apparently pressing domestic issues. 
5.2 The Threat 
The Icelandic non-communist press expressed concerns of a purposed security threat following 
both invasions in Scandinavia. This perceived threat is twofold: First, it is an external threat 
posed to the vulnerable Icelandic state by the great power war. Second, the non-communist 
press announces the existence of an internal threat which is brought up in relation to the treason 
of Kuusinen in Finland and of Quisling in Norway. 
5.2.1 The External Threat and the Neutral Approach towards Germany 
The external threat to Iceland during the two cases is obviously posed by the two aggressors of 
the Norwegian and Finnish Campaigns. Although there was no real threat of a Soviet invasion 
of Iceland during and following the Winter War, it is clear that the Icelandic press rightfully 
feared that the event was the beginning of a dark fate for the Nordic Countries. It was also a 
matter of principles; if the great powers were to be allowed to attack neutral minor nations, 
what would happen to Iceland? The German Invasion of Denmark and Norway, however, 
brought the war closer to Iceland in all aspects. What is peculiar in our findings is the neutral 
approach towards Nazi-Germany which obviously characterises the Icelandic press discussions 
on the invasion. Why did Morgunblaðið, the largest newspaper in Iceland, representing the 
largest and perhaps the most mainstream political party, engage in such a lenient stance towards 
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Germany during the Invasion of Norway? 
It is worth repeating that the neutral approach as it appears in Morgunblaðið should not be 
mistaken for an attempt to apologise the attack on Norway. It was literally an expression of 
neutrality. Morgunblaðið not only viewed neutral opinion regarding the war in Europe to be an 
extension of the “natural and declared neutrality of the nation”, but also a necessary virtue in 
times of extreme danger. Furthermore, the paper maintained that if people refrained from taking 
sides in the conflict, it would be easier to keep the nation united.3 Breaking down the ideology 
behind the neutral approach we can see that it is based primarily on two notions which are 
disconnected from any pro-German sentiment: First, pacifist remarks, objecting to the 
destructiveness of the war and the aggressiveness of both great powers towards the minor 
nations. Second, it is based on the idea that both Germany and Great Britain are respectful and 
friendly nations to the Icelanders and that the Icelanders wish nothing more than an end of 
hostilities and a resume of normal relations. Total neutrality was thus seen as essential in order 
to save Icelandic ships from being sunk in the Atlantic and in order to keep up foreign trade 
with both great powers. 
 The neutral approach towards Germany began as an extension of the official neutral 
standpoint of the National Government and was apparent in all three centre-right newspapers 
in September 1939 when the Second World War broke out. Neither Vísir nor Morgunblaðið 
made opinionated comments on the German Invasion of Poland in early September, stressing 
only the importance of neutrality and national unity.4 Giving an equal representation of the 
claims of both Chamberlain and Hitler in Morgunblaðið’s editorial on September 4, the editor 
openly declared his unwillingness to take sides in the conflict.5 Tíminn reminded its readers to 
show respect for the great powers’ “sufferings” by exercising “moderation and honour” in 
discussions on them. These “most civilized nations in the world”, the editor claimed, were no 
natural enemies and should not really be at war.6 Only the Soviet Union was made feel the 
disapproval of the centre-right press. In his New Year’s editorial address in December 1939, 
Tíminn’s editor stated that the causes of the world war originated in the lack of freedom and 
democracy, which pertained certain countries of Europe; a system that he denounced and 
declared was alien to all Icelanders. He directed his criticism against the Soviet Union, its 
aggressiveness and oppressiveness in Finland and Eastern Europe, as well as against the 
                                                 
3 “Hvað vill Alþýðublaðið?” Morgunblaðið. 23.05.1940, p. 5. 
4 “Fjöreggið”. Vísir. 06.09.1939, p. 4; “Hlutleysið”. Morgunblaðið. 03.09.1939, p. 5. 
5 “Dimmasti dagurinn”. Morgunblaðið. 04.09.1939, p. 3. 
6 Jónas Jónsson. “Svo hafa forlög fært þeim dóm að höndum'”. Tíminn. 05.09.1939, p. 406. 
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Icelandic communists for supporting it – but there was no mentioning of Nazi-Germany 
whatsoever.7 Similarly, Morgunblaðið’s editor did on at least one occasion in September 1939 
suggest that the Invasion of Poland was an unjustifiable act of aggression but directed the blame 
completely on Stalin and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact while bashing on the opinions of 
Icelandic communists.8   
 While it was permissible to castigate the Soviet Union almost beyond limits on paper, it is 
obvious that the centre-right press was holding back on its writings on Germany. As we have 
seen, Tíminn gradually abandoned the neutral approach and after the Invasion of Denmark and 
Norway, the paper largely joined Alþýðublaðið in criticising Germany. The fact that 
Morgunblaðið allowed itself to criticise Germany only after the fourth research period had 
begun is evidential to that the neutral approach was an attempt to avoid the provocation of 
Germany. But why? 
 Whitehead has shown that the Icelandic press was the subject of interventions by the 
Icelandic and German authorities from 1938 on. The German consul in Reykjavík, Werner 
Gerlach, was very observant of the Icelandic newspapers, which he read and commented on in 
weekly reports sent to Berlin. He had hoped that the right-wing papers could become an 
advocate for Germany in Iceland, but was disappointed in late 1939 to learn that this was not 
the case. Gerlach is said to have put heavy pressure on the two right-wing editors, summoning 
them to his office to complain about their writings and giving them German propaganda 
material to publish. 9 Furthermore, Whitehead maintains that Gerlach was so “arrogant” and 
“bad tempered” that he managed, with threats of economic sanctions, to scare the government 
of Iceland into tightening censorship on anti-German publications.10 Thus, from 1938 until the 
British Occupation in May 1940, the foreign affairs department of the Icelandic Government 
Office monitored the Icelandic newspapers and exhorted them if their writings could contradict 
Icelandic trade interests.11  
 Whitehead’s sources suggest that Morgunblaðið’s editor, Valtðr Stefánsson, was intimidated 
by the German consul’s threats, which, if true, may have affected the paper’s policies. But 
Stefánsson was also no stranger to the inner circles of the Independence Party and the National 
Government. Whitehead claims that Morgunblaðið’s editor had such solid connections in the 
                                                 
7 Þórarinn Þórarinnsson. “Um áramótin”. Tíminn. 30.01.1939, p. 598. 
8 “Illgresið”. Morgunblaðið. 10.09.1939, p. 5. 
9 Whitehead. 1995, pp. 36-37. 
10 ibid. p. 38 and 32-33. 
11 Thorsteinsson. 1992, p. 154. 
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party and in the top levels of the government that he must have known that the government was 
acting neutral while cooperating with the British behind the scenes.12 The editor’s attitude was 
thus coordinated with the government: It was a front, designed by the government and its 
confidants, among them the editor of Morgunblaðið, in order not to provoke the Germans into 
sinking Icelandic vessels.13 
While this may be the case, let us not forget that the right-wing press had displayed 
sympathies for Hitler in the 1930s and the few pro-German opinion pieces in the period of this 
study appeared in these papers. 14  Furthermore, if the neutral approach was only a play, 
Morgunblaðið’s editor solely took the voluntary decision to play it. Even though the Icelandic 
government had warned the newspaper editors previously during the Phoney War, the other 
papers did not act out a neutral approach towards Germany after the Invasion of Norway. Tíminn 
was the very organ of the prime minister and its co-editor was none other than the leader of the 
Progressive Party. Alþýðublaðið represented the Labour Party whose government minister was 
responsible for foreign affairs and the censorship which the German consul shall have pressed 
forward.15 Neither of these papers felt the need to write against their political commitments 
once German aggression began to appal them. It would thus be safe to assume that even though 
Morgunblaðið may have been acting out of responsibility and duty, the paper nevertheless still 
harboured enough respect for the Germans that it willingly allowed them to enjoy the benefit 
of doubt. 
5.2.2 The Internal Threat and Domestic Anti-Communism 
Throughout this study’s time frame, the Icelandic communists remain an unbearable thorn in 
the eyes of the pro-government press which constantly tried to flock the nation behind the 
National Government under the banner of neutrality and national unity. Not only did the 
                                                 
12 Whitehead. 1995, p. 187. 
13 ibid. p. 278-279. 
14 ibid. p. 38-39. Alþýðublaðið did at times accuse these papers of pro-German sentiments during the Battle of 
Norway, even as late as late May 1940, when Morgunblaðið was called, “Göbbels' local branch” in Reykjavík. 
Alþýðublaðið claimed Morgunblaðið had always been one-sided in its news coverage of the war and delivered 
only news from German sources. These accusations were dismissed as an unnecessary imputation by 
Morgunblaðið. (“Hvað vill útibú Göbbels í austurstræti?” Alþýðublaðið. 22.05.1940, p. 4; “Hvað vill 
Alþýðublaðið?”. Morgunblaðið. 23.05.1940, p. 5). One month previously, in April, Alþýðublaðið accused Vísir 
of lacking sympathy with the 'sister nations' by agitating against the Labour Party's pro-Nordic Labour Day 
celebrations on the grounds that Vísir had previously “laid flat before Hitler”. Naturally, Vísir, dismissed the 
accusations and reminded that unlike Alþýðublaðið, the paper covered the war from a neutral standpoint. (“Verið 
á verði um 1. maí”. Alþýðublaðið. 27.04.1940, p. 3; “Hlutleysi”. Vísir. 29.04.1940, p. 2). 
15 Werner Gerlach’s complaints about newspaper coverage were directed to the foreign affairs department of the 
Government Offices which answered to the Labour minister Stefán Jóh. Stefánsson (Whitehead. 1995, p. 34-
35). 
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communist press outrage the other papers with its support for the invasion of Finland, it worked 
against the government’s great power policies with its anti-Allied stance.16  
The anti-communist discourse in the non-communist press thus constructed two opposing 
fronts during and following the Winter War, consisting of the larger ‘Icelandic nation’ 
represented by the National Government and the pro-government press against the communists 
and the communist press. The fact that more than half of the editorial articles touching upon the 
Winter War in Finland in the Icelandic press during that particular conflict were about domestic 
anti-communism tells a lot about the mind-set of the non-communist newspaper editors. 
Moreover, Winter War anti-communism is the second most common topic of all related and 
unrelated topics during that winter, which goes to show just how large of an issue the alleged 
communist menace was in the eyes of their opponents. How can we explain these strong 
reactions? Was there a real threat posed by the Icelandic “kuusinens” during the Winter War?  
 According to Whitehead, the need for national unity was high during the winter of 1939-
1940. Even though the authorities thought they could depend on the British for external defence, 
the young Icelandic state “could not have been any weaker” during the interwar era.17 Unlike 
the neighbouring countries, Whitehead claims, the state was unable to maintain law and order 
if and when an organised opposition employed physical force against it. 18  This had been 
apparent during the great labour unrest of the 1920s and 1930s which caused a headache for the 
non-socialist authorities. Police authorities were even physically defeated by communists and 
a working class mob in the largest of these clashes, the so-called Gúttó-fight of 1932.19 National 
socialists, communists and even social democrats established gangs to defend their respective 
causes in street fights and the question whether or not to strengthen the police force was a 
constant issue among politicians of all parties in the decade before the war.20 
 Whitehead’s claim (see Chapter I) that the Socialist Party was a significant threat to the 
establishment throughout the 1940s goes hand in hand with the arguments employed by the 
anti-communist Winter War discourse. The Icelandic government undoubtedly maintained that 
                                                 
16 In late January 1940, Þjóðviljinn published a news story on the secret Icelandic-British trade talks; a supposed 
leak of information that was aimed at exposing the fact that the Icelandic government was not neutral but a 
puppet of Britain. (“Utanríkisverzlun Íslands...” Þjóðviljinn. 25.01.1940, p. 1). The story was dismissed by the 
government press as poisoned lies and was perceived as potentially threatening to the country's neutrality since 
it could be seen as a provocation by the Germans (“Landráðaskrif kommúnistablaðsins…” Alþýðublaðið. 
25.01.1940, p. 1; “Ljótur verknaður”. Morgunblaðið. 28.01.1940, p. 5). Þjóðviljinn's writings caused an 
embarrassment for the government in relation to the German consul. (Whitehead. 1995, p. 188-191).  
17 Whitehead. 2010, p. 426. 
18 ibid. 
19 Jóhannesson, G. 2006, pp. 34-37. 
20 ibid. pp. 38-44. 
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the communists were the greatest internal threat at the time and not Icelandic Nazis or other 
domestic elements. There is little wonder Icelandic Nazis are seldom mentioned as possible 
quislings after April 9, 1940 because vocal Nazis were virtually non-existent and German-
friendly individuals were not seen as aggressive or dangerous. 
 However, the parliament resolution which was proposed in late March 1940 against ‘anti-
democratic individuals’ was never accepted in a form that could obstruct communist influence 
and the non-communist papers themselves directly stated during the Winter War that the 
communists’ alleged transgression was not illegal or constituted a ‘real’ treason. The 
transgression was purely a disobedience towards the mainstream opinion, i.e. the legitimising 
principles of the discourse. Therefore, I suggest that Finnagaldur in the Icelandic press was not 
a reaction to a real threat at the time but a discursive punishment. Anti-communist elements 
were appalled by the communists’ opinions because they went directly against their ideology, 
which was the ruling ideology of the political elite; namely, unconditional sympathy with the 
minor nations and national unity. We shall return to this factor in Chapter 5.5.  
 The anti-communist discourse does not really indicate danger and insecurity; on the contrary, 
it was a loud, triumphalist boast by victorious anti-communist commentators who rejoiced over 
the fact how unpopular the communists were among the public. This is further illustrated by 
the government press’ reactions when a real threat presented itself following the Invasion of 
Denmark and Norway and the apparent arch-treason was conducted by Quisling. As pointed 
out by Whitehead, the Icelandic authorities were concerned about the possibility that a few 
hundred ethnic Germans situated in the country would perform an attack from within following 
April 9. The Icelandic prime minister ordered arrangements to be made to prevent this: A limited 
curfew on foreign sailors was initiated, the German consulate in Reykjavík was kept under 
constant surveillance and a specially trained armed police was kept at hand ready to meet a 
gang of German fifth column fighters in the case of a German invasion.21 The question whether 
or not the editors of the pro-government newspapers knew this, suspected it, or could have 
guessed it, remains unclear. We know, however, for a fact that it was almost completely left out 
of the public discussions in the government press. Germans positioned in Iceland were never 
mentioned as a possible threat in these papers with the exception of a single remark by 
                                                 
21 Whitehead. 1995, p. 296-300 and 309. Some of these fears were fuelled by the presence of 62 German sailors 
who had been stranded in Iceland since January 1940. One non-government-related commentator feared that 
there were almost 200 Germans in Iceland, some of whom had close relations with the Nazi Party and were 
even trained members of the SA and SS. 
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Alþýðublaðið’s columnist.22  
 What makes Winter War anti-communism in the Icelandic papers different from typical anti-
communism was the fact that the communists now met opposition from society at large. Their 
apologism for the Invasion of Finland made them appear, not only as enemies of the 
establishment, but also the enemies of the minor nations – of the Nordic nations and of Icelandic 
well-being. According to the non-communist papers’ testament, ‘everybody’ was appalled by 
the violence in Finland; the violence the communists were said to worship. Since the 
communists had not broken any laws, the practical goal of Finnagaldur in the Icelandic press 
was thus to exploit negative public reception of the Invasion of Finland, expose to the readers 
the communists’ alleged real intent and exclude them on moral grounds. Even though the 
communists generated the opposition themselves, it was a joint effort of all the non-communist 
political elements to grasp the opportunity and rid Icelandic society of the menace of 
communism – and this was probably the period in the long history of Icelandic communism 
and anti-communism where they came the closest to reaching that goal. 
 Lastly, how can we explain the anti-communist remarks following Quisling’s coup? 
Someone had to be pointed at in the papers and there is no reason to doubt that the anti-
communist commentators really believed the communists would commit treason if that far-
fetched scenario of a Soviet invasion would present itself. Furthermore, Alþýðublaðið’s second 
wave of anti-communism in May and June 1940 was based on rumours of Nazi-communist 
cooperation in German-occupied Norway. Since Alþýðublaðið tended to view the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact as an alliance, the discussion may have been based on an actual fear of treason 
relating to a possible German invasion of Iceland – as the paper itself suggested. However, 
given the fact that the smear campaign took place well into the British occupation it could have 
been an attempt by the Labour Party organ’s editor to get Þjóðviljinn banned by the British 
occupation authorities, but these, of course, are only speculations. 
 At the end of the day, the discussions on both internal and external security was the subject 
of a similar type of rhetoric in the Icelandic non-communist press; careful, serious and secretive 
towards Germany and the quislings, while unconstrained and heated towards the Soviet Union 
and the Icelandic communists. This can be understood in the light that Nazi-Germany and ethnic 
Germans in Iceland constituted a real threat during the winter of 1939-1940, whereas the far-
away Soviet Union and the Icelandic communists were not. 
                                                 
22 “Um daginn og veginn”. Alþýðublaðið. 18.04.1940, p. 2. 
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5.3 Portrayals of the Aggressors 
In the two following sub-chapters, the Icelandic press’ portrayals of the two sets of aggressors 
and defenders of the two cases will be compared and discussed. These portrayals make up the 
press’ construction of the external world and will reveal underlying ideas and world-views. The 
contents of Chapters 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 are illustrated by Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix 1. 
5.3.1 Comparison 
Even though there is a marked difference in the Icelandic press’ portrayals of Nazi-Germany 
and the Soviet Union and the perceived operation and intent of the two invasions, they do share 
a number of mutual attributes; mainly their association with violence and betrayal. 
Commentators of all four newspapers noted in one way or another the perceived oppressive 
occupation by the Germans in Norway and Denmark and the Soviet leadership’s oppression of 
civilians and its own soldiers during the Winter War. Furthermore, both invasions are perceived 
as illegitimate acts by all the Icelandic papers with reference to ‘the rights of the minor nations’; 
i.e. the right to remain neutral and sovereign. As a result of that we can observe a universal 
denunciation of the use of force against the neutral minor nations. Both the aggressive powers 
are also criticised for breaking deals and betraying causes. Finally, the opinion towards Quisling 
and Kuusinen for their exercises in the field of national treason is altogether universally 
negative to say the very least. Interestingly, Kuusinen’s actions are usually referred to in the 
Icelandic press as ‘treason’ (i. landráð); illustrating the perception that the Finnish communist 
undermined his homeland and worked against it in collaboration with a national enemy. 
Quisling’s actions in Norway, however, are generally referred to as ‘betrayal’ (i. svik), which 
frames him as a trusted figure who unexpectedly stabbed his countrymen in the back. 
A notable difference in the portrayals of the two aggressors is the alleged cruelty of the one 
in Finland, i.e. on the scale of day-to-day military operations, which is not present in the Battle 
of Norway discourse. The Icelandic papers make little mention of German attacks on civilians 
or uneven air combat. The bombing of cities is not a markedly important theme in opinion 
pieces during the Norwegian campaign. The reason for this difference in outlook is the 
perception that the Germans were first and foremost fighting the Allies in Norway. The press’ 
universal understanding of the Norwegian Campaign as a scenario in the world war limits their 
notion of the invasion as an attack on the Norwegian people. The emphasis on air combat and 
especially terror bombing as the Soviet’s main source of violence during the campaign in 
Finland is easily understood from the perspective of the day, when aerial bombing was a 
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relatively recent and unconventional concept. Air combat was also the most uneven front of the 
Winter War due to Finnish vulnerability. This fact further magnified the bully-like aspect of the 
conflict in Finland which intensified the reactions in the Icelandic papers. 
 Although the German invasion of Norway was not overall seen as blatantly aggressive as the 
Soviet Invasion of Finland, this case is, on the other hand, more characterised in the Icelandic 
press by insidiousness and cunning use of ‘organised treason’. This is seen in a negative light 
across newspaper titles, even in Morgunblaðið. It is thus save to suggest that negative reception 
of both invasions was to a large extent based on moral grounds – resentment of violence and 
fellow feeling with the little man in the case of Finland and distaste of insidious betrayal in the 
Norwegian case.  
 Finally, the main difference in the portrayals of these two powers lies in the Frontier 
Metaphors presented in Chapter III. There are two main opinions in the Icelandic press 
regarding responsibility of the world war and the two conflicts: First, Alþýðublaðið’s view that 
Nazi-Germany was the main perpetrator of the war and that Soviet war guilt derived from its 
association with Germany. Second, Morgunblaðið’s neutral view towards the world war, and 
the view that the Soviet Union was the main aggressor of the war. Interestingly, as there was a 
universal understanding from the beginning of hostilities in Finland that Stalin’s aim was a 
bloody conquest of that country, the belief that Germany aimed for a long-term conquest of 
Denmark, Norway or Sweden seems non-existent in this discourse during the first month of the 
Norwegian Campaign, even in the anti-German press. The neutral press presented the invasion 
purely as a military operation which is only said to last throughout the world war.  
Despite a general disassociation with the Nazi regime, the Germans are seen in the Icelandic 
centre-right press as, a European “friendly nation”. 23 The Russians, on the other hand, are 
perceived as a stranger nation during the Winter War and throughout the period. The Germans 
are repeatedly treated as a menningarþjóð in the centre-right papers: A civilized, educated or 
cultured nation, whose history of economic and cultural ties with Iceland is noted.24 The term 
is one of the most frequently used concepts in the Icelandic press to describe other nations of 
high esteem and it carries with it a strong relation to a Eurocentric standard for civilization. 
Nations attributed the term during the period in question are typically the British, French, 
Germans and the Nordic nations. In some pacifist opinion pieces, French, British, German, 
                                                 
23 “Ljótur verknaður”. Morgunblaðið. 28.01.1940, p. 5. 
24 See for example: “Ørlagastundin”. Morgunblaðið. 10.04.1940, p. 5; “Þeir eru glaðir”. Morgunblaðið. 22.02.1940, 
p. 5; “Út af ófriðarsvæðinu”. Vísir. 15.03.1940, p. 2. 
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Norwegian and Finnish soldiers and civilians are simultaneously treated either in terms of self-
sacrifice or as victims of war and violence.25 No mention is made of the Soviets in this regard; 
only as victims of the Stalinist regime during the bloodiest days of the Winter War are Soviet 
soldiers viewed in a somewhat comparable light.  
5.3.2 Euro-Orientalism and Suspicion of Russia 
The Icelandic non-communist press’ alienation of the Soviet Union in almost every aspect is 
perhaps the most obvious example of us-them polarities this study has to offer. The idea that 
Russia is a strange and alien country is not restricted to the Icelandic press, nor was it a new 
conception attached solely to Bolshevik Russia. Oula Silvennoinen maintains that to the Finns, 
the Russians had been considered a “hereditary, implacable enemy of Finland”, and constituted 
the “culturally and ethnically alien ‘other’, whom first the Catholic and then the Lutheran” 
Swedes had fought to keep out of Finland.26 On this subject, Max Jakobson wrote in his classic 
work on the Winter War: 
The Eastern border of Finland became the boundary between Byzantium and Rome [during 
Swedish rule]; it also became the frontier of Western cultural and economic standards. […] To the 
great majority of Finns – Lutheran, literate, egalitarian, industrious – Russia stood for Asiatic 
barbarism which they had learned to resist.27 
It is apparent that elements of the Icelandic non-communist press, which associated with 
Finland and repeatedly touched upon this piece of Swedish-Finnish history when constructing 
the frontier in its analysis of the Winter War, shared the view described above. 28 Terms like 
Asian, Asiatic, half-asiatic, uncivilized, nomads and oriental are meant to alienate the Russian 
great power as something foreign, non-European, fearful and backward. Such a language is an 
example of a classic Eurocentric – or Euro-Orientalist approach, as suggested by Ezequiel 
Adamovsky. He maintains that the idea of the superiority of Western liberal society in the 19th 
and 20th centuries was partly formed by defining the East as its backward other due to the lack 
of western ingredients. Russia was considered Western Europe’s antithesis before the revolution 
of 1917; a notion which was only to be aggressively intensified by both parties during Soviet 
                                                 
25 Sigurður Einarsson. “Jól”. Alþýðublaðið. 23.12.1939, p. 3; “Hermenn Íslands…” Tíminn. 04.05.1940, p. 190. 
26 Silvennoinen. 2013, p. 130. 
27 Max Jakobson. The Diplomacy of the Winter War. An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1961, pp. 6 and 7. 
28 See for example: “Hver hefir Finnans metið móð?” Alþýðublaðið. 06.12.1939, p. 3; “Viborg”. Alþýðublaðið. 
02.13.1940, p. 3.  
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times, culminating in the Cold War.29 Adamovsky’s Euro-Orientalism is based on the concept 
of binary oppositions, which are contrasting attributes between the Eurocentric perception of 
the progressive West and the perceived backward others, in this case, Russia. 30  Similarly, 
György Péteri proposes that the portraying of geographic regions on an axis of development 
termed developmental hierarchies is a central aspect of such mental mapping. The extremes of 
said axis, Péteri proposes, is usually civilisation, modern and Europe, versus barbarism, 
backwardness and Asia.31  
 This categorisation is typical for the Icelandic press portrayal of Finland and Russia during 
the Winter War and the sharp contrasts presented in Chapter III rhyme strikingly with Péteri’s 
and Adamovsky’s concepts. Table 6 (see Appendix 1) lists the findings in the Icelandic press of 
contrasting attributes during the Winter War compared to Adamovsky’s “main sociohistorical” 
and “cultural binary oppositions in Euro-Orientalist discourse”, as presented in the appendix of 
his study. 
The emphasis on culture and civilization derives from the fact that the Icelanders considered 
themselves educated, civilized and cultured too. The period of Icelandic home rule and 
sovereignty (1904-1944) was characterised with the optimism and ambition of a young nation 
state. Kjartansson maintains that no contemporary Icelanders would have placed the country 
among the under-developed colonies of the non-European world, despite the relative under-
development and poverty of the interwar era. Rather, the Icelanders fully identified themselves 
with the Christian, ‘civilized’ world of the white man.32  Hálfdanarsson points out that the 
maintenance of this image was important for Icelandic opinion makers in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, who even “orientalised” the Faroese and the Greenlandic Inuit to define themselves 
as modern Europeans.33 In search of confidence, some even viewed the nation as the pinnacle 
of the white race, being the ‘purest’ of the Germanic nations and best connected with the ancient 
Nordic roots.34  
The Soviet Union was not only considered the devil of the Finnish campaign, it was also 
                                                 
29 Ezequil Adamovsky. “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810-
1880“. The Journal of Modern History. 77:3 (2005), pp. 591-628, pp. 591 and 620. 
30 ibid. p. 613-615. 
31 György Péteri. “Introduction: The Oblique Coordinate Systems of Modern Identity”. Imaging the West in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Ed.: György Péteri. Pittsburgh, 2010, pp. 1-12, p. 3. 
32 Kjartansson. 2002, pp. 143-144. 
33 Guðmundur Hálfdanarson. “Iceland Perceived: Nordic, European or a Colonial Other?” The Postcolonial North 
Atlantic. Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Volume 20 in series: Berliner Beiträge zur Skandinavistik. 
Eds.: Lill-Ann Körber and Ebbe Valquardsen. Berlin, 2014, p 60 and 56-59. 
34 Kjartansson. 2002, pp. 143-144. 
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seen by many as a major threat to Europe. The Military Frontier Metaphor is a rhetoric of 
suspicion towards the alien other in the East. During the bulk of the interwar era in Europe, 
Bolshevik Russia was the power which was most widely feared would disrupt the established 
international order. With the advent of Nazi aggression in the late 1930s, however, the 
democracies in Europe not directly bordering the Soviet Union shifted their defensive focus 
towards Germany. 35 We can see that this shift is somewhat absent in the Icelandic papers of 
1939-1940, with the notable exception of Alþýðublaðið, due to the neutral approach towards 
Germany. The Winter War appears usually in a larger context of Stalin’s alleged imperialist 
aspirations, who, in addition to Scandinavia, is seen threatening the Balkans and Turkey.36 
Vísir’s headline and subtitle in Frame 1 of Image 6 are examples of such a portrayals. It is 
suggested that the Invasion of Finland, along with alleged Soviet designs on the Balkans has 
triggered an international wakeup call against the “red danger”. This illustrates how the Soviet 
Union was portrayed as a common European threat.  
Additionally, in Frame 2 
Vísir encourages its readers 
to “support Finland in the 
struggle” by donating to the 
Finland Relief. This shows a 
direct association with 
Finland and it illustrates 
Vísir’s vision how the 
Icelanders could be a part of 
the “consortium of nations” 
against the Soviet Union 
while the Finns defended 
Nordic and Western 
civilization at the frontier. 
Such an association also 
appeared in some of the 
newspaper editorials agitating for the Finland Relief when it was launched on “Finland Day” 
                                                 
35 Silvennoinen. 2013, p. 133. 
36 See for example: “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 10.12.1939, p. 5; “Rússar hóta Afghanistan…” Vísir. 
03.01.1940, p. 2; “Rússland og Balkanríkin”. Alþýðublaðið. 11.01.1940, p. 2. 
Image 6: The headlines in Frame 1 read:“The War's Foreplay over and the 
First Act of the Tragedy Beginning? - The Consortium of Nations Against 
Communism Toughens. - Italian Pilots Fight with the Finns – Russian 
Claims on Bessarabia Unite the Balkan Nations Against the Red Danger”. 
The headline in Frame 2 agitates for the Icelandic Finland Relief:“Support 
Finland in the Struggle – Finland-day on Sunday”. Source: Vísir. 
07.12.1939, p. 1. 
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in early December 1939, as Vísir’s example shows: 
Today we show our sympathy to the Finnish sister nation, sympathy which will make a little 
difference, but attests though, that we Icelanders are considered among civilized nations, [and we 
will do our share], despite little capacity.37(a) 
5.4. Portrayals of the Defenders 
5.4.1 Comparison 
The Icelandic press’ portrayal of the defenders of the two cases is relatively uniform. Translated 
here as sister nation, the Icelandic term frændþjóð (n. broderfolk. s. frändefolk), is frequently 
used during both cases to underline the cultural association shared by the Icelanders on the one 
hand and the Nordic nations on the other. Glorification of the Nordic Countries goes hand in 
hand with the unquestioned sympathy with these nations. We can see that the Icelandic 
newspapers presented the Danes, Norwegians and Finns in the winter of 1939-1940 as 
exceptionally successful and progressive peoples. Common attributes attached to all of the 
Nordic Countries during the two conflicts is the notion of ‘mental and material’ progress in the 
field of culture, education, arts and athletics, as well as the Nordic Countries’ remarked interest 
for neutrality and peace in the international arena. 
Interestingly, the Icelandic press counts Finland unconditionally as a member of the Nordic 
brotherhood. Some scholars have pointed out that not everyone identified Finland as being a 
fully Nordic country before the Second World War. 38  Henrik S. Nissen suggests that this 
changed with the Soviet Invasion of Finland and that the Winter War discourse in Denmark and 
Norway was fuelled by Nordic nationalism which made the Norwegians and Danes approach 
the Finns for the first time as a Nordic nation.39 Strømsøe, on the other hand, maintains that 
Nordic cooperation in the interwar era had reached such heights that Finland was already in 
1939 considered an unquestioned part of the Nordic community. Attack on Finland was 
therefore seen as an attack on Scandinavia.40  
The findings in the Icelandic press clearly support Strømsøe‘s point of view. Sympathy with 
                                                 
37  “Samúð með Finnum”. Vísir. 10.12.1939, p. 2. See also: “Finnland”. Morgunblaðið. 10.12.1939, p. 5; 
“Þjóðarmetnaður Íslendinga...” Alþúðublaðið. 09.12.1939, p. 1. 
38 See for example: Uffe Østergård. “Nordic Identity between “Norden” and Europe”. European Peripheries in 
Interaction. The Nordic Countries and the Iberian Peninsula. Eds.: Luis Beltrán, et al. [Place of publishing not 
specified], 2002, pp. 151-203, p. 154; Henrik S. Nissen. “Det nationale og demokratiet“. Norden under 2. 
Verdenskrig. Copenhagen, 1979, pp. 205-222, p. 207. 
39 Nissen. 1979, p. 207.  
40 Strømsøe. 1997, p. 399. 
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the Finns in the press was securely built upon the precondition that the Icelanders were related 
to them through Nordic or Scandinavian links and they are repeatedly categorised among the 
Danes and Norwegians as a frændþjóð. The Sympathy Address to Finland, signed in early 
December 1939 (see Chapter II), described the Icelanders and Finns sharing the attribute of 
being “the utmost outrider[s] [or outposts] of Nordic culture” in the west and in the east 
respectively.41(b)  
In February 1940, Þjóðviljinn, criticised what the communists regarded as exaggerated 
sympathy with the Finns among the non-communist press. The Finns were not at all a ‘sister 
nation’ of the Icelanders, the paper claimed, but equally unrelated to them as “Congo-
Negroes”.42 Alþýðublaðið saw such assertions as insulting to the Finns – stating that the Finns 
had become “so Swedish”, that they should be placed nowhere but among the Nordic Nations.43 
A local scholar joined in on the discussion in Alþýðublaðið, concluding that the Finns should 
neither be equated with Negroes nor Mongols, but were indeed closely related to the “Nordic 
race”.44 Thus, even though the Icelanders had very insignificant contact with the Finns before 
the war, the Icelandic non-communist press considered them a part of the Nordic whole along 
with Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the Winter War.45 
Unsurprisingly, the point of divergence in the portrayal of Finland on the one hand and 
Norway/Denmark on the other is related to the military aspect of the two conflicts. As we have 
seen, portrayal of the Finns is foremost characterised with a heroisation, whereas the 
Norwegians and Danes are the subject of victimisation in the Icelandic press. This has 
everything to do with the defenders’ dissimilar roles on their respective fronts during the 
conflicts – in the same way as was mentioned earlier regarding Germany and the Soviet Union 
in the role of the aggressors. The Icelandic papers featured daily headlines from London and 
Copenhagen reporting astonishing Finnish victories at the front. The apparently spectacular 
Finnish defence against the largest army in the world earned the Finns a worldwide reputation 
of heroism. Thirty years after the Winter War’s conclusion, Allen F. Chew evoked the 
journalistic myth reported to the Western media by foreign correspondents in Finland during 
                                                 
41 “Ávarp frá Íslendingum...” Vísir. 01.12.1939, p. 1. 
42 “Brjálun hugsunarinnar...” Þjóðviljinn. 06.02.1940, p. 2. 
43 “Finnum líkt við Kongonegra!” Alþýðublaðið. 07.02.1940, p. 3. 
44 Ólafur Hansson. “Uppruni Finna”. Alþýðublaðið. 09.02.1940, p. 2-4. p. 4.  
45 The Finns and Icelanders had little to do with the each other before the war. The Finns were a great minority 
among other foreigners in Iceland during the interwar era of whom the vast majority were Danes, Norwegians 
and Swedes. Nevertheless, publications from the interwar era suggests that the Finns were indeed considered 
part of the Nordic whole. In some interwar writings on the Finnish Civil War, one can even find rhetoric similar 
to that of the Winter War (Jónsson, A. 2013, p. 156). 
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the conflict: 
Those who recall the journalistic coverage of the “Winter War” of 1939-1940 are familiar with the 
myth that the Finns were superhuman, fearless, deadly efficient defenders of Western civilization 
against a brutal, godless, blundering communist horde which outnumbered them fifty to one […]. 
Like most myths, this one contains elements of both fact and fantasy.46 
Evaluation of the accuracy of these foreign reports is not the goal of this study. However, 
Chew’s description matches the glorified and heroised, black-and-white portrayal of the Finns 
which is apparent in the Icelandic press – and this earned them respect and admiration from the 
newspaper commentators beyond proportions.47  
The Norwegians on the other 
hand, even though they refused to 
give in to German dominance on 
April 9, 1940, were in most cases 
not perceived as heroic fighters at 
all. Discussions on the Norwegian 
Army at the front is next to non-
existent. The Norwegians are 
occasionally given credit for the 
decision to stand up and fight, but this notion is an occasionally mentioned fact and far from 
constituting a discursive theme. The fact that the Battle of Norway was a campaign of the 
Second World War seems to have taken the Norwegians into the background and left them 
victimised for being swept up into the world war against their will. They are empathised for the 
unfortunate fate of being situated between the two warring great powers and in the anti-fascist 
press for being downtrodden by the Germans.  
Even the demonised images of Kuusinen and Quisling are made with these portrayals of 
victimisation and heroisation in mind. The Norwegian people is seen as the victim of Quisling 
and his gang.48 The Finns, on the other hand, are said to have successfully fought communism 
during and following the Finnish Civil War, and successfully cleansed their society of the 
                                                 
46 Allen F. Chew. The White Death. The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War. East Lansing, 1971, p. vii. 
47 Strømsøe points out that the reports from Finland were subject to censorship by the Finnish authorities and were 
far from being accurate objective observations. As foreign public opinion was deemed important for the Finnish 
war effort, foreign reports became an integrated part of Finnish propaganda. (1997, p. 266-270). 
48 See for example: “Þegnskapur”. Morgunblaðið. 05.05.1940, p. 5. 
Image 7: The overall presentation of the Nordic Countries in the 
Icelandic press during the invasions of Finland and 
Norway/Denmark. 
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communist threat.49  
5.4.2 Brotherhood with the Nordic Nations 
Association with Finland and Norway/Denmark is omnipresent in the portrayals of these parties. 
As we have seen, the Frontier Metaphors during the Winter War illustrates an association with 
Finland as the defender of Scandinavia. It is hardly unreasonable that Icelandic commentators 
suggested this when the Finnish soldiers were seen as the only obstacle from, to quote 
Morgunblaðið’s columnist in January 1940, Stalin’s “destruction of [the] Nordic nations [and 
of] Nordic culture”.50(c) Strømsøe points out that even though there were different approaches 
towards Finland among the pro-Finnish activists, i.e. interventionists, in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, there were three things they all had in common: A certain degree of traditional 
‘scandinavianist’ fellow-felling, anti-communism and Russophobia.51  
Apparently, pro-Finnish sentiments in the Icelandic press are also built upon these themes, 
although we can safely suggest that Nordic companionship was by far the strongest in 
Alþýðublaðið. The official address from the Icelandic Finland Relief declared that “the other 
Nordic nations” had begun a fund-raising and it would not be fitting that the Icelanders stood 
by “alone”.52 The official press discourse also suggests an association with the Nordic Countries 
in relation to neutrality. The neutral commentators, as we have seen, flagged the official 
standpoint of the National Government, which was Nordic neutrality and even took sides with 
Norway in the heated prequel to Operation Weserübung. The invasions of Finland, Norway and 
Denmark demonstrated that the peaceful intent of the Nordic Countries, their non-aggression 
pacts and declarations of neutrality – like that of Iceland itself – had failed.  
Why is there such a widespread glorification of the Nordic countries in the Icelandic press? 
Glorification of the defenders is presented in a way that it decisively separates them from the 
aggressors, even from the perspectives of all three approaches. Thus, glorification of Finland 
and Norway becomes an antithesis to the demonisation of the villain. From the universal anti-
Soviet approach, Icelandic commentators keep a significant distance between a glorified 
Finland and an alienated Soviet Union. From the anti-German approach a distance is kept from 
the fascist and aggressive Nazi-Germany with presentation of the victims as innocent 
champions of national freedom, peace and socialism. From the neutral approach, commentators 
                                                 
49 See for example: Jónas Jónsson. “Forusta Alþingis”. Tíminn. 23.04.1940, p. 178. 
50 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 27.01.1940, p. 5. 
51 Strømsøe, pp. 408-409. 
52 “Þjóðarmetnaður Íslendinga...” Alþýðublaðið. 09.12.1940, p. 1-4, p. 4. 
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clearly separate a glorified Nordic society of peace and progress from the violence and 
barbarism of the anonymous world war.  
These considerations aside, Uffe Østergård suggests that glorification of Nordic society is a 
common practice amongst Nordic commentators. Usage of the word Norden is typically loaded 
with a positive understanding of Northern Europe as something exceptional and “different from 
the rest of Europe”53 It consist of an additional set of positively defined attributes which unite 
the nations in question as something more than merely a geographical region but a transnational 
entity of common history. Ole Wæver suggests that Nordic people perceive Norden as being 
“better than Europe”, based on the attribute of a model society through welfare, peace and 
humanitarianism.54 Although such a Nordic identity was primarily constructed in the post-war 
era, we can see that the Icelandic newspaper commentators applied it already in the winter of 
1939-1940. In fact, the attributes from the press is similar to those suggested by Østergård are 
typically carried with the term Norden in Nordic self-perception: 
Norden is perceived as something non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Rome, anti-imperialist, non-
colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small and social democratic. In short, the Nordic peoples have 
perceived themselves as having no responsibility for Europe’s exploitation of the rest of the world 
[…].55 
Finally, to state the obvious, although the Icelandic elite largely tried to distance itself from the 
Danes up until the 1930s, with the exception of the social-democrats, the Icelanders 
undoubtedly considered themselves part of the Nordic community. 56  However, being 
considered an equal part of said community is also typical for the Icelandic mind-set of the 
interwar era, for it was part of an identity building in the nationalist spirit. The Icelandic elite 
wanted the nation to remain sovereign and establish itself as independent, and thus co-equals 
of the Nordic nations.57 Furthermore, they looked to the big ‘sister nations’ as role models. The 
vast majority of the Icelandic political elite was educated in the Nordic Countries, usually 
Denmark, before the war and it goes without saying that Iceland and Denmark had enjoyed a 
                                                 
53 Østergård. 2002, p. 154. 
54 Ole Wæver. “Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War”. International Affairs. 68:1 (1992), pp. 77-
102, p. 84. 
55 Østergård. 2002, p. 154. 
56 Gestur Guðmundsson. “Er Ísland hluti Norðurlanda?” Íslenska söguþingið. 28.-31. maí 1997. Ráðstefnurit I. 
Reykjavík, 1998, pp. 254-267, p. 256. 
57 This view is apparent in publications from the early 20th century. See for example: “Samvinna Norðurlanda”. 
Morgunblaðið. 10.12.1919, p. 1. “Heima og erlendis”. Skinfaxi. 6:10 (1915), pp. 107-108; Steinþór 
Guðmundsson. “Ræða”. Skinfaxi. 6:10 (1915), pp. 110-111; Einar Benediktsson. “Norræn menning”. Eimreiðin. 
38:1 (1932), pp. 72-74; Sveinn Sigurðsson. “Norræn samvinna”. Eimreiðin. 42:4 (1936), pp. 355-361. 
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close patron-client relations for centuries. 58  Ingi Sigurðsson has shown that the Icelandic 
cultural elite of the late 19th and early 20th centuries had high esteem of Norway and the 
Norwegians and he points out that in this period, Norway was considered by many as providing 
an economic and political example for the young Icelandic state.59  
5.5 Icelandic Self-Perception 
In the preceding analysis, we have encountered a number of attributes positively and negatively 
attributed to all parties of the 1939-1940 invasions of Scandinavia. The opinion-loaded 
representation of foreign actors reveals the values of the commentators themselves and their 
perception of their place in the world. György Péteri calls such mental mapping symbolic 
geographies. Accordingly, people define themselves by drawing “boundaries of social spaces 
where they are within, and relating themselves and their spaces to others”.60 Furthermore, 
Péteri suggests that mental mapping is a process of building identities: 
What makes these socially and historically situated processes really important is their intimate 
relationship to the formation of identities and, indeed, to identity politics (including the regular 
attempts in all kinds of modern political regimes to manage identities through the projection of 
images about themselves and the others).61 
I would suggest that the newspaper discourse during these two dramatic events reveals a good 
deal of identity formation; namely that of the Icelandic nation state, which was still in its 
formative period during the winter of 1939-1940 and aiming for full independence in the 
coming years.  
5.5.1 Icelandic Nationalism 
It has been discussed how glorification of Finland, Norway and Denmark not only reflects the 
Icelandic commentators’ association with the ‘sister nations’, but also their own identity in a 
disassociation from them, in the form of a wish to be accepted as the fifth independent Nordic 
nation. Nationalism was still a very widespread ideology in Icelandic cultural and political 
society during the interwar years. Guðmundur Jónsson has pointed out that nationalism 
                                                 
58 Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson. “Íslenskir valdamenn og Evrópa á tuttugustu öld”. Íslenska söguþingið. 28.-31. maí 
1997. Ráðstefnurit I. Reykjavík, 1998, pp. 217-230, pp. 228-229. 
59  Ingi Sigurðsson. “Islendingenes holdninger til Norge og nordmennene fra 1814 fram til den andre 
verdenskrigen”. Historisk tidskrift. 88:2, (2009), pp. 251-277, pp. 276-277. 
60 Péteri. 2010, p. 2. 
61 ibid. 
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appeared not as a solid ideology but an omnipresent paradigm, which blended into other 
ideologies such as socialism or liberalism.62 This description fits well into the nationalist aspect 
of the newspaper discussions during the winter of 1939-1940, for Icelandic nationalism is 
frequently to be found underlying in the discussions on the events in Scandinavia. Phrases like 
foreign oppression or foreign great powers are often employed during both of our cases, not to 
mention terms like freedom, independence, sovereignty, patriotism, treason, betrayal and 
traitors. 
Although universal, such a language is more flamboyant during the Winter War. Admiration 
of the Finns is partly based on common attributes with them by the Icelanders above the other 
Nordic nations. This is the apparently admirable example set by the freedom loving Finns in 
terms of nationalist fervour and their fight for independence against the former oppressor. The 
commentators referred to supposed Icelandic suffering under centuries of foreign oppression 
and thus felt that they in particular – that is, the Icelanders as a nation, could relate to the conflict 
in Finland. One of Vísir’s commentators in January 1940 maintained that sympathy with the 
little man was “grown into the nature of the Icelander”, as he explained the Icelandic sympathy 
with Finland as an outburst of righteous anger. He concluded that “old wounds bleed when 
people tearfully think of a little sister nation struggling for her life and freedom”. This sympathy, 
he concluded, “illustrates that the Icelandic blood is long-retentive” on foreign subjugation and 
constraint. 63  Although all papers share this admiration, Tíminn’s writings seem more 
characterised by nationalist references than the others.64  
As was regularly pointed out by the Icelandic papers, the Finns and Icelanders had much in 
common in relation to national freedom. The Finns gained independence in the same year that 
the Icelanders received their sovereign state and in the period since, the papers present a picture 
of the Finnish Republic as a model society. The Finns are presented as a nation for which 
national unity and patriotism is of the highest value. They are praised for their exemplar 
“national-upbringing”; a patriotic education system that is said to deliver popular education and 
                                                 
62 Guðmundur Jónsson. “Þjóðernisstefna, hagþróun og sjálfstæðisbarátta”. Skírnir. 169:1 (1995), pp. 65-93, p. 66. 
63 “Hvað á að gera við föðurlandssvikarana?” Vísir. 29.01.1940, p. 2. 
64 As an example, in January 1940, Tíminn compared the Soviet territorial claims on Finland and the communists' 
support for these claims with an Icelandic textbook saga from the 11th century, in which Norwegian King Ólafur 
Haraldsson (St. Olaf) demands that the Icelanders cede to him Grímsey Island. An Icelandic hero, Einar 
Þveræingur, defeats the king as well as his fellow Icelanders who want to give in to the demands. The point of 
the saga was to illustrate the inequality of Soviet demands, the admirable nationalist fervour of the Finns and 
the anti-national nature of the Icelandic communists by using a metaphor which people could relate to. The 
communists are equated to those Icelanders who wished to cede Grimsey Island to a foreign power (“Þeir, sem 
vilja gefa Grímsey”. Tíminn. 18.01.1940, p. 27). 
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national unity. For the sake of this healthy system, some OP writers maintain, the Finnish nation 
was prepared and able to withstand the unequal match with the Red Army.65 Reflecting over 
the Icelandic sympathy with the Finns, Vísir’s editor noted in March 1940: 
[Our sympathy] is natural. The Finns [are] our coevals in sovereignty. They had, like us, used their 
given freedom energetically. Cultural and vocational progress was very frequent. Their popular 
education had reached a high level. […] They appreciated the freedom and the values it had brought 
them. That’s why they sacrificed their blood to protect it.66(d) 
Furthermore, the heroic steadfastness of the Finns towards national freedom is seen as providing 
an example for the Icelanders in their own struggle for independence, which was apparently 
felt by some to have lost its fervour. Jónas Jónsson, the leader of the Progressive Party and co-
editor of Tíminn claimed in February 1940 that the nationalist dedication of the Icelanders had 
dampened in the recent years, but added that sympathy with the Finns had shown that people 
still harboured a living love for freedom. The donations to the Finland Relief and the pro-
Finnish gatherings proved that the ‘nation’ was ready to take on the project of independence 
and defend it. 67  Using the Winter War as a platform from which to protest the current 
constitutional position of Iceland in a personal union with Denmark, Tíminn’s editor pointed 
out how the Winter War had gone differently if the Finns had had the same relationship with 
Russia as Iceland had with Denmark at the time.68 
The message from all this is clear: Using the Finnish Republic and Finnish/Norwegian 
national unity as examples, the press is legitimising the ruling ideology of the Icelandic elite; 
namely, Icelandic nationalism and independence aspirations. Positive comparison between the 
successes of the Icelandic and Finnish states since receiving “freedom” glorifies and legitimises 
the idea of an independent Icelandic nation state. Additionally, the non-communist papers praise 
the Finnish Republic’s success from their unique class-political perspective, further legitimising 
their vision of how to use the national freedom. For example, the bourgeois press mentioned 
individual entrepreneurship and national unity as well as anti-communism as the Finns’ main 
achievements since 1918 whereas Alþýðublaðið praised Finnish social-democrats and the 
                                                 
 
65 See for example: Jónas Jónsson. “Frelsi og sjálfstæði”. Tíminn. 20.02.1940, p. 78; Jón N. Jónsson. “Þjóðir og 
þjóðmenning”. Vísir. 29.03.1940, p. 2. 
66 “Örlög Finna”. Vísir. 14.03.1940, p. 2. 
67 Jónas Jónsson. “Frelsi og sjálfstæði”. Tíminn. 20.02.1940, p. 78; Jónas Jónsson. “Áramótahugleiðingar”. Tíminn. 
30.12.1939, p. 598 Jónsson also made similar remarks about the Norwegians roughly four months later 
maintaining the Icelanders were lagging behind the Norwegians, who “sacrifice everything they have” in order 
to “make their country free again”. (Jónas Jónsson. “Frjáls þjóð í frjálsu landi”. Tíminn. 30.04.1940, p. 186). 
68 Jónas Jónsson. “Frelsi og sjálfstæði”. Tíminn. 20.02.1940, p. 78. 
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Finnish labour movement for achievements in labour issues.69 
Domestic anti-communism in relation to the Winter War was no less engulfed in a nationalist 
language. As pointed out by Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Icelandic nationalism was not 
considered a political ideology in the interwar years, nor was it observed as a historical 
phenomenon; rather, nationalism was understood as the “core of human nature”. He who 
renounced the motherland and its people, Hálfdanarson maintains, was seen as “renouncing 
himself”.70 The Icelandic communists did just that in the eyes of their adversaries. They are 
ostracised in the non-communist press for having anti-national opinions regarding the Winter 
War and thus they are decisively placed into the other-category along with the Kuusinen, 
Quisling and the invading Soviets and Germans. 
By denouncing the ‘rights of the minor nations’, the communists were said to be denouncing 
Icelandic right of independence and thus had completely resigned from Icelandic society. This 
is, in fact, the main embodiment of legitimising principles in the discourse. The discursive 
themes dictate what is allowed to say in public and what not and the opinions of the communists 
went head-on against the mainstream opinion which demanded unconditional sympathy with 
Finland and a condemnation of the attack on moral grounds. As the Finnish cause was made 
into an Icelandic cause, the non-communist press saw the communist opinion as a resignation 
from the Icelandic national cause and thus from Icelandic society.  
5.5.2 Us vs. Them 
To sum up the analysis of the press portrayals of foreign actors, let us return to the construction 
of symbolic geographies in the Icelandic press. We have seen that the overall content of Chapter 
III and IV reveals a significant division of “social spaces” between the speaker, i.e. us, and the 
others. In this case, the speakers are the commentators of the Icelandic press, representing the 
ideologies of the National Government and the Icelandic political elite. As we have seen, there 
are slightly different categorisations in the Icelandic press and these differ between newspapers 
titles and periods. Therefore, based on the observation in Chapter III and IV, I would suggest 
                                                 
69 See for example: “Varnarstríð (!)” Alþýðublaðið. 15.12.1939, p. 3. Alþýðublaðið also employed its own social-
democratic character when criticising the Soviet Union. Reflective of the fact that the paper's editor, Stefán 
Pjetursson, was once a pro-Soviet communist before turning against Stalin, the paper often published opinion 
pieces during the Winter War which deemed Stalin's pact with Hitler and his invasion of Finland a betrayal of 
international communism, the labour movement and the true principles of the Russian Revolution. See for 
example: “Sviknar hugsjónir”. Alþýðublaðið. 24.01.1940, p. 3; “Hvað hefði Lenín sagt...” Alþýðublaðið. 
21.02.1940, p. 3; Charles Rappoport. “Gamall byltingarmaður...” Alþýðublaðið. 22.02.1940, p. 2. 
70  Guðmundur Hálfdanarson. “Þjóð og minningar”. Íslenska söguþingið. 28.-31. maí 1997. Ráðstefnurit I. 
Reykjavík, 1998, pp. 354-365, p. 356. 
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that the Icelandic non-communist press reveals a three-layered mental map of the surrounding 
world during the troubled winter of 1939-1940. Although these maps are mostly confined to 
certain newspapers, they are applied by them all at some point throughout the whole period. 
 
Image 8: A three-layered map depicting the us and them associations apparent in the Icelandic non-communist 
press during the winter of 1939-1940. Note that the map is only meant to give a general overview of the world-
views. 
First, during the Winter War, some commentators of the Icelandic press present a perception of 
the external world through goggles of the Civilization Frontier Metaphor. Here, Iceland is seen 
belonging to Europe, along with the Western Allies and Nazi-Germany, against Asiatic 
Bolshevik Russia. Second, through the lens of the neutral approach, some commentators 
constructed a vision of a world divided by us; the neutral and peaceful minor nations, 
prominently the Nordics, and them; the violent world war of the great powers. Finally, during 
the latter half of the Phoney War period, an understanding of the external world is reached by 
adding the belligerent Western Allies into the second equation, thus promoting an image of the 
forces of democracy and freedom versus dictatorship and totalitarianism. As we have seen, 
Alþýðublaðið and Tíminn did at times suggest this world-view before the fourth research period 
and it is safe to conclude that it had become dominant in all papers by the end of this study’s 
period in June 1940.  
A complete set of speakers, actors and attributes positively attached to us and negatively 
attached to them, is listed in Table 7 in Appendix 1. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Soviet Invasion of Finland in November 1939 and the German Invasion of Norway four 
months later in April 1940 prompted wide-ranging reactions in Iceland. The events provoked 
responses by the Icelandic government, the Icelandic public and, not least, the Icelandic 
mainstream political press. This study has covered roughly six months of newspaper content 
from the four most prominent non-communist newspapers in Iceland. An image has been drawn 
of the mind-set of the Icelandic political elite during the last winter of the interwar era and it 
has been placed both into an international and domestic context. The main results of this study 
are the reflections made of Icelandic political culture at the time; the political elite’s emphasis 
on national unity and anti-communism; its association with the Western world and the Nordic 
Countries and disassociation with the warring great powers, most obviously the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, the two discourses illustrate an apparent sense of helplessness and 
defencelessness vis-à-vis the great power belligerents by the Icelanders themselves and on 
behalf of other minor nations. 
*** 
The Icelandic press reacted overall badly to the two invasions in Scandinavia; commentators 
expressed a sense of anger, judgement, accusations, and call for social exclusion; danger, fear, 
insecurity, and sorrow. All of these negative expressions are counterweighted by one positive 
notion; admiration of the Finnish fighting spirit during the Winter War, which appears as some 
sort of a light in a seemingly dark atmosphere. On the one hand, the newspaper content is about 
domestic elements and the Icelandic situation as a direct result of the two invasions and foreign 
subjects on the other, dealing with opinionated portrayals of the belligerents. Interestingly, the 
Icelandic papers used more space discussing the internal affairs than the events themselves. Of 
the domestic issues, which focus on the search for – and defence against an internal threat and 
how to cope with the external threat, domestic anti-communism is the most overarching and 
far-reaching topic of them all. It is a dominating discourse during the Winter War and has an 
underlying presence in the non-communist press throughout the remaining three research 
periods of study’s time frame. Discussions on the invasions themselves and their actors are 
confined to three approaches: (1) An anti-Soviet approach during the Winter War, (2) an anti-
German approach and (3) a neutral approach during the Battle of Norway. What all approaches 
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have in common is a universal condemnation of violence, both in the form of interstate 
aggression and fifth column treason, and a universal sympathy with the Nordic nations. 
In the introduction to this study, the question was posed whether or not the Invasion of 
Finland triggered more anger and shock in the Icelandic press than the Invasion of Norway. The 
direct answer is yes: The Invasion of Finland was undoubtedly more shocking and more 
appalling in the eyes of the contemporaries and it generated observably more heated discussions 
in the papers – and that is excluding the widespread popular reactions in the real world outside 
of the discourse. The discussion is aggressive, excessive, feisty, and accusing; it is a discourse 
of repulsion and detestation towards communists in Iceland, Finland and in the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, it is almost completely monolithic, where all of the non-communist papers share 
the same view and employ the same arguments in denunciations of them, the villain and in 
admiration of us and the hero.  
However, this is not to say that the Icelanders cared less about the Invasion of Norway or 
had less sympathy with the Norwegians than with the Finns. In fact, the two discourses are 
different in scope but not in scale. Both events became the most discussed topics in the Icelandic 
press for the durations of the campaigns. The discussion around the Battle of Norway is far 
from monolithic. Here, there are two opposing approaches towards the aggressor and there is 
even a marked difference in the use of language among the anti-German papers. The 
heterogeneous discourse is characterised by sadness instead of admiration and insecurity and 
anxiety instead of anger and accusations – with the notable exception of Alþýðublaðið’s fierce 
anti-German stance. The contemporaries themselves saw the events of April 9, 1940 as a more 
serious matter than the Winter War and that is why the discourse is less heated and excessive. 
Furthermore, my conclusion is that unlike the Finnish case, the Invasion of Norway and 
Denmark triggered a real alert in Icelandic government circles. This time, the authorities 
suspected an actual internal danger, which was neither Icelandic Nazis nor communists as the 
newspapers suggested, but ethnic Germans stationed in Iceland. The silence of the press and 
the neutral approach towards Germany supports this conclusion. 
Four prominent ideologies were extracted from the two discourses. First, there is anti-
communism and anti-Soviet sentiments. Second, the pacifist-like opposition to the great powers 
and their destructive world war and a moral belief in the rights of the minor nations of neutrality 
and sovereignty. Third, an opposition to dictatorship and fascism. Finally, the papers express a 
Eurocentrist glorification of Western civilization, mostly through the alienation of its perceived 
Bolshevik Russian antithesis – and more specifically; glorification of the Nordic Countries, 
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including Finland. These ideas and opinions are reflected in the papers’ portrayals of the actors 
of the two conflicts.  
The aggressors; Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union, are seen sharing the identity of 
oppressive dictatorships who broke promises and illegitimately imposed violence upon 
innocent minor nations. The Soviet Union is universally despised in the non-communist press 
and the Frontier Metaphors illustrate the idea of the Soviet Union as an 
uncivilized/uncultured/uneducated society, which is alien to the Icelanders and threatening to 
European civilisation and world peace. The portrayal of Nazi-Germany is twofold. 
Commentators of the anti-German approach perceive Germany as the main villain of the world 
war in association with the Soviet Union. As such, the Germans are seen bearing full 
responsibility of the Norwegian Campaign and the world war in general. Commentators of the 
neutral approach towards Germany, on the other hand, do not identify the Germans specifically 
as villains; they speak uncritically of them and even associate with them within the boundaries 
of Germany being a cultured and civilized nation with good, friendly ties to Iceland. In criticism 
of the two invasions, the former operation is characterised by Soviet cruelty and violence and 
the latter by German insidiousness and betrayal. 
The defenders; Norway and Finland, are seen as part of a Nordic community – and as such, 
are glorified as exemplar societies; progressive, successful, nationalist, anti-communist and 
social-democratic. Furthermore, the innocence of the Nordic Countries is drawn to the 
foreground by emphasising their strive for peace and neutrality. Finland is placed 
unconditionally into this equation during the Winter War. When it comes to defining the two 
actors in reference to the conflicts, their portrayals are contrasting. The Norwegians are 
victimised for the apparently tragic fate of ending up caught in the storm between the great 
powers or, in the anti-German press, they are victimised for being violated and betrayed by the 
Germans. The Finns, on the other hand, while surely being victimised in the first days of the 
campaign, overall became the subjects of heroisation and praise for their admirable fighting 
spirit. Sympathy with Finland is thus based on esteem and admiration, whereas sympathy with 
the Norwegians is built on grief and condolences.  
Comparison of the various party-press titles reveals a pattern where the right-wing 
Morgunblaðið and the left-wing Alþýðublaðið seem to form opposing poles and the other papers 
somewhat fluctuate in between. Apart from the different approaches towards Germany, the non-
communist papers largely agreed upon the major principles listed before but applied a varying 
focus and weight to them. Even though the neutral approach was a tactical move to hold on to 
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Icelandic neutrality, the right-wing press undoubtedly still harboured respect for the Germans; 
at least enough to let them enjoy the benefit of doubt throughout the first three periods of this 
study’s time frame. In relation to the Soviet Union, the right-wing press is particularly focused 
on the Civilization Frontier Metaphor and these papers usually associate with the non-
communist West rather than the Nordic Countries specifically. Tíminn, characterised by 
nationalist rhetoric, was less concerned about the foreign events than the other papers but 
focused on domestic issues. Tíminn shared the neutral approach towards Germany up until 
Operation Weserübung, but did, along with Alþýðublaðið, occasionally display pro-Allied 
remarks. Alþýðublaðið, on the other hand, is characterised by its unconcealed opposition to 
Nazi-Germany throughout all four research periods of this study, and its repeated tendency to 
associate Hitler with Stalin and communists with Nazis. Alþýðublaðið is also the paper which 
associates the most with the Nordic Countries. 
As for chronological evolution of the discourses, we have seen that the initial response to 
the Invasion of Finland was disappointment with the Soviet Union and domestic anti-
communism. As the Winter War dragged on, the Icelandic commentators directed the attention 
towards the Finnish defence, although anti-communism always remained on the agenda. More 
importantly, we can see a clear shift in the Battle of Norway discourse as it approached and 
entered the fourth research period; i.e. from May 10, 1940, on. Morgunblaðið gradually 
abandoned its neutral stance towards Germany and there is a marked increase in pro-Allied 
remarks in the press. We can also observe an increased return to anti-communism from early 
May onwards, when Alþýðublaðið launched a smear campaign against Þjóðviljinn with 
references to alleged communist collaboration in occupied Norway. 
We have seen how opinionated portrayals of foreign belligerents reveals three-layered us 
and them associations in the press. These are an association with the non-communist Europe 
against communist Asia; an association with the Nordic Countries against the great powers and 
the world war and an association with the democratic Western Allies against the autocratic 
signatories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Furthermore, we can see how, to a certain extent, 
elements of the government press, namely the centre-right papers, with their connections with 
the government was utilised to deliver the official policy of the Icelandic government and even 
act out rigged opinions and portrayals in order to keep face towards Nazi-Germany. 
Furthermore, there is an underlying nationalist rhetoric in the two discourses, particularly 
during the Winter War, which serves to legitimise the ruling ideology of the Icelandic political 
elite at the time; namely Icelandic nationalism. The rhetoric legitimises the idea of Icelandic 
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sovereignty and independence aspirations and de-legitimises treason and anti-national elements.  
The communists are seen as perpetrators in the discourse for their opinions which illustrates 
their breach of the discourse’s legitimising principles and its obvious power relations. Their 
opinion went against the mainstream opinion which demanded unconditional sympathy with 
Finland based on undeniable rights of the minor nations. Furthermore, communist opinions and 
discourse went against the established neutrality of Iceland. The anti-communist discourse 
constructed a solid internal division of us and them by repeatedly and constantly placing the 
Icelandic communists among the foreign others; not only Kuusinen and the Soviet invaders of 
Finland, but even Quisling and the German occupiers of Norway. To that end, the government 
press employed nationalist rhetoric and spoke on behalf of ‘the Icelandic nation’ when it 
stressed the communists’ allegedly self-initiated resignation from Icelandic society. The anti-
communist discourse in relation to the Winter War does not contain many new arguments in 
itself. My conclusion is thus that Finnagaldur in the press was an exploitation of the opposition 
met by the communists in society and was meant to demonstrate to the readers, i.e. the Icelandic 
people, that traditional anti-communist arguments had been right all along. 
*** 
The Icelandic newspapers in 1939-1940 reflect a small society whose leaders strive to steer 
away from the storms of war and keep united and sovereign at all costs. They construct an 
image of the world in which their nation is sovereign and equal to the big ‘sister nations’ in 
Scandinavia and Europe. They commiserate with their sufferings and wish for an end of 
hostilities in Europe. Furthermore, in their constructed world, their main adversaries; 
communists and other alleged anti-national elements, are not welcome. Morgunblaðið’s 
columnist summed the situation up quite nicely shortly after the Invasion of Denmark and 
Norway, and illustrated the hopes and fears of the Icelandic political elite during that 
troublesome winter: 
These are difficult days for the minor nations. Which of the three sister nations has the best prospects 
of surviving: The one without arms and did not defend herself; the one who is currently defending 
herself; or the one who is now armed, surrounded and waiting? The only hope for life for the minor 
nations during these times is that from the depths of the tragedies will rise a concentrated national 
mind, vigour and unity like what was apparent among the Finns. 
In these times, a divided minor nation will be wiped out.1 (a) 
                                                 
1 “Reykjavíkurbrjef”. Morgunblaðið. 14.04.1940, p. 5. For the purpose of convenient translation, this quote has 
been markedly rephrased. 
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This research has been a contribution to the history of Iceland during the Second World War 
and the political culture of the late interwar era, using solely the perspective of the press. The 
approach and method applied in this research is fresh and welcome in the field and I would 
suggest that further research of the mind-set of the Icelandic political elite based on press 
analysis and discourse analysis was interesting to see. Furthermore, there are aspects of the 
1939-1940 invasions in Scandinavia that this study has not covered in detail and might deserve 
further research, such as the press’ approach towards the dissolution of union with Denmark 
and the press portrayals of Great Britain and the Western Allies before the Occupation of Iceland. 
I would suggest that a closer look at the Icelandic press during the Phoney War from the 
perspective of Allied-German relations could contribute to paint up a more wholescale picture 
of the subject than has been done here.  
Additionally, I think it would be interesting to see the findings of this research in an 
international perspective. A press analysis of reactions in other neutral minor states of Europe 
would provide an interesting possibility for an international context, for example Sweden, 
which observed both the Winter War and the Battle of Norway from a close distance, or Ireland 
which might have enjoyed somewhat comparable issues vís-á-vís the great power belligerents 
to that which was concluded here.  
Finally, this study has given a detailed look into the Icelandic anti-communist political 
culture at the end of the interwar era. Further studies on communism and anti-communism could 
benefit from a thorough look at the non-communist press discourse and its maintenance of 
power relations. Even though Icelandic communists have been regarded a great threat to the 
establishment and a source of violence during the interwar era, we have seen here, through the 
perspective and method of this study, how this group was completely ostracised and 
excommunicated in the discourse during that particular period. The findings do not pose a 
convincing argument for the communists’ threat during that particular winter, even though the 
anti-communist contemporaries continuously claim so. However, for the ongoing debate on the 
Icelandic far-left, the question remains: Was rhetorical anti-communism a reaction to dangerous 
communist opinions or was it a pro-action designed to smear their image? 
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Appendix 1 
Tables 
 
Editorial Topics during the  
Winter War 
No.  
Articles 
 
Editorial Topics during the 
 Battle of Norway 
No.  
Articles 
The Labour Movement 36  The Battle of Norway 28 
The Winter War: Anti-communism 34  Iceland and the World War 20 
The Parliament and its Work 33  The World War 18 
The Winter War in General 28  The Labour Movement 14 
The State Budget 28  The Occupation of Iceland 13 
Inter-government Party Debates 25  Employment 10 
Prices and Inflation 18  Anti-Communism 9 
The Parties and their Work 17  The Parliament and its Work 9 
Wages 16  The Union with Denmark (occup.) 9 
The Government and its Work 15  Wages 9 
Class Conflict 13  Inter-government Party Debates 8 
Anti-communism (non-Winter War) 10  Taxation 8 
Criticism of the Government 8  Class Conflict 5 
The World War in General 7  Foreign Trade 5 
Employment 6  Reykjavík Town Budget 5 
Foreign Trade 6  The Government and its Work 5 
Currency 5  Journalism of the World War 4 
Iceland and the World War 5  About Eimskip 4 
Reykjavík Town Budget 4    
Energy 4    
Taxation 4    
Other/diverse 62  Other/diverse 49 
Total 384  Total 232 
Table 1: The most common subjects of the five main 
newspapers in Reykjavík during the Winter War 
period. The table has the Winter War topic split into 
general discussions about the war and articles 
expressing domestic anti-communism referring to the 
Invasion of Finland. 
 
Table 2: The most common subjects of the five main 
newspapers in Reykjavík during the Norwegian 
Campaign, April-June 1940. 
 
Source: Vísir, Morgunblaðið, Tíminn, Alþýðublaðið and Þjóðviljinn. December 1939-June 1940. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 X 
 
 THE SOVIET UNION AS A PARTICIPANT 
OF THE INVASION OF FINLAND 
NAZI-GERMANY AS A PARTICIPANT 
 OF THE INVASION OF NORWAY 
Common 
attributes 
The attacker is a dictatorship whose oppression of subjects is noted 
 Illegality of the invasion and a denounciation of the use of force against peaceful nations 
Critisism for breaking deals and promises 
The invasion is seen as a threat to the security of Iceland in one way or another 
The use of fifth column traitors is seen as unprecedented and is universially despised 
Differing 
attributes 
Focus on the cruelty of the Red Army during the 
campaign 
Focus on the insidiousness and cunningness of the 
attack 
Harshly worded one-sided presentation of the 
campaign 
Sober two-sided military reports during the 
campaign 
The attacker is said to be aiming for a complete 
conquest of Finland, followed by an advance into 
Scandinavia. 
The attacker is said to be occupying Norway and 
Denmark for military purposes for as long as the 
world war lasts. 
The attacker is seen as a backward 
nation who is alien and threatening. 
The attacker is seen as a cultured and civilized  
nation who is unfortunately at war. 
Table 4: Common and contrasting attributes of the aggressive actors of the invasions of Norway and Finland as 
presented by the Icelandic non-communist press. 
 
 FINLAND AS A PARTICIPANT 
OF THE INVASION OF FINLAND 
NORWAY/DENMARK AS A PARTICIPANT 
 OF THE INVASION OF NORWAY/DENMARK 
Common 
attributes 
Successful states through progress, nationalism and/or socialism 
 Neutral minor nations whose only wish is to live in peace 
Both receive sympathy for being the subject of aggression 
Differing 
attributes 
Heroisation: Sympathy based on admiration and 
esteem 
Victimisation: Sympathy based on condolences and 
sorrow 
Focus on Finnish military deeds during the 
campaign 
Absence of the Norwegian army during the 
campaign 
Table 5: Common and contrasting attributes of the defensive actors of the invasions of Norway and Finland as 
presented by the Icelandic non-communist press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
XI 
 
(Jónsson, 2015)  (Adamovsky, 2005) 
Finland The Soviet Union The West Russia or Eastern 
Europe 
The People and State (A1): Main Socio-historical Binary Oppositions 
Europe Asia civilization barbarity 
civilized/educated 
/cultured 
uncivilized/uneducated 
/uncultured 
modernity, development, 
progress 
tradition, 
underdevelopment, 
stagnation 
democracy dictatorship liberalism communism 
freedom oppression freedom 
despotism or 
totalitarianism 
national freedom ‘prison-house of nations’ pluralism or “diversity” homogeneity 
The Winter War individuals masses 
minor nation great power (A2): Main Cultural Binary Oppositions 
neutrality expansionism education (“civilization”) cultural handicaps 
patriotism treason (Kuusinen) normal deviant 
valour and 
heroism 
massacres and terror 
bombings 
rational irrational 
individualist commandos expendable ‘slaves’ capable incapable 
Table 6: To the left (Jónsson, 2015): Contrasting attributes found in the Icelandic non-communist press describing the 
two belligerents of the Winter War. To the right (Adamovsky, 2005): Excerpts from Adamovski’s tables of binary 
oppositions in Euro-Orientalist discourse. Note that some of Adamovsky’s concepts are left out in this table for the 
sake of convenience. Source: Ezequil Adamovsky. “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern 
Europe in France, 1810-1880“. The Journal of Modern History. 77:3 (2005), pp. 591-628, pp. 626-627. 
 
 Concepts and attributes 
positively attached to us 
Concepts and attributes 
negatively attached to them 
AT HOME 
the speaker 
Iceland 
the Icelandic nation 
the National Government 
the parliamentary opposition 
Icelandic communists 
Icelandic Nazis 
ABROAD 
the actors in the 
conflicts 
the ‘Nordic Countries’* 
Finland 
(the Western Allies) 
the Soviet Union 
Kuusinen and Quisling 
(Nazi-Germany) 
ATTRIBUTES 
attached to both 
the speaker at 
home and the 
actors abroad 
Europe 
civilization/education/culture 
democracy 
freedom 
national [-freedom] 
peace 
neutrality 
minor nations 
patriotism 
heroism 
individuality 
enterprise 
industriousness 
Asia (USSR only) 
uncivilized (USSR only) 
dictatorship 
oppression 
foreign [-occupation] 
world war 
expansionism 
great powers 
treason 
cowardice 
masses 
cruelty 
insidiousness 
Table 7: A complete list of speakers, actors and attributes distributed into us-and them-categories, as seen in 
Chapters III and IV. * Norway and Denmark. 
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Appendix 2 
Original Texts of Foreign Language Quotes 
 
Title Page 
a Original text: “Og upp af eldi og totrímingu sprengikúlnanna og kúgun yfirdrottnunarinnar eiga bræðraþjóðir 
okkar eftir að rísa, frjálsar og fullvalda. Og það verður þeirra eigin innri siðmenning, sem ber þær fram til 
þeirrar giftu. Og það er samúð og hjálp hins frjálsborna fólks hvarvetna í heiminum – bein og óbein – er gefur 
þeim þreklund og þol til að bíða þeirrar stundar óbrotnum, ósigruðum.” 
Chapter I - Introduction 
a Original text: “En diskurs representerer dermed et tankesett, et mønster eller en sammenheng å fortolke verden 
innenfor.” 
b Original text: “[...] málgagnið var flokkurinn pappír klæddur og litið á skrif þess öll [...] sem rödd flokksins”. 
c Original text: “Markmið Þórs er að skrifa aðgengilegan texta sem ber uppi skoðanir hans […] Þór lítur svo á að 
hann hafi rétt til að segja sína skoðun og fella dóma um menn og málefni”. 
d Original text: “Ég er ekki í hópi þeirra sagnfræðinga, sem trúa því, að þeir geti hafið sig ofar samtíð sinni og 
skoðunum og fjallað um málin af óskilgreindu „hlutleysi”. Ég hef ákveðin viðmið, sem ég tel óheiðarlegt að 
leyna. Takmark mitt er ekki að vera „hlutlaus”, heldur leita að sannleika og skýra hann”. 
Chapter II – Finland, Norway and Iceland 1939-1940 
a Original text: “Norsk historie er internasjonal historie, slik den kom til å arta seg her i landet, i møtet med dei 
særnorske føresetnader.” 
b  Original text: “Vegna þeirrar afstöðu, er kommúnistaflokkurinn, sem hjer starfar undir nafninu 
Sameiningarflokkur alþýðu – sósíalistaflokkurinn –, þingmenn þess flokks og málgögn hafa markað sér til frelsis, 
réttinda og lýðræðis smáþjóðanna síðustu vikurnar, og alveg sérstaklega viðvíkjandi málefnum Finnlands, lýsa 
undirritaðir alþingismenn yfir því, að þeir telja virðingu Alþingis misboðið með þingsetu fulltrúa slíks flokks.” 
c Original text: “[...] og geri þar með daginn að voldugri samúðaryfirlýsingu með frændþjóðum okkar og þeirra 
góða málstað gegn ofbeldinu.” 
d Original text: “Í augum ráðherra voru verndaryfirlýsingar Breta því tvíeggjaðar. Í þeim fólst hætta fyrir sjálfstæði 
og hlutleysi þjóðarinnar, en jafnframt trygging gegn þýsku hernámi, sem allir ráðherrarnir og þorri þingmanna 
taldi mestu bölvun sem yfir landið gæti gengið.” 
Chapter III – The Soviet Invasion of Finland in the Icelandic Press 
a Original text: ““Verndari smáþjóðanna” afhjúpar sig til fullnustu” 
b Original text: “Það sem menn áður trúðu á, hefir nú brugðist allra vonum, samningar eru rofnir, sett grið virt að 
vettugi [...]”. 
c Original text: “Þar fellur fyrir fullt og allt sú blekking, að Rússland sé ríki verkamanna og bænda.”. 
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d Original text: “Hver einasti sannur Íslendingur fyrirlítur starfsemi, hugarfar og andlegan vesaldóm þessara 
manna. Flestir hafa litið á þá sem föðurlandslausa en óskaðlega uppskafninga. En augu þjóðarinnar eru nú að 
opnast fyrir því að þeir geta verið stórskaðlegir á þeim viðsjártímum, sem nú standa yfir.“ 
e Original text: “[...] hver, sem ver morðingjanna málstað “hins myrta dreyra á sekum höndum ber.” 
f Original text: “Kommúnistarnir taka ekki undir þær kveðjur. Þeir lýsa fyrirlitningu sinni á þeim mönnum, sem 
láta í ljósi samúð með þeim, sem vilja sjálfir eiga ættjörð sína. Þeir senda öðrum mönnum kvðejur sínar, 
níðingunum, sem svikið hafa ættjörð sína og gengið óvinunum á hönd, finsku landráðamnönnunum, sem hrópa 
af brjáluðu ofstæki: Finnland fyrir Rússa!” 
g Original text: “Nafn hans þarf að lifa eins og nokkurskonar áminning til þjóðarinnar um það, hverra erinda 
flokksbrot kommúnista gengur hér á landi” 
h Original text: “Þessir menn eru kommúnistarnir, eða Kuusin-arnir, sem er þeirra rjettnefni nú, því að þeir bíða 
eftir tækifæri til að svíkja sitt land og sína þjóð, eins og Kuusinen, finski kommúnistinn […] Hvað á að þola 
starfsemi Kuusinanna í okkar þjóðfjelagi? Á að bíða eftir því, að þeir biðji einræðisherrann í Moskva um 
samskonar “vernd” og Kuusinen hinn finski gerði? Á að bíða eftir það rauði herinn komi hingað, til kvaddur af 
landráðamönnunum?” 
i Original text: “Þeir eru og farnir að hvísla því, að vísu lágt ennþá, íslensku kommúnistarnir, að nú sje sú 
langþráða stund að nálgast, að rauði herinn komi og “frelsi” íslensku þjóðina!”. 
j  Original text: “Nú loksins höfum við hrokkið við. Atburði hinna síðustu daga hafa sannfært okkur um að 
kommúnistar eru til alls vísir. […] Ef Stalin teldi sig þurfa á Íslandi að halda, og hefði tækifæri til að leggja það 
undir sig, myndu dýrkendur hans hiklaust ofurselja landið.” 
k Original text: “[…] Kommúnistaflokkurinn hér myndi fagna Rússum með blysför, ef þeir kæmu hingað sömu 
erinda og til Finnlands […]. 
l Original text: “Þeir verða að sætta sig við að vera útskúfaðir úr félagsskap þeirra, sem vita hvað þjóðrækni og 
ættjarðarást er. Þeir liggja fyrir fyrirlitningu allra ærlegra manna á Íslandi. Það er sú refsing, sem þeim er búin 
[…]“ 
m Original text: “Þjóðin mun veita þeim, er setja á svikráðum við frelsi hennar og ætla henni sama hlutskipti og 
Finnum, þau laun, er þeir verðskulda”. 
n Original text: “En nú er það almennings að framfylgja þessari stefnu í verki, og sýna kommúnistum í hvívetna þá 
andúð og fyrirlitningu, sem starfshættir þeirra verðskulda. […] Þeir eiga að finna til þess að með [stuðningi við 
Sovétríkin og samúðarleysi með smáþjóðunum] hafa þeir fyrirgert rétti sínum til áhrifa á íslenzk mál. Með slíkum 
samtökum almennings verður fullkomið áhrifaleysi þeirra bezt tryggt [...]” 
o Original text: “En þetta verður ekki þolað lengur. Ef ríkisvaldið tekur ekki í taumana, þá verður þjóðin sjálf að 
gera það. [...] Það er kominn tími til að þeim sé gert ljóst, að þjóðin mun ekki láta sér nægja að fyrirlíta þá. Hún 
mun nú sjá um að þeir verði ekki lengur hættulegir sjálfstæði hennar og menningu.”. 
p Original text: “Þessvegna er það skylda allra sannra Íslendinga að gera leiguþýin frá Mosvka útlæg frá öllum 
trúnaðarstöðum í þjóðfjelaginu. Fyrstu átökin í þessa átt eru nú háð hjer í Reykjavík […]” 
q Original text: “Í gærmorgun rjeðst 180 miljón manna þjóðin, Rússar, á 4 miljón manna þjóðina, Finna, undir því 
yfirskyni, að rússneska “öreigaríkinu” stafaði hætta af Finnum. Um nær allan hinn mentaða heim er litið svo á, 
að aldrei hafi verið hafin jafn gjörsamlega ástæðulaus árás, sem gert hefir verið eins lítið til að grímuklæða og 
þessa árás Rússa.” 
r Original text: “Einn svívirðilegasti verknaður veraldarsögunnar átti sér stað í gærmorgun.”. 
s Original text: “Rauði herinn dreifir eldi og dauða yfir landið. Borgir eru brenndar, varnarlaus þorp jöfnuð við 
jörðu [...].” 
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t  Original text: “Ófriðurinn, loftárásirnar, sprengjuárásirnar, íkveikjusprengjurnar, eltingaleikur rússneskra 
flugmanna með vjelbyssskothríð á konur og börn, allt er þetta að verða daglegt brauð hjá þessari hetjuþjóð [...]”. 
u Original text: “Og á móti mýgrút rauða hersins, sem harðstjórinn í Moskva getur alltaf endurnýjað með því að 
senda inn nýjar og nýjar þúsundir af þrælum sínum út í dauðann, eru Finnar of fáir.” 
v Original text: “Allur heimurinn horfir í dag með undrun og aðdáðun á hina frækilegu vörn Finna gegn ofureflinu”. 
w Original text: “Frjettaritari einn í Norður-Finnlandi segir m.a. frá því, að hann kom inn í hermannaskála, þar 
sem hermaður var að klippa einn fjelaga sinn. […] hárskurður var auðsjáanlega ekki hans daglega iðja. 
Blaðamaður spurði því, hver væri aðalatvinna hans. “Jeg skýt Rússa”, sagði Finninn.” 
x Original text: “Nú erum við í kepni, þar sem ekki er barist um mínútur og sekúndur, heldur um frelsi Finnlands 
[…] Því í þessari styrjöld er það afrek einstaklinganna sem mest veldur á, og sem stur kapp í menn”. 
y Original text: “[…] enginn veit hvar hersveitir Rússa nema staðar þegar þær hafa náð að komast að landamærum 
Svíþjóðar og Noregs.” 
z Original text: “Kemur ekki röðin næst að Svíþjóð og þar næst að Noregi? [...] Og yrði þá ekki skamt yfir til okkar 
Íslendinga?” 
aa Original text: “Það sem óttast er, er að fyr eða síðar hljóti svo að fara, að hin málmauðugu hjeruð í Norður-
Svíþjóð og íslausu hafnirnar í Norður-Noregi freisti Rússa til þess að halda áfram vestur á bóginn.” 
bb Original text: “Þeir hafa alltaf um aldaraðir, leitazt við að færa út yfirráð sín vestur á bóginn, helzt alla leið 
vestur að Atlantshafi. Og þeir hugsðu nú sérstaklega gott tækifæri gefast, er vesturþjóðirnar, England og 
Þýzkaland, voru komnar í ófrið saman og gátu eigi við snúizt að veita mótstöðu gegn fyrirætlunum þeirra.” 
cc Original text: “Það er hörmulegt til þess að vita, að mestu menningarþjóðir heims, sem nú berast á banaspjót, 
skuli verða þess valdandi, að villimenska kommúnismans brjótist til valda á hinum friðsömu Norðurlöndum.”. 
dd Original text: “Einir allra valdhafa í þeim löndum, sem hvítir menn byggja, hafa þeir á vorum dögum stjórnað 
landi sínu svo illa, að þar hefir geysað hver hungursneyðin eftir aðra, sem hefir orðið miljón ofan á miljón 
manna að fjörtjóni. Og eigi fór betur fyrir þeim, þegar þeir hófu árásina gegn hinni frjálsu, dugmiklu finsku þjóð, 
sem nú heldur uppi baráttu menningarinnar gegn hinni mongólsku pest.” 
ee  Original text: “[...] enda yrði það ævarandi smánarblettur á öllum menningarþjóðum heims“ ef aðstoð 
Vesturveldanna kæmi of seint og Finnland tapaði Vetrarstríðinu. 
ff Original text: “Þegar við lesum upp aftur hinar dásamleg lýsingar Herodotos [...] á mismuninum á Hellenum og 
barbörum, mismuninn á hinni grísku menningarþjóð og Asíu mönnunum og baráttunni milli þeirra, sem lauk 
með sigri Hellena á hinni asiatisku harðstjórn, þá er það eins og hinn ömurlegi harmleikur, sem leikinn var fyrir 
meir en 2000 árum, sé enn þá á leiksviðinu fyrir augum okkar. […] Barátta mannkynsins […] er hin sama nú 
sem þá, og þeir, sem í dag falla í baráttunni fyrir því að hindra það, að hið villimannlega blóðveldi 
Asíumannanna nái að breiðast út yfir hinn menntaða heim, vinna sams konar sögulega hetjudáð eins og þá, sem 
einu sinni var unnin í Þermopyle-skarðinu.” 
Chapter IV – The German Invasion of Norway in the Icelandic Press 
a Original text: “Menn bíða enn milli vonar og ótta [...]”. 
b Original text: “Það ótrulegasta hefir skeð […] Rjettur smáþjóðanna er ekki til, þegar stórveldin eiga í stríði [...]”. 
c Original text: “Allir þessir atburðir hafa haft djúptæk áhrif á hugi manna hér á landi. Við Íslendingar höfum [...] 
ekki viljað trúa því, að hlutleysi smáþjóðanna yrði skert og griðasáttmálar á þeim rofnir. En nú verðum við að 
trúa því, atburðirnir, sem gerzt hafa, verða ekki véfengdir.”. 
d Original text: “Nú sjáum við, að veggur náungans brennur. Við vitum, að þegar svo er, er okkar eigin húsi hætt. 
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[...] Þótt við Íslendingar séum afskektir og fjarri alfaraleiðum, þá skulum við ekki gleyma því, að skógarbrunar 
eða sinueldar fylgja engum vörðum. […] Þess vegna er okkur það um fram alt nauðsynlegt að vera við öllu búnir.” 
e Original text: “Við skulum búast við því versta, vona hið góða, [...] Þótt að syrti í bili, skulum við aldrei glata 
voninni um bjarta, friðsamlega framtíð [...]”. 
f Original text: “[...] einu stórkostlegasta vélabragði og landráðastarfsemi, sem veraldarsagan greinir frá.” 
g Original text: “nokkrir sjúkir öfgamenn” 
h Original text: “En eins og allir geta orðið sammála um, að Hitler hafi enn ekki komið með neitt nýtt vopn, er 
sérstaklega skiftir máli í hernaðinum, eins víst er það, að hann hefir í þeim ófriði, sem nú stendur yfir, notað með 
betri árangri en allir fyrirrennarar hans í veraldarsögunni, vopn, sem er hernaðinum jafngamalt [...] - Það vopn 
er skipulögð landráðastarfsemi á meðan andstæðinganna.” 
i Original text: “[Eru hér menn] sem myndu reiðubúnir að feta í fótspor Kuusinen eða Quislings [...]?” 
j Original text: “[...] að vera á verði í framtíðinni. Við skulum ekki vera svo blindir að halda, að hjer finnist engir 
Kuusinar eða Quislingar [...]. 
k Original text: “Er enginn hjer meðal okkar, sem er reiðubúinn að vinna sama níðingsverkið á ættlandinu og 
föðurlandssvikararnir gerðu í Finnlandi, Danmörku og Noregi? Spurningunni er varpað hjer fram, til þess að 
hver einstaklingur athugi sitt eigið hugarfar. Ef til vill gætu atburðirnir á Norðurlöndum orðið til þess, að minna 
menn á skylduna við fósturjörðina […]. 
l Original text: “[...] vaxandi andúð á ofbeldisflokkum [...] Þess vegna þarf að gefa þeim fyllstu gætur og fylgjast 
vel með baktjaldastarfi þeirra.” 
m Original text: “[…] ýmsir áhrifamenn hafa litið með velþóknun til svipaðrar flokksstarfsemi hér og þeirrar, sem 
Quisling veitti forystu í Noregi.” 
n Original text: “Alþingi hefir markað glögga línu í þessum efnum. […] Þjóðhollir menn í landinu geta nú fylgt 
forustu Alþingis í þessu máli, með því að einangra í verki frá opinberum og almennan trúnaði þjóðfelagins þá 
Íslendinga, sem starfa í sömu átt og þeir ógæfumenn, sem opnuðu Noreg fyrir framandi þjóð.” 
o Original text: “Þeir hafa beygt kné sín fyrir Hitler og gerzt Quislingar hans […].” 
p Original text: “Hér úti á Íslandi starfa þessir umboðsmenn einræðisins frjálst og óhindrað [gegn Þjóðstjórninni]. 
Hverjir væru líklegri til þess að takast á hendur hlutverk svikarans en þeir, ef slíkt tækifæri byðist? [...] Þessir 
menn eru því allra bezt til þess fallnir að fara með hin einu “nýju vopn”, sem Hitler hefir enn teflt fram í 
yfirstandandi styrjöld – skipulagða landráðastarfsemi. [...] Ef einhver skyldi halda, að í kommúnistunum og 
nazistunum hér sé einhver annar efniviður en í kommúnistum og nazistum annarra þjóða, þá hefir hann ranga 
hugmynd um hlutina. Það, sem þessir flokkar hafa gert annars staðar, munu þeir einnig gera hér [...]. 
q Original text: “Sá flokkur, sem nú er í opinberu bandalagi við Quislign í Noregi […].” 
r Original text: “[Íslenskir nasistar og kommúnistar] gerðu sér vonir um það, að geta eins og í Noregi svalað skapi 
sínu á pólítískum andstæðingum sínum hér í skjóli þýzkra yfirráða [...]. 
s Original text: “Að sjálfsögðu verður hjer enginn dómur lagður á aðgerðir ófriðaraðila […] Sagan dæmir um 
innrás Þjóðverja í Noreg og hertöku Danmerkur […]. 
t Original text: “Eftir 6 mánaða “leit að vígvöllum” […] hafa stórveldin sem eigast við, fundið sjer Noreg.” 
u Original text: “[...] Danmörk og Noregur, eru orðin vettvangur hinnar blóðugu stórvelda-styrjaldar. [Danmörk] 
hefir neyðst til að lúta valdboði annars styrjaldaraðilans, sem hefir sett her [í landið] og verður danskt land hjer 
eftir notað til ófriðaraðgerða, meðan styrjöldin stendur. 
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v Original text: “[Hver verða örlög Norðurlandanna] sem eru nú nauðug orðin vettvangur styrjaldarinnar.” 
w Original text: “Viðskipti þjóðanna taka á sig einkennilegar myndir á þessum dögum.” 
x Original text: “Hjer deila stórveldin ekki um það, hvað er rjett eða rangt gagnvart alþjóðarjetti. Því á hinum 
síðustu og verstu tímum telja ófriðarþjóðir það rjett, sem samræmist best þeirra eigin hagsmunum. Þetta er 
siðalærdómurinn, sem ræður í heiminum í dag, og sem máttlausar og vanmegnugar smáþjóðir verða að sætta 
sig við.” 
y Original text: “Vafamálið, sem menn hugleiða á næstunni […] verður þetta. Er árásin á Noreg, hver sem hin 
raunverulegu upptök hennar eru, og hvaðan sem þau eru sprottin, hinn endanlegi ávöxtur af menningarlífi 
Evrópuþjóða? 
z Original text: “Í algerðu hlutleysi okkar horfum við á hinar grimmu aðfarir ófriðaraðila, og getum með sjálfum 
okkur verið sannfærðir um, að hver sem sigra kan, getur aldrei bygt upp nýrri og betri heim fyrir mannkynið […] 
fyrri en vopnin verða lögð niður, og ljósin kveikt […].” 
aa Original text: “Hlutleysið leggur ekki nein bönd á skoðanir manna. […] Þess vegna var okkur […] fullkomlega 
leyfilegt að fordæma árás Rússa á Finna […]. Alveg á sama hátt er okkur leyfilegt að gagnrýna Þjóðverja fyrir 
atferli þeirra í Danmörku […]. Hitt er náttúrulega sjálfsagt, að gæta hóflegs orðbragðs um erlenda atburði.” 
bb Original text: “Á sama hátt og Rússland rauf gerðan griðasamning á Finnlandi, rauf Þýzkaland griðasamning 
sinn við hina litlu og gersamlega varnarlausu Danmörku. Og til þess að ekkert vantaði á samlíkinguna hefir 
Þýzkaland nú einnig tekið sér leppstjórn Rússlands í Terijoki […] [með því að] stofna þýzka lepstjórn í Oslo. 
Verkfærin eru hvert sem annað, þótt annað kalli sig kommúnista og hitt nazista, enda málstaðurinn sá sami […].” 
cc Original text: “[Landið er] beygt undir ok nazistiskrar harðstjórnar um ófyrirsjáanlegan tíma. Norðmenn verða 
nú daglega að leggja líf sitt í sölurnar til þess að verja land sitt og frelsi fyrir sams konar kúgunartilraun.” 
dd Original text: “Hinar grimmdarfullu og tilefnislausu árásir, sem þrjár Norðurlandaþjóðir hafa orðið fyrir af 
hálfu Rússlands og Þýzkalands, hafa vakið samúð langflestra manna hér á landi. Íslenszka þjóðin óskar þess 
yfirleitt, að frændþjóðirnar, sem sætt hafa hinu skefjalausa ofbeldi, fái sem fyrst slitið sig úr kúgunarfjötrunum 
[...].” 
ee Original text: “[Innrásin] var svo lævíslega undirbúin og framkvæmd af svo takmarkalausri fyrirlitning fyrir rétti, 
fyrir gefnum loforðum […].” 
ff Original text: “[Á]rás Þjóðverja á Noreg og Danmörku var fyrir löngu undirbúin og það á einn hinn lævíslegasta 
og ódrengilegasta hátt, sem um getur.” 
gg  Original text: “Það er þýðingarlaust fyrir Þýzkaland að ætla sér að afsaka þessa svívirðilegu árás með 
tundurduflalagningum Bretlands úti fyrir vesturströnd Noregs, þó að þar hafi tvímælalaust verið um 
hlutleysisbrot að ræða. […] Og er það ekki öllum ljóst, að árás Þýzkalands hefir líka verið undirbúin löngu áður 
en Bretland lét leggja tundurduflunum við vesturströnd Noregs, og meira að segja hafin fyrir þann tíma, […]?” 
hh Original text: “[...] hver smáþjóðin eftir aðra er svift sjálfstæði sínu, mannréttindum og frelsi af hans [Stalíns] 
nýja vini Hitler.” 
ii Original text: “En þó verður að viðurkenna það, að hernám af hendi vinveittrar drengskaparþjóðar, […], getur 
ekki verið mikið áhyggjuefni samanborið við hlutskifti margra annarra smáþjóða og eru síðustu nærtæku dæmin 
Holland, Belgía og Luxemburg, að ógleymdum okkar mestu vina- og frændþjóðum.” 
jj Original text: “En hve ógeðfellt sem hernám landsins er þjóðinni, mætti hún muna það, að stórum þyngri örlogum 
hafa frænþjóðir okkar sætt [...].” 
kk Original text: “Við getum hver og einn haft okkar skoðanir á aðferðum hernaðarþjóða. Við getum eða öllu heldur 
við hljótum að bera sárán harm í brjósti útaf hlutskifti frændþjóða okkar.” 
 XVIII 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ll Original text: “[...] þrátt fyrir einlægan friðarvilja sinn [og] þær fórnir, sem þau hafa fært, bæði efnalegar og 
andlegar, til þess að fá að halda friði og hlutleysi, hafa ekkert stoðað.” 
mm Original test: “Við hvert fótmál okkar Íslendingar og hverja athöfn líður okkur ekki úr minni hið yfirlýsta 
ævarandi hlutleysi okkar. En alt fyrir það getur ekki hjá því farið, að samúð okkar mðe fændþjóðunum á 
Norðurlöndum er innileg og ævarandi.” 
nn Original text: “Hafi einvherjar leifar gamallar andúðar leynst í fylgsnum íslenskrar þjóðarsálar, hafa þær horfið 
um leið og ofbeldisverkið var framið.” 
oo Original test: “Þessar getsakir eru hvorttveggja í senn fávíslegar og ódrengilegar. […] Hér er um að ræða þær 
þjóðir, sem við höfum þolað súrt og sætt með gegnum aldirnar. Vináttu- og menningarböndin við þær munu aldrei 
verða rofin af okkar hálfu.” 
pp Original text: “Árásin á finnland var sú fyrsta á Norðurlönd. Nú hafa hinir hættulegu atburðir færst nær okkur, 
hættan meira yfirvofandi okkur sjálfum og allt gerist svo óvænt […] Við hinar hörmulegustu fréttir setur menn 
oft hljóða,, þá brestur orð til þess að lýsa sársaukanum.” 
qq Original text: “Og allstaðar þar sem Norðmenn koma stendur af þeim hressandi gustur atorku og manndóms.” 
rr Original text: “Hér átti í hlut smáþjóð, friðsöm og óhlutskiftin, sem með iðjusemi, atorku og natni hafði reist 
eitthvert mesta menningarþjóðfélag sem sögur fara af. Í einni svipan verður hún að varpa ávöxtunum af striti 
sínu fyrir fætur árásarþjóðar og eiga það undir geðþótta hennar, hvaða bætur hún hlýtur fyrir.” 
ss Original text: “Og við sívaxandi lýðræði hafa Norðmenn síðan notið friðar við allar þjóðir og frelsis inn á við í 
meira en 125 ár, þangað til nú, og orðið það, sem þeir eur í dag: ein frjálsasta, atorkusamasta og siðmenntaðasta 
þjóð heimsins.” 
Chapter V – Comparison and Discussion 
a Original text: “Í dag sýnum við samúð okkar hinni finsku frændþjóð vorri, samúð, sem fær litlu umþokað, en 
sannar þó að við Íslendingar teljumst til menningarþjóða [...]”. 
b Original text: “[Íslendingar eru] ysti útvörður norrænnar menningar í vestri, eins og Finnar eru það í austri”. 
c Original text: “[...] tortríming norrænna þjóða, norrænnar menningar.” 
d Original text: “Og þetta er eðlilegt. Finnar máttu heita jafnaldrar okkar í fullveldinu. Þeir höfðu eins og við 
notað fengið frelsi kappsamlega. Menningarlegar og verklegar framfarir voru mjög örar. Alþýðumenntun þeirra 
hafði komist á hátt stig. [...] Þeir kunnu að meta frelsið og þau verðmæti, sem það hafði fært þeim. Þess vegna 
fórnuðu þeir blóði sínu til verndar því.” 
a Original text: “Hlutur smáþjóða er erfiður á þessum dögum. Fyrir hverja frændþjóðina eru horfurnar skárstar 
af þessum þrem, þeirri vopnlausu, sem varðist ekkert, þeirri sem verst, og þeirri sem bíður vopnuð innikróuð, 
átekta? Það getur orðið vafamál. En eigi smáþjóðum að vera lífsvon á þessum tímum, þá byggist hún á því, að 
úr djúpi hörmunganna stigi einbeittur þjóðhugur þrek og eining eins og sýndi sig meðal Finna. Sundruð smáþjóð 
nú á tímum þurkast út.” 
